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To Estonia – the world’s most advanced digital society
ABSTRACT
For more than 18 years, the Estonian electronic identity card (ID card) has
provided a secure electronic identity for Estonian residents. The public-key
cryptography and private keys stored on the card enable Estonian ID card holders
to access e-services, give legally binding digital signatures and even cast an
i-vote in national elections.
This work provides a comprehensive study on the Estonian ID card and its
security challenges. We introduce the Estonian ID card and its ecosystem by
describing the involved parties and processes, the core electronic functionality
of the ID card, related technical and legal concepts, and the related issues. We
describe the ID card smart card chip platforms used over the years and the identity
document types that have been issued using these platforms. We present a detailed
analysis of the asymmetric cryptography functionality provided by each ID card
platform and present a description and security analysis of the ID card remote
update solutions that have been provided for each ID card platform. As yet another
contribution of this work, we present a systematic study of security incidents and
similar issues the Estonian ID card has experienced over the years. We describe
the technical nature of the issue, mitigation measures applied and the reflections
on the media. In the course of this research, several previously unknown security
issues were discovered and reported to the involved parties.
The research has been based on publicly available documentation, collection
of ID card certificates in circulation, information reflected in media, information
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1. INTRODUCTION
For more than 18 years, the Estonian electronic identity card (ID card) has
provided a secure electronic identity for Estonian residents. It has been the
technological cornerstone for secure electronic authentication and legally
binding digital signatures. The ID card has enabled secure identification in
various e-services, the most ambitious of them being internet voting in national
elections. The Estonian ID card roll-out started in 2002 and is considered to be
one of the most successful deployments of smart card-based national ID card
systems in the world with respect to dissemination and active use. From the 1.3
million Estonian residents, 67% have used the ID card electronically at least once
in the second half of 2018 [1].
The purpose of this work is to provide a comprehensive study on the Estonian
ID card1 and its security challenges. The topic is very broad as the security of the
ID card depends not only on the cryptographic functionality embedded in the
chip, but also on the way it is used and the security of the whole ecosystem built
around it. Nevertheless, we believe that this work has achieved its aim as it
covers the main aspects of the ID card and its security in a historical and
multidisciplinary perspective. The central thesis of this work is: Despite its
success, the Estonian ID card and its ecosystem has experienced and still
experiences technical, organizational and managerial deficiencies that affect its
security.
This work is based on publicly available documentation, information reflected
in media, information from the involved parties, and our own analysis and
experiments performed in the field. An important dataset that was used for our
own validation and analysis was the collection of ID card public-key certificates
that have been accumulated over the years from the public ID card certificate
repository.
The thesis follows the monograph style, referring to and briefly summarizing
our original publications listed at the end of the thesis. Due to the historical
nature of the research, the thesis is rich with the precise dates of when events
took place. The short ISO 8601 (“YYYY-MM-DD”) date notation is used
throughout the document when referring to dates.
1.1. Research questions and tasks
The main research question that this work aims to answer is: What are the security
issues that the Estonian ID card and its ecosystem has experienced over the years?
To answer this question, we first define the field (the ID card ecosystem) and
then study it in a systematic manner. During this process, we enumerate
1This work does not cover aspects related to the mobile phone-based electronic identity solutions
used in Estonia, such as Mobile-ID and the recently introduced Smart-ID.
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previously known and unknown security issues and the corresponding technical
and procedural measures that were put in place to address them. To achieve this
goal, we define and solve five research tasks:
1. Provide a comprehensive study of the Estonian ID card ecosystem. A wide
variety of information about the Estonian ID card and its ecosystem is
available. However, it has been rather dispersed, not being able to provide
a holistic overview of the ecosystem. This task aims to map the main
components of the ID card ecosystem, describe their role and purpose, use
cases and interrelations and the historical and legal context, with a
particular focus on the related security aspects.
2. Study the ID card chip platforms that have been in use. Over the years, the
ID card’s electronic functionality has been implemented using five smart
card chip versions that rely on different software and hardware
implementations. However, comprehensive research on these platforms
and their differences is nonexistent. This task seeks to identify these
different platforms and study their functionality, mainly focusing on
cryptographic functionality, performance characteristics, and compliance
to standards.
3. Study and analyze ID card remote update solutions. At times the Estonian
ID card has employed unique technical solutions that have enabled ID card
cardholders to update data and software on their cards remotely over the
internet. However, the description of the protocols used to implement this
functionality and their security analysis has been missing. The goal of this
task is to document the protocols used and analyze their security.
4. Investigate previously known security issues. Over the years, information
about several ID card related security incidents has become publicly
known. However, the information that has reached the public space has
been rather limited and fragmented, unable to provide the full picture of
the known security issues the Estonian ID card has experienced. This task
aims to put these publicly available bits and pieces together, placing them
into chronological context, validating them and extending on the findings
when possible.
5. Uncover previously unknown security issues. Since this field has not been
heavily researched before, we can assume that only some of the security
issues have emerged to the public. Systematic work on the research tasks
listed above should lead to a discovery of security issues and other findings
that were not previously known.
After the main research question of this work is sufficiently answered, we
extend this work by proposing the answer to an additional research question:
How sufficient are the technical, organizational and managerial mechanisms at
addressing the ID card related security challenges? The answer to this question
is provided in the last two chapters of this work.
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1.2. Methods and data sources
This work falls under the field of observational research [2]. First, we use the
descriptive study to gather in-depth qualitative data about the Estonian ID card,
its ecosystem and the security issues it has experienced, and then we conduct an
exploratory study to establish reasons behind these issues and to infer common
traits in their handling.
This work is mostly based on publicly available information. We have
analyzed the smart card interface specifications for the Estonian ID card [3–13],
information available in the Certificate Authority’s (CA) documentation
repository [14], security certification documentation of the ID card components,
and hundreds of news articles and other online resources referenced in this work.
We have gathered additional information from the involved parties and by
performing our experiments with actual ID cards.
An enormously useful data source for this research was the ID card certificate
dataset described in detail in Section 2.17.1. We used it in conjunction with other
data, such as certificate revocation data, to validate the scale of the publicly known
ID card incidents and performed data analysis to discover previously unknown
artefacts and anomalies.
1.3. Contributions
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
1. We provide a comprehensive overview of the Estonian ID card and its
ecosystem. This is the first work to provide a broad overview of the
Estonian ID card and related aspects. This work discusses practical
aspects, insights and nuances not covered elsewhere. An important
contribution of this work is the provided legal and historical context
around the topic. Throughout this work we have discovered several legal
non-compliances and have highlighted shortcomings of the Common
Criteria security certification scheme. This work can serve as a starting
point for the scholars interested in the Estonian ID card and its ecosystem.
2. We provide several in-depth studies on the ID card related aspects. In
separate academic publications, we have published our research on the
practical security aspects of using the ID card for authentication to
e-services [15] and the use of the ID card for authenticaton to
machines [16]. In separate publications we have also published our
interdisciplinary research on the compliance of the Estonian digital
signature scheme to the legal requirements in the context of the time of
signing [17] and the legal challenges involved in solving the ID card
security incident in 2017 [18].
3. We provide a comprehensive study of the ID card technological platforms
and identity document types used throughout the years. This is the first
14
study to provide a detailed overview of the Estonian ID card technological
platforms and the corresponding identity document types. For each
platform, the description of the technological solution used to implement
the electronic functionality of the ID card is provided together with the
photos of the smart card microcontroller and images of the corresponding
identity document specimens. We have analyzed the cryptographic
functionality provided by each platform, its performance characteristics
and compliance to standards. By applying various black box analysis
methods we have partially recovered the RSA key generation algorithms
implemented by the platforms. We have found that for several ID card
platforms the chips supplied by the ID card manufacturers do not
correspond to the certified version as defined in the official specification.
4. We document and analyze the ID card remote update solutions used in
Estonia. In this work we have documented and analyzed the protocols
used to implement the ID card remote update functionality. As a result, we
have found that the ITSEC-certified secure messaging protocol had a
cryptographic flaw that allowed card impersonation attacks to be
performed and the implementation of the GlobalPlatform secure
messaging protocol had a padding oracle vulnerability, allowing the
decryption of communication. These findings have helped to improve the
security of the remote update solution and we hope that this work serves as
a useful reference for the development of future remote smart card update
solutions.
5. We present a comprehensive study of publicly known security incidents and
other issues the Estonian ID card has experienced. This is the first study
providing a detailed overview of incidents the Estonian ID card has
experienced. The events that took place have been reconstructed based on
bits and pieces covered in public resources. When it was possible, we have
gathered additional information by contacting the parties involved,
analyzing our certificate dataset and conducting our own analysis and
experiments. We have put forth the effort to determine the cause and
impact of the incident, the incident response taken by the involved parties
and the public communication. The study provides several previously
unknown insights and can serve as a basis to draw further lessons from the
incidents. The experience from the Estonian ID card provides other
countries implementing nation-wide PKI a comprehensive overview of the
issues that they may encounter.
6. We discover previously unknown ID card security flaws and related issues.
In the course of this work we have discovered various security issues of
different severity. The most significant findings related to the security
flaws in key management have been published as a separate academic
publication [19]. These findings have resulted in real-world implications –
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the recall of the affected ID cards and a litigation process against the
ID card manufacturer Gemalto.
7. We derive broader findings for improving the security of the Estonian
ID card and its ecosystem. We have drawn broader findings and have
proposed recommendations that can be used as an input by the state when
making policy changes related to the organization of ID card security.
1.4. Structure of the thesis
The subsequent chapters of this work have been divided as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces the Estonian ID card ecosystem, among other things,
providing an overview of: the parties that are involved in the ID card
manufacturing process, issuance and supervision; the core electronic
functionality of the ID card and the related legal concepts; the use of
authentication, decryption and digital signing, and the related issues; the
related support components such as smart card readers and the ID card
software; the certificates, the public certificate repository and the
@eesti.ee email address; and the lifecycle of the ID card and its
certificates.
• Chapter 3 proceeds by chronologically introducing the ID card platforms
(smart card chip versions) used over the years and the identity document
types that have been issued using these platforms.
• Chapter 4 describes in detail the asymmetric cryptography functionality
provided by each ID card platform. By analyzing the properties of the keys
and the timing information of the cryptographic operations, we attempted
to recover the implementation details of the asymmetric cryptography
algorithms used on each platform. We found that on each platform the
cryptographic algorithms were implemented with slight differences.
• Chapter 5 provides a description and security analysis of the ID card remote
update solutions. We outline the secure messaging protocols that are used
to implement card management operations and describe the remote update
solutions that have been used for each ID card platform.
• Chapter 6 presents a list of security incidents and similar issues that the
Estonian ID card has experienced over the years. Some of the issues listed
in this chapter were found by us and reported in the course of this research.
• Chapter 7 discusses the broader findings of this work, providing a list of
recommendations that, in our opinion, could strengthen the security of the
Estonian ID card and its ecosystem.
• Chapter 8 provides the concluding statements for this work.
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2. ESTONIAN ID CARD ECOSYSTEM
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the Estonian ID card and its
ecosystem. We start by providing the historical background of how the ID card
was introduced and continue by describing the involved parties and processes, the
core electronic functionality of the ID card, related technical and legal concepts,
and the related issues.
2.1. Historical background
In 1992, after Estonia obtained full independence from the Soviet Union, the
Citizenship and Migration Board (CMB) started to issue passports. The first
generation of passports were valid for 10 years and hence had to be renewed in
2002. The Estonian government decided to use this as a chance to introduce a
new type of identity document in the form of a national identification card
(ID card). The main purpose for introducing the ID card was to provide Estonian
residents with the means for digital signing under the Digital Signatures Act
whose drafting process started in 1997 and completed in March 2000. [20, 21]
In 1997, CMB published their internal plans on the development of the
ID card and soon after several public and private entities became interested and
involved [21]. In May 1998, the Ministry of the Interior formed a committee for
the development and preparation of the issue of the identification card and its
technical specifications. In June of the same year, the committee issued a call for
tenders for the initial research on the ID card. In July, the committee selected AS
Aprote to perform the preliminary survey of the ID card and Küberneetika AS to
perform the preliminary research on the ID card technologies. By the end of
1998 both reports were completed and the committee set out the starting points
for future activities. [22]
The preliminary ID card survey [23] envisioned the ID card as a
multi-functional card in which private and public entities would include data
about the cardholder. This, however, did not materialize as the ID card is merely
an authentication tool, with the information about the cardholders stored in the
respective databases of these entities.
The preliminary study on ID card technologies [24] provided an overview of
smart card technologies, standards and ongoing pilot projects worldwide. This
study and further reports [25–27] recommended the Estonian ID card profile to
be based on the Swedish SEIS standards that were significantly further developed
by the Finnish FINEID national ID card standardization activities. As a result,
it was decided to base the electronic functionality of the Estonian ID card on the
Finnish FINEID specifications, using two public-key certificates for the purpose
of authentication and digital signature, and adding improvements mainly in the
form of additional card management functionality.
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While the idea of a digital signature was new, the problem of online
authentication already had a solution. In 1996, Estonian banks started to
introduce online banking using password cards and PIN calculators to
authenticate their clients [20]. As the banks already had an authentication
infrastructure in place that could be used to authenticate a large part of the
Estonian population, in the late 1990s, banks started to provide a federated
authentication service (the so-called bank link) to third parties [28]. The
provision of such service was not legally regulated, but as banks were considered
trustworthy, several governmental e-services, such as e-Taxation and Citizen
Portal, relied on bank authentication to provide e-services to citizens [20]. Today,
this authentication option is still used in Estonia but is being slowly deprecated
for governmental e-services [29].
The final decision to issue ID cards was made in March 2000 and the first
cards were issued in 2002 [21]. However, the final decision to make the ID card
a mandatory identity document for all Estonian residents aged 15 and above was
only made at the end of 2001 [20, 30]. As we know it now, this decision was the
key factor in the success story of the Estonian ID card [21].
2.2. Main parties
In the manufacturing and issuance of the Estonian ID card, several private and
public parties are involved. There is a smart card manufacturer that produces the
smart card chip microcontroller and, usually, also the core software (operating
system) for it. Then there is an ID card manufacturer that incorporates the chip
into a plastic card, prints cardholder information on the card and personalizes the
chip by loading the electronic information on the card. During the process of
personalization, cryptographic keys are generated and public-key certificates are
loaded into the card. The public-key certificates are issued by a trusted party
called Certificate Authority (CA). The purpose of a certificate is to establish a
trusted binding between the generated public key and the cardholder’s identity,
allowing relying parties to later link the actions performed with the cryptographic
key to the corresponding cardholder. The system governing certificate issuance
and management is called a public key infrastructure (PKI). The reliance on
certificates means that the security of the ID card depends on the PKI and the
related cryptography as much as it depends on the security of the smart card chip.
The process described above produces an identity document that can be issued
to the cardholder. The document issuer is a government entity that ensures that
the ID card is distributed to the rightful person. In addition, there are government
entities that are responsible for the development and oversight of the electronic
identity (eID) field in Estonia.
Figure 1 shows the interaction between the main parties involved in the
ID card manufacturing and issuance process. In the sections below we describe
























Figure 1: ID card manufacturing and issuance process
2.3. Document issuance
The ID card is an identity document issued by the Estonian state as a public
service. The issuance of identity documents is regulated by the Identity
Documents Act [31] (IDA) and related government regulations [32–35]. There
are several types of identity documents that we refer to in this work as the
ID card. These document types will be introduced and described in detail in
Chapter 3.
Initially the authority issuing the ID cards was the Citizenship and Migration
Board (CMB). In 2010, CMB became a part of the Police and Border Guard Board
(Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet – PPA) and currently all types of ID cards are issued by
PPA, except the diplomatic identity card which from the legal viewpoint is issued
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). PPA is the authority responsible for the
procurement of ID card manufacturing services on behalf of the Estonian state.
The customer service points of PPA provide several ID card-related services:
applying for, receiving and revoking an ID card; suspending, terminating
suspension of, revoking and updating ID card certificates; and receiving a new
PIN envelope. Some of these services were also previously provided in the
branch offices of Swedbank and SEB banks. IT support for managing ID card
issuance and the related activities is provided to PPA by the IT and Development
Centre at the Estonian Ministry of the Interior (Siseministeeriumi
infotehnoloogia- ja arenduskeskus – SMIT).
PPA is also the national authority responsible for operating the Country
Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). CSCA’s purpose is to ensure the
cryptographic authenticity of ICAO-compliant electronic machine-readable
travel documents (eMRTDs) issued by Estonia [36], i.e., ePassports and
residence permit cards (see Section 3.3.4).
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2.4. ID card manufacturing
In 2000, after the concept of ID cards began to materialize, the Ministry of the
Interior issued a public bid where six companies submitted an offer to
manufacture the ID cards: Bundesdruckerei GmbH, TRÜB AG, Setec OY,
Maurer Electronics GmbH, Gemplus and the Estonian company ID Süsteemide
AS [37]. At the end of 2000, a five-year ID card service purchase agreement was
signed with the Swiss company Trüb AG [21]. A separate contract to provide
qualified certificates for the ID cards was concluded with Sertifitseerimiskeskus
AS (SK). In addition, the Estonian company ID Süsteemide AS was contracted
to develop the EstEID smart card interface specification [3] to run on top of the
MICARDO smart card operating system (OS) platform.
Due to the contractual requirement that ID cards must be personalized inside
the country [38], in 2001 Trüb AG established subsidiary company Trüb Baltic
AS with a card personalization center in Tallinn. The personalization center was
located in the high-security cellar of Hansapank (now Swedbank) head office and
the ID card production line was able to produce 350 ID cards per hour [39] with
the full capacity of 5 000 cards per day [40].
In January 2002, the first cards were issued [40]. The standard state fee for the
card was 150 kroons (10 EUR), while the actual cost of production was 350 kroons
(24 EUR) [30, 41]. The initial ID card agreement faced sharp criticism as being
unfavorable for the state. It was claimed that the state overpaid by several millions
of euros for the manufacturing equipment [38, 42] and that the same production
line was actually also used to produce payment cards for banks [43, 44].
In 2007, a new contract with Trüb came into force. The contract was concluded
in 2006 without a public procurement process. According to CMB, this was done
to avoid a possible security risk and to maintain the same infrastructure for ID card
issuance. Starting with this contract the provision of certification services was not
a separate contract but rather a part of the ID card manufacturing contract with
Trüb purchasing certification services from its subcontractor SK. [45]
In 2010, a new contract was signed with Trüb. In this procurement only Trüb
submitted an offer [46]. In 2011, new ID cards with an updated design were
introduced. The state fee was increased from 150 kroons (10 EUR) to 24
EUR [47]. In February 2015, Trüb AG was acquired by Gemalto (formerly
Gemplus), with Gemalto taking over the contractual liabilities of Trüb.
Over the years, Trüb has outsourced tasks that are related to the development
of chip functionality and personalization to several local contractors, such as
RAULWALTER OÜ, Proekspert AS and Ideelabor OÜ.
At the beginning of 2015, PPA proclaimed a classified procurement for
ID card manufacturing for the period 2018–2023, sending invitations to four
selected companies: Giesecke & Devrient, Morpho, Gemalto and Oberthur [46].
From the four companies Morpho, Gemalto and Oberthur made an offer [46]. In
spring of 2016, the procurement committe announced Morpho as the winner, but
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due to the complaints of Gemalto and Oberthur the decision was annulled [48],
the technical specification was updated and a new procurement process was
initiated [49]. In spring 2017, PPA signed a contract with Oberthur for ID card
manufacturing beginning from 2019 [50]. The decision of this procurement was
appealed again – this time by Gemalto and Morpho. At the end of 2017, the first
instance court dismissed Gemalto’s complaint, ruling Oberthur the winner [51].
Oberthur’s victory was overshadowed by the news that the World Bank imposed
a two year ban on Oberthur for corruption charges in Bangladesh [52]. Gemalto
later appealed the decision in the court of second instance [53] and later to the
Supreme Court [54]. PPA and Gemalto had additional litigations that are
discussed later in Section 6.7.4.
The current agreement with Gemalto was valid until the end of 2018 [49], with
an additional 5-year after-contract warranty period. At the beginning of 2019,
Gemalto ceased their operations in Estonia [55], providing PPA with a money-
back guarantee for the warranty period.
As a result of the merger of Oberthur Technologies and Safran Identity &
Security (Morpho), PPA’s contractual partner Oberthur is now known as
IDEMIA. IDEMIA chose SK as its subcontractor for provision of certification
services, and the Estonian company Hansab AS for performing card
personalization in Estonia. The first ID cards manufactured by IDEMIA were
issued at the end of 2018.
It is important to note that currently there are only 5 major companies in the
world that manufacture smart card security microcontrollers. These are Infineon,
NXP, Samsung, STMicroelectronics and EM Microelectronic [56]. The other
companies in the smart card business write software for these chips and build
products to run on top of these chips. The ID cards manufactured by Gemalto
were built on the chips produced by Infineon, while the ID cards manufactured
by IDEMIA uses the chip manufactured by NXP.
The manufacturing of ID cards has always been a closed, non-transparent
activity, not open to scrutiny even to the manufacturer’s contracting partner – the
Estonian state. The personalization protocols and procedures have never been
publicly documented, leaving the security aspects of this process to be
determined by the competency of the ID card manufacturer. As described in
Section 6.8 of this work, this lack of supervision oversight allowed the ID card
manufacturer to engage in activities that compromised the ID card security
without it being detected for years.
2.5. Certificate Authority
From the introduction of the ID card in 2002 until today, the ID card certificates
are issued by the privately-owned Estonian company SK ID Solutions AS
(formerly AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus – SK).
SK was established in 2000 to create eID solutions to enable authentication
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and digital signatures [57]. SK is owned with equal shares by two of the biggest
banks in Estonia – Hansapank (now Swedbank) and Eesti Ühispank (now SEB),
and two Estonian telecom operators – AS Eesti Telefon (later Elion) and AS Eesti
Mobiiltelefon (later EMT). In 2016, Elion and EMT were merged under the Telia
name, which gave Telia 50% of the SK shares [58].
Estonian banks have played an important role in promoting the use of the
ID card. For example, the Estonian Banking Association from 2007 to 2009
gradually decreased the password card daily transaction limit to 3 000 kroons
(191 EUR), requiring the use of an ID card or PIN calculator for transactions
above that limit [59]. In the years 2013–2015, online banking has been
responsible for around 65-75% of all the ID card transactions [60].
Historically, SK has been an eID competence center in the private sector.
Before the state actively engaged in eID development, SK privately financed the
development of ID card software, designed digital signature file formats and
promoted development of e-services [20].
Legally, SK is a qualified trust service provider (QTSP) that provides
qualified certificates for electronic signatures and seals, qualified electronic time
stamps and other trust services. This means that digital signatures created using
SK certificates can provide equivalent legal effect as a handwritten signature.
2.5.1. Legal framework
On the European Union level, requirements for qualified trust service providers
are regulated by Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 [61] (eIDAS). The aspects not
regulated by eIDAS are regulated by the Estonian national law – Electronic
Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [62]
(EITSETA). In the context of trust services, PPA acts as a registration authority
(RA) of SK, performing identity verification for certificate applicants. Before
eIDAS, the requirements for certification service providers (pre-eIDAS
terminology) were prescribed in the national Digital Signatures Act [63] (DSA),
which implements EU eSignature Directive 1999/93/EC [64] (Directive).
The compliance to DSA requirements had to be confirmed in annual
information systems audits. Under eIDAS, the QTSP has to be audited every two
years by an accredited conformity assessment body. SK has been audited from
2002 – 2014 by KPMG Baltics AS, and later, to be in compliance to eIDAS
requirements, by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH and TÜV AUSTRIA CERT
GMBH. As we will see later in this work, the assurance level provided by these
audits is rather limited in practice.
The contractual relationships between the cardholder and SK are regulated in
the document “Terms and Conditions for Use of Certificates of Personal
Identification Documents of the Republic of Estonia” [65] (Terms and
Conditions) and other documents referenced therein, such as the Certification
Practice Statement (CPS) and certificate policies (CPs). The Terms and
Conditions is also considered to be legally binding towards any relying party that
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relies on the trust services provided by SK. Without accepting the Terms and
Conditions, the ID card is not issued [66]. As the ID card is a mandatory identity
document in Estonia, the contractual relationships with SK are forced upon every
Estonian resident age 15 and above.
Starting from 2017-07-01, the lawmaker has declared SK a provider of vital
services [67] as the continuity for services provided by SK are of crucial
importance to the Estonian state. In 2019, the government issued a regulation
specifying the requirements for ensuring the continuity of digital identification
and digital signing [68].
The perception of SK’s sovereignty in the ID card context has varied between
SK being an independent CA providing certification services for the security
token (ID card) issued by the Estonian state, versus SK being the government’s
CA that is only technically run by SK as a legal entity. With the introduction of
IDEMIA-issued ID cards this has visibly shifted to the latter: (1) the certificates
for IDEMIA-issued ID cards are issued under a separate SK root CA named
EE-GovCA2018; (2) the activation of a private key requires the presence of a
PPA representative (Section 6.2.2 in [69]); and (3) the authorship of the
certificate policy [70] now belongs to PPA. The state’s wish to infringe upon the
decisions of SK was strongly visible in 2017 when the ID card crisis had to be
solved (Section 6.7.3).
2.5.2. Business model
SK is paid by the ID card manufacturer for every certificate issued for the Estonian
ID card. The conditions of the ID card manufacturing contract are confidential,
therefore it is not publicly known how much revenue SK receives from ID card
certificate issuance. However, we know that CMB paid SK 60 kroons (4 EUR)
for each ID card (which contained two certificates) in the years preceeding 2007
when the state had a separate contract with SK [41].
Additionally, e-service providers who wanted to enable ID card authentication
in their web services had to pay SK for each query made to the OCSP (Online
Certificate Status Protocol) service that establishes whether a certificate has been
suspended or revoked. The revocation information was freely available in CRLs
(Certificate Revocation List), but the information there is not up-to-date. Some e-
service providers also opted to use the public LDAP service to establish certificate
validity free of charge (see Section 2.17). After eIDAS came into force, SK was
required to provide free access to the OCSP service. However, SK continues to
also offer a commercial OCSP package with improved support [71].
As every digital signature is expected to be accompanied with validation data
consisting of OCSP confirmation and a cryptographic timestamp, SK was paid for
every digital signature created with the ID card. In practice, the cost for digital
signing is covered by the e-service providers who offer digital signing in their
web environments, as every ID card user is only allowed to create up to 10 digital
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signatures in a month free of charge on their computers for personal purposes1.
For digital signature formats DDOC and BDOC (timemark profile), the OCSP
response also served as a timestamp (see Section 2.10.2). The ASiC-E format
(BDOC timestamp profile) prescribed by eIDAS requires the use of a separate
timestamp, which alternatively could be purchased from another QTSP, thereby
bypassing the need to use SK commercial services for digital signature creation.
Currently, SK’s dependency on revenue from the ID card and related services
has decreased. For several years SK has been providing Mobile-ID service in
Estonia and Lithuania [58], as well as the recently launched Smart-ID service,
which has experienced huge growth in the Baltics [73].
Additional SK revenue comes from operating the Estonian Country Signing
Certificate Authority (CSCA) that PPA had outsourced to SK since the
introduction of ePassports in 2007. This service is provided for PPA under a
separate contract and the operation of the Estonian CSCA is not audited in the
context of trust services.
2.5.3. Customer service points
Because of the owners, SK has had a special relationship with Swedbank and
SEB, which allowed the bank branch offices to be used as SK customer service
points. The customer service points of SK provided services to: receive a new
PIN envelope; suspend, terminate suspension of, revoke and (in some cases)
update ID card certificates. From 2002 to 2007-01-15, the state had a cooperation
agreement with SK which allowed the ID card applicants to collect their ID cards
in branch offices of Swedbank and SEB [74]. From 2019-03-01 ID card-related
services are provided only in PPA customer serivice points [75]. SK, however,
still provides 24/7 phone service for certificate validity suspension requests.
2.6. Oversight and development of eID field
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (Majandus- ja
Kommunikatsiooniministeerium – MKM) creates national development plans
and policies and performs general coordination in the field of ICT. Under eIDAS
(and previously under the Directive) MKM has been a supervisory body but has
delegated some of the duties to subordinate government organizations. Under the
Directive, MKM also acted as the conformity assessment body that evaluated the
compliance of signature creation devices to the security requirements (see
Section 2.10.1).
The Estonian Information System Authority (Riigi Infosüsteemi Amet – RIA)
is the state agency under MKM that is responsible for the coordination and
development of electronic identity (eID) and cyber security. Estonian national
CERT (CERT-EE) runs under RIA’s cyber security branch. RIA is considered the
1This has been a soft limit which has been enforced based only on an IP address [72].
24
eID competence center in the public sector. RIA organizes the development of
ID card software (see Section 2.13) and as of 2016 is responsible for the digital
elements on the ID card [76].
Starting in 2019, RIA was given the role for supervision of trust service
providers, to ensure that their services comply to the requirements set forth in
eIDAS. Before 2019, this function was performed by the Technical Regulatory
Authority (previously known as Technical Surveillance Authority) (Tehnilise
Järelevalve Amet – TJA). TJA did not have the technical competence in this field
and it performed its supervisory function rather formally – just receiving the
compulsory conformance audit reports from the trust service providers and
updating the registry [20].
While RIA has the competence, its involvement in the development of the eID
field conflicts with its supervisory function. Unfortunately, considering the state’s
direct involvement in the development of the eID field, the question is whether the
state can at all objectively supervise the trust service providers that provide trust
services for the state-backed eID solutions.
2.7. Electronic functionality of the ID card
From its introduction in 2002 until now, the core electronic functionality
provided by the Estonian ID card has stayed the same. The ID card contains two
asymmetric (RSA or ECC) keys with the corresponding X.509 public-key
certificates, and symmetric keys to perform card management operations.
Authentication key. The authentication key is used to log into e-services by
providing a signature in the TLS client certificate authentication process (see
Section 2.8). This key can also be used to decrypt documents encrypted for the
cardholder (see Section 2.9). Cryptographic signature and decryption operations
with this key have to be authorized using the 4-digit PIN1 code. The PIN
verification mechanism is described in detail in Section 2.11.
Digital signature key. The digital signature key is used to give legally
binding digital signatures that under eIDAS are recognized as qualified electronic
signatures. Each signature operation with the key has to be authorized using the
5-digit PIN2 code. The digital signature function and the related concepts are
further discussed in Section 2.10.
Key usage counters. The publicly readable key usage counters show how
many private key operations have been performed with a particular private key
(Section 12.4 in [9]). The counters can be used to determine how active the
cardholder is in regards to using the ID card for authentication and digital
signatures. This feature is not present on the IDEMIA-powered ID cards
introduced in December 2018.
Personal data file. The ID card chip contains a publicly readable personal data
file, which consists of 16 records containing the same information as is printed on
the card. The use of this functionality is discussed in Section 2.12.
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Card management operations. The cards are preloaded with symmetric
keys that can be used by the manufacturer to perform various card management
operations in the post-issuance phase. This provides a method to reset PIN codes
in the event the cardholder forgets them, generate new keys, write new
certificates, and even reinstall the whole smart card applet if needed. The card
management keys and secure messaging are discussed in Section 5.1.
2.8. Authentication function
The most popular use case of the authentication key is to authenticate to web
services over the internet using the TLS client certificate authentication protocol.
Less common use cases for the authentication certificate include signing email
with S/MIME, authenticating over SSH and VPN, and logging on to a
workstation [77].
The legal status of the authentication certificate is regulated by the Identity
Documents Act (IDA). IDA refers to the authentication certificate using the term
“the certificate enabling digital identification”. According to IDA clause 181 (2),
“the digital verification of the identity of the holder of a document is carried out
through the certificate enabling digital identification”. IDA clause 181 (3) gives
the right for the service providers in the public sector to require the use of
authentication and digital signature certificates in the process of providing
e-services. The providers of public services, however, are not restricted and may
also decide to provide e-services using less secure options, such as bank link
authentication [28] or passwords. The exception here is i-voting, where the
electronic voting procedure described in Riigikogu Election Act [78] up to 2017
required the use of the authentication certificate for voter identification.
eIDAS and EITSETA do not specify requirements for the authentication
certificate, therefore it does not have to be issued by a QTSP. However, since the
authentication certificate is issued under the same CA and the same Terms and
Conditions, the certificate policy documents and other CA statements are
applicable to both certificates.
Starting from 2018-11-07, the authentication functionality of the ID card
became part of the notified eIDAS electronic identification scheme with
assurance level “high” [79], requiring it to be recognized by other EU member
states.
In practice, all noteworthy public and private service providers in Estonia
support the ID card authentication mechanism for accessing their systems. At the
end of 2020, we compiled a list of more than 200 Estonian e-services [80] that
support the ID card authentication. These systems usually allow people to see the
data collected about them. The abuse potential for unauthorized use of ID card
authentication has been nicely demonstrated by the artistic installation
“Memopol” [81], which gathered and displayed various details about the user
once the cardholder inserted their ID card and PIN1 in the machine.
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2.8.1. TLS client certificate authentication
The TLS protocol provides a client certificate authentication (CCA) feature that
is supported by all major browsers and TLS server implementations, and is used
by e-service providers in Estonia to implement ID card authentication in their
services. In the TLS CCA process the client sends their authentication certificate
to the server and proves access to the corresponding private key by signing the
TLS protocol handshake. In our paper “Practical Issues with TLS Client
Certificate Authentication” [15] we studied this use case and the related practical
issues in detail by analyzing the TLS CCA implementations of 87 Estonian
e-service providers.
TLS CCA provides very strong protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks, as the attacker who is impersonating the server cannot reuse the client’s
signature on the handshake to authenticate to the legitimate server (Section III-K
in [15]). However, we found that in practice only 7% of Estonian service providers
(mostly banks) also require the presence of a TLS CCA connection after the login
phase. Other providers rely on an HTTP session cookie that can be stolen in a
successful server impersonation attack (Section IV-B-4 in [15]).
At the time of the study, most of the service providers were using the Apache
HTTP server with the module mod_ssl to implement TLS CCA. Most of the
service providers (87%) were checking the revocation status of the client’s
certificate. A large part of service providers (47%) had superfluous CAs in their
trust store and 45% of service providers had a longer chain verification depth
than needed. While these misconfigurations are not directly exploitable, we
found that the two biggest Estonian banks were using F5 BIG-IP SSL load
balancer with a misconfiguration that allowed the TLS CCA to be bypassed
using a fake authentication certificate whose CA signature was not valid [82, 83].
At the end of 2020, Semjon Kravtšenko (supervised by the author of this work)
repeated the experiment and found 4 other e-services (cooppank.ee, elisa.ee,
printincity.ee and arved.ee [84, 85]), whose ID card authentication
implementation had a similar flaw.
The use of TLS CCA introduces a privacy issue, as the client certificate is
sent over the network in plaintext unless TLS CCA is requested in the TLS
renegotiation process. We observed that 33% of the e-service providers request
TLS CCA in the initial handshake, resulting in the client’s certificate being sent
unencrypted. TLS v1.3 has introduced mandatory encryption of the TLS
Certificate message. However, support for TLS v1.3 is not yet widespread.
There are plans currently in development to introduce an alternative ID card
authentication method by performing authentication on the application level using
a browser extension that signs a challenge with the authentication key [86].
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2.9. Decryption function
The authentication key2 of the Estonian ID card can also be used to decrypt data
encrypted for the corresponding cardholder. The public keys of the cardholders’
can be found in the public LDAP certificate repository (see Section 2.17) and the
authentication certificate contains an @eesti.ee email address assigned to the
cardholder (see Section 2.18). In theory, this allows a person to initiate encrypted
communication with an ID card holder without having prior contact. The
requirement, however, is that the personal identification code of the recipient is
known and the recipient has enabled email forwarding for their @eesti.ee email
address.
The encryption and decryption functionality is implemented in the ID card
software [87] (see Section 2.13). By specifying the recipient’s personal ID code,
the encryption utility retrieves the authentication certificate from LDAP and
encrypts data using the corresponding public key. The encrypted data is stored
using the XML-based Estonian-specific CDOC encryption file format. The
utilization of CDOC is the most popular ID card encryption use case, although
the encryption function can also be used to encrypt emails with S/MIME3 [77].
CDOC encryption is widely used in the private and public sector for sending
sensitive email attachments. The government’s regulation for document
transmission in offense proceedings [88] requires delicate personal data to be
sent using ID card encryption. A popular use case is sending CDOC encrypted
fines for traffic violations to natural persons [89]. Since the encryption
requirements for transmission of state secrets are classified, it is not publicly
known for which levels of classification the ID card encryption functionality can
be used (see page 50 in [90]).
ID card encryption can only be used for short-term transmissions, as the
renewal or replacement of the ID card would render the CDOC unopenable.
Since the CDOC encryption scheme does not provide forward secrecy, the
compromise of the private key would put the confidentiality of all CDOCs
encrypted for that key at risk, as it was in the case of the ID card crisis in 2017
(see Section 6.7). There is, however, an ongoing effort to address these
concerns [91].
We note that the current ID card encryption scheme is not secure if the
adversary is the Estonian state, as the state can decrypt the files by confiscating
the recipients ID card (which is the property of the state) and resetting the PIN
codes using the PIN replacement procedure (see Section 2.11.4). The encryption
scheme, however, is secure against covert attacks by the state, assuming that the
ID card certificates are not mis-issued and the state does not store the private
keys of the cardholders.
2Technically, the ID card platforms issued up to fall 2014 (MICARDO, MULTOS and jTOP
SLE66) also provided decryption functionality for the digital signature key. This, however, was not
compliant with the certificate’s key usage extension and was not used in practice.
3In practice, we have not seen anyone using the ID card for the S/MIME encryption or signing.
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2.9.1. CDOC format
The CDOC [92] file format (.cdoc file extension) was established in 2005 and
consists of a single XML file based on the XML Encryption specification [93].
The data is encrypted with a random symmetric 128-bit AES transport key
and stored as a base64-encoded value in the XML. The symmetric transport key
is encrypted with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption scheme4 using the public key
from the recipients authentication certificate. A single CDOC file can contain
encrypted data for several recipients (it is a common practice for the sender to
also add themselves as a recipient). In this case, the symmetric transport key is
encrypted using the public keys of several recipients. The encrypted transport
key is placed in a recipient-specific EncryptedKey element along with the
authentication certificate of the recipient.
To encrypt more than one file, the contents of the files are embedded in an
XML structure as base64-encoded values and then the XML structure is encrypted
as if it was a single plaintext file. The base64 encoding of the plaintext introduces
some noticeable overhead.
The document-wide EncryptionProperties element contains plaintext
metadata about the encrypted files: the filename, size (in bytes) and the MIME
type of the plaintext file.
The AES block cipher is used in CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode. The IV
(Initialization Vector) is randomly generated and prepended to the ciphertext. The
CBC mode does not provide integrity for the ciphertext, therefore an attacker can
modify some parts of the ciphertext in a possibly meaningful manner. To protect
against such ciphertext malleability attacks and to provide authenticity of the data
and metadata, the sender can manually sign the CDOC file.
AES 128-bit cipher provides a 128-bit security level5. However, since the
symmetric transport key is encrypted using a 2048-bit RSA key which provides a
112-bit security level, the overall security level of the encryption scheme is limited
to 112 bits (or 80 bits for the ID cards using 1024-bit RSA keys).
2.9.1.1. Elliptic Curve (EC) support
Due to the flaw in the Infineon’s RSA key generation algorithm (see Section 6.7),
starting from November 2017, the public key algorithm used in the Estonian
ID card was switched from 2048-bit RSA to 384-bit Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) using NIST P-384 curve. The CDOC format specification was updated to
enable ECC support [95].
The ECC-enabled ID cards provide ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) key
agreement operations with the authentication key. Thus, for ECC recipients the
transport key is encrypted using a 256-bit AES key which is derived from a 48-
byte ECDH shared secret. The use of ECDH key agreement requires the sender
4RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption is vulnerable to padding oracle attacks (see Section 6.3).
5If considering multi-target attacks, AES-128 may not provide 128-bit security, e.g., a 280 attack
will break an AES-128 key out of a batch of 248 keys [94].
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to generate an ephemeral EC key pair using the same P-384 curve and embed
the public key in the CDOC. Hence, in case of ECC, the sender has to not only
generate a random transport key, but also a random ECC key for each recipient.
In addition, the updated specification improves the security level of the
transport encryption, replacing 128-bit AES that operates in CBC mode with
256-bit AES that operates in GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) mode. The
authenticated GCM encryption mode prevents ciphertext malleability attacks,
although the authenticity for the complete ciphertext and metadata has to be
provided by other means.
While 256-bit AES provides a 256-bit security level, the overall security level
for a CDOC that contains only ECC recipients is limited to 192-bits of security,
since the 384-bit ECC provides a 192-bit security level. If the CDOC contains
any 2048-bit RSA recipients, the security level of the scheme is further limited to
112 bits. It is important to note that this is not so in the case of quantum computer
attacks as data encrypted using 384-bit ECC would be broken earlier than data
encrypted using 2048-bit RSA (see Section 2.1 in [96] for estimates). Hence, if
we consider quantum computer attacks, the switch to ECC actually makes the
current ID card encryption scheme less secure against future adversaries.
2.10. Digital signature function
The digital signature key of the ID card can be used to give legally binding
digital signatures. Under eIDAS this type of electronic signature is called a
qualified electronic signature (QES) and under the Directive it was called an
advanced electronic signature based on a qualified certificate and which is
created by a secure-signature-creation device. The Estonian law uses the term
“digital signature” to denote this type of legally binding electronic signature. EU
regulation gives this type of signature the same legal effect as handwritten
signatures, meaning that this signature should satisfy requirements for data in
electronic form in the same way as a handwritten signature satisfies signature
requirements for paper form documents. This, however, does not force the EU
member states to accept digital signatures in every field as the member states are
free to apply specific form requirements.
The public sector is required to accept digitally signed documents. Document
exchange between government institutions is mainly performed electronically
using digitally signed documents [97]. Court decisions and legal acts are signed
digitally and the state provides various e-services that rely on the digital
signature – from changing vehicle ownership online [98] to casting a vote over
the internet in national elections [99]. The digital signature is also widely used in
the private sector, with the most popular use cases being the signing of contracts
and online banking transactions. According to id.ee statistics, more than one
billion digital signatures have been created as of October 2020.
Technically, a signature given using the digital signature key is no different
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from a signature given using the authentication key and they both can be used as
evidence in legal proceedings. However, signatures given using the digital
signature key have the presumption of authenticity established in subsection
277(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure [100]. This means that when a document
signed using the digital signature key is presented as evidence, burden of proof is
on the signatory to prove that it was not the signatory who signed the document.
Furthermore, there are a few types of legal transactions that are required to be in
written form. These transactions will be valid in electronic form only if given
using the digital signature key (see page 44 in [17]).
The digital signature certificate contains certificate policy references and the
nonRepudiation6 flag in the key usage extension denoting that the key can be
used to give legally binding signatures. While this key should not be used for other
purposes, for several years the Firefox browser had a bug which allowed the user
to select a digital signature certificate for authentication [101]. It turned out that
some TLS server implementations such as Microsoft IIS for client authentication
would also accept the digital signature certificate (see Section IV-B7 in [15]).
Today there are mainly two ways by which digital signatures are given. One is
using the ID card software and signing the document on a user’s device, and the
other is signing in a web environment using the ID card browser extension [102].
When signing in the web environment, e-service providers use JavaScript function
calls to obtain a signatory’s signature on a hash value prepared by the service
provider. This type of digital signing in a web environment provides a very poor
evidentiary value in practice as the signatory is not able to see what is being signed
and thus has to blindly trust that the service provider is not asking them to sign
something that they did not intend to sign.
2.10.1. Signature creation devices
For an electronic signature to have equivalent legal effect as handwritten
signatures, the eSignature Directive 1999/93/EC [64] required the signature to be
created by a secure-signature-creation device (SSCD). The technological
solution of the SSCD had to satisfy security requirements set out in Annex III of
the Directive. The Directive required the conformity of SSCDs to be determined
by a public or private body designated by member states, and Decision
2000/709/EC [103] specified the minimum criteria to be taken into account when
designating such conformity assessment bodies. The conformity assessment
bodies were not required to assess the conformance based on certifications such
as ITSEC or Common Criteria, but Decision 2003/511/EC [104] stated that
products compliant to technical standard CWA 14169 shall be presumed to be
compliant with the SSCD requirements of the Directive.
Historically, the assessment of the Estonian ID card platforms’ conformance
to the security requirements has been done rather poorly. In Estonia the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Communications (MKM) acted as an SSCD conformity
6In the recent editions of X.509 standard the flag has been renamed to contentCommitment.
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assessment body under the Directive. While SSCD conformance assessments
had to be performed before introducing each ID card platform and after making
any changes to the platform, only on 2016-03-04, after the eIDAS regulation
appeared on the horizon, did MKM confirm SSCD compliance of the ID card
platforms used in Estonia. The assessment [105] was based on the conclusions of
the compliance assessment committee formed by four RIA employees. The
assessment relied on security certificates of ID card components, available
technical information and expert opinions (Section 6 in [106]).
The above-mentioned conformance assessment had purely formal qualities as
the authorities have not been able to even determine the actual components that
are used in some of the ID card platforms. While for some smart card
components the committee could rely on security certifications, the EstEID
applet has never been formally certified7. As we found from the 2011 ID card
incident (Section 6.4), the applet did not even receive sufficient security testing
before being put in production8, and as we found from the incident of key
generation outside the ID card (Section 6.8), the ID card manufacturer made
unauthorized modifications to the applet without informing the authorities.
On 2016-07-01, eIDAS [61] regulation came into force, which requires a
qualified electronic signature to be created by a qualified electronic signature
creation device (QSCD). The security requirements for QSCDs largely stayed
the same as for SSCDs, however, article 30 of eIDAS introduced a requirement
for security certification of QSCDs. The Commission Implementing Decision
(EU) 2016/650 [107] specifies Common Criteria evaluation standards and
Protection Profiles according to which the QSCDs must be certified.
The ID card platforms used in Estonia before eIDAS came into force, are
recognized under eIDAS as QSCDs not through the certification, but through the
transitional measures (page 10 in [108]) laid down in article 51 of eIDAS, which
states that signature creation devices, which under the Directive were recognized
as SSCDs, are deemed to be QSCDs under eIDAS.
The discovery of the security flaw in 2017 (Section 6.7) showed that the
affected ID card platform in practice does not satisfy the security requirements of
SSCDs. While the affected platform was updated to work around the flaw, the
reassessment of SSCD conformity was not done [18].
The IDEMIA-powered ID card platform introduced at the end of 2018 is the
first ID card platform that has received a decent SSCD conformity assessment
both in form and substance – unfortunately, not without compliance issues (see
Section 3.5.5.1). In theory, the legal noncompliances of the platforms could be
used to challenge the SSCD/QSCD status of the platforms and hence the validity
of the digital signatures created with them.
7We note that the EstEID applet implements logical protection of private keys and hence is
subject to conformity assessment (see Decision 2003/511/EC [104] and recital 56 of eIDAS).
8The compliance assessment committee, in its 2016-03-04 decision, also confirmed SSCD status
for the vulnerable ID card platform issued in 2011 (the vulnerable and the fixed platform in the
conformity assessment is recognized as one platform).
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2.10.2. Signature file formats
In 2002, SK developed the digital signature file format DDOC [109] (DigiDoc)
which served as the de facto Estonian digital signature file standard for more than
a decade. The DDOC format is based on the XML Signature specification and
the XAdES (XML Advanced Electronic Signatures) extension. It consists of a
single XML file with the .ddoc file extension, where the signed files are
base64-encoded and stored inside the XML structure. In addition to the
signatory’s signature and certificate, DDOC stores additional validation data to
enable signature validation after the signatory’s certificate has expired or has
been revoked. According to standards, the validation data consists of a
cryptographic timestamp over the signatory’s signature proving the time of the
signature’s existence, and an OCSP response proving that at the time the
signature existed, the signatory’s certificate was still valid.
DDOC format relies on a clever non-standard solution that removes the need
to have a separate timestamp: having the OCSP response also serve as a
timestamp. The OCSP response’s nonce extension is used to carry the hash of the
timestamped data (signatory’s signature). The SK OCSP responder that produces
such OCSP timestamps is also audited as a timestamping service. The added
functional requirement is that OCSP responses issued by the service have to be
logged for evidentiary purposes. To improve the integrity of the logs, SK
implemented the SeqLog hash chain system and they periodically publish hash
values in the newspaper [110].
Today the DDOC file format is deprecated as it is not internationally
recognized and is limited to the RSA cryptosystem and SHA-1 hash algorithm.
The development of the BDOC signature file format (successor of DDOC)
started in 2008 and finished with the completion of BDOC version 2.1.2 [111]
in 2013. The main difference compared to DDOC is that the signed files are
now detached and stored together with signature XML files (separate file for each
signature) in a single ZIP container following the ASiC (Associated Signature
Containers) standard. In addition to the non-standard OCSP timestamps (so-called
timemarks), the BDOC specification also supports a timestamp profile, enabling
the use of a separate RFC 3161 standards-compliant timestamp. The signatures
created using the BDOC timestamp profile are fully compliant with the XAdES
file format specification stipulated by eIDAS [112]. eIDAS also stipulates two
additional signature file formats – CAdES (CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures)
and PAdES (PDF Advanced Electronic Signatures). However, these formats are
not supported by the Estonian ID card software.
Signatures created using the BDOC timemark profile are usually stored using
the .bdoc file extension, while the preferred file extension for signatures using
the internationally recognized BDOC timestamp profile is .asice (ASiC
Extended – ASiC-E). We note that the timestamps issued by the SK OCSP
timestamp responder are not recognized under eIDAS as qualified electronic time
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stamps, therefore the timestamp of the BDOC timemark profile does not have the
presumption of authenticity provided in article 41(2) of eIDAS.
The support for creating BDOC files was already introduced in the ID card
software v3.5 released on 2011-11-10. However, only in v3.10, released on 2015-
03-05, was the BDOC using timemark profile set as the default format and the
option for creating signatures using the timestamp profile was introduced. The
support for creating DDOC signatures was dropped in v3.12 released on 2016-
02-01. ID card software v18.12 released on 2018-12-03 removed the option to
choose between BDOC profiles, making the internationally recognized BDOC
timestamp profile the only format supported for signature creation9. [113]
Versions 1.0 and 2.1 of BDOC were established as Estonian standards [114,
115]. However, since no Estonian legislation has ever stipulated their use, the
use of DDOC and BDOC signature formats in Estonia has been more of a social
agreement. The Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506 [112] now
sets the BDOC format with the timestamp profile as one of the formats that has to
be accepted by public sector bodies in the EU.
2.10.3. Signature validation
Unfortunately, there is no binding standard that would precisely describe the
validation rules of a digital signature as yet. The general algorithm is described
in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [116], but for its input parameters it relies on a signature
validation policy that has to be provided by the party validating the signature.
ETSI TS 119 172-4 [117] (currently in standardization process) plans to provide
such a common policy for validation of eIDAS qualified electronic signatures.
In Estonia, the validation rules implemented in the state-provided ID card
software are the de facto rules that are used to determine what is technically
considered to conform to the legal term “digital signature”. The validation rules
are implemented as understood by software developers and have changed over
the years leading to a situation where signatures recognized as valid by older
software versions are no longer recognized as valid by newer versions (and vice
versa). For some file format errors introduced in previous versions, newer
versions have backwards compatibility, returning the validity status “valid with
warnings” [118].
From the introduction of the digital signature, Estonian law has required a
digital signature to provide the ability to establish the time when the signature
was created. However, in our article “Time of signing in the Estonian digital
signature scheme” [17], we showed that contrary to this legal requirement, the
Estonian digital signature scheme does not provide reliable proof of the time
when a document was digitally signed. The “Signed on” field reported by the
9BDOC timestamp profile signatures created using the ID card software still use SK OCSP
timestamp responder for OCSP responses, thereby providing an extra non-qualified timestamp that
benefits from SK SeqLog integrity features.
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ID card software shows the time from the cryptographic timestamp. However,
the timestamp of the signature can only prove that the signed document existed at
that particular time, while the document might have actually been signed much
earlier, as the timestamp can be later added by anyone. To demonstrate this
problem, we published a video [119] showing how the “Signed on” time of a
digitally signed legal act downloaded from the Riigikogu website could be
updated. Technically, the modification was trivial. The original cryptographic
timestamp and OCSP response was removed and replaced with a new one. The
timestamp could be updated in this manner by anyone at any time as long as the
certificate of the signatory, used to sign the document, was still valid. This came
as a great surprise to the public as it was widely believed that the signing time of
a digital signature could be reliably established.
In the article, we also pointed out a more fundamental signature validation
issue rooted in the validation algorithm’s assumption that the signatory’s
certificate is valid from the moment of its issuance until its expiration or
revocation. Since the ID card certificates, after their issuance, are in a suspended
state and can also be suspended later in their lifetime (see Section 2.15), the
validation process cannot provide assurance that the digital signature was given
when the signatory’s certificate was valid. This allows the validity of any digital
signature created with the Estonian ID card to be challenged.
2.10.4. Long-term validity
The timestamp on a signatory’s signature provides the theoretical ability to verify
the validity of the signature as long as: (a) the second-preimage resistance of the
hash function used to sign the document is secure; (b) the CA records of issued
and revoked certificates are available; and (c) the records of issued timestamps are
maintained by the timestamping authority (TSA).
To validate a signature without requesting offline evidence from the CA and
TSA, the validation scheme must assure that at the time of validation the private
keys of the CA, OCSP responder and TSA have not been compromised. During
the validity period of the corresponding certificates the revocation information of
compromised keys is available through PKI. However, after the certificates have
expired, there is no source to establish whether the signatures made using the
corresponding keys can still be trusted. The current validation algorithms ignore
this issue, assuming that after the certificate expired, the corresponding private
key was destroyed and hence cannot be compromised as long as the cryptographic
algorithms are considered strong.
2.10.4.1. Collision attacks against SHA-1
Due to the weaknesses in the cryptographic hash function SHA-1, the Estonian
digital signature scheme has already experienced risks of outdated cryptography.
The first cryptanalytic attack against the collision resistance of SHA-1 was
35
discovered in 2005 [120]. In 2011, the cryptographic algorithms life cycle study
ordered by RIA recommended abandoning the use of SHA-1 in favor of the
SHA-2 hash function family (Section 3.4.4 in [121]). In October 2015, it became
known that a practical attack against SHA-1 collision resistance using the current
technology costs much less than previously estimated [122]. In February 2017,
the first SHA-1 collision was published [123] proving that SHA-1 was broken
not only in theory, but also in practice. The collision blocks published by the
researchers allowed anyone to trivially construct two different PDF files that
would produce the same SHA-1 hash [124].
While the issuance of ID card certificates switched from SHA-1 to SHA-256
in January 2015 [125], a complete deprecation of SHA-1 in digital signatures has
still not occurred, as SHA-1 signatures (including recently created signatures) can
still be successfully validated.
The main issue concerns the DDOC signature format which only supports the
SHA-1 algorithm. The BDOC format also supports SHA-1, but the ID card
software has always created BDOC signatures using SHA-25610. For BDOC
containers that contain any SHA-1 signature, ID card software v3.8, released on
2013-12-10, introduced a warning preventing the addition of signatures to such
BDOC containers. Support for creating signatures in DDOC format was removed
from the ID card software starting with v3.12 released on 2016-02-01. [113]
Since SHA-1 resistance against second-preimage attacks is still strong, the
SHA-1 signatures created before the collision attacks became feasible can still be
trusted, while signatures created today can be exploited in collision attacks. In
practice, SHA-1 collision attacks could be exploited by tricking a victim into
signing a specially crafted document that would result in the signature also
validating another document with a colliding hash value which the victim did not
intend to sign11.
While the users with up-to-date ID card software cannot be tricked into
signing documents that exploit SHA-1 collisions12, the acceptance of SHA-1
signatures allows cardholders, who have intentionally created such SHA-1
colliding signatures, to later repudiate the signature based on the claim that they
have fallen victim to a SHA-1 collision attack. To be on the safe side, the current
validation algorithm should be updated to discard SHA-1 signatures created after
January 2017. This, however, will also invalidate some legitimate signatures
created using the outdated software, which in turn shows that the Estonian
authorities have been late in deprecating SHA-1 usage in digital signatures.
10Except for signatures created using MICARDO-powered ID cards where an RSA signature
with SHA-224 algorithm was used (see Section 4.1.2 for the reasons).
11For the DDOC format the collision blocks published by the researchers cannot be directly used,
as the hash reference is calculated over the XML structure containing base64-encoded files.
12The current technological solution enabling digital signing in web environments cannot prevent
such attacks, but as we discussed before, this solution is prone to a much more straightforward attack
by a service provider.
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2.10.4.2. TeRa (Tembeldamisrakendus)
As a response to the weaknesses of the SHA-1 algorithm, in July 2017 RIA
released a new version of the ID card software containing the timestamping
application TeRa (TembeldamisRakendus) and urged everyone to timestamp
their DDOC files by July 2018 at the latest [126].
The application searches for DDOC files in the user’s file system and obtains a
SHA-256 timestamp over the whole file, storing the timestamp along with the file
in an ASiC-S (ASiC Simple) container using the file extension .asics.
The timestamp is issued by the Lithuanian qualified trust service provider
(QTSP) BalTstamp UAB using an RSA 2048-bit key whose validity will expire
on 2022-05-15. The QTSP promises to maintain the records of all issued
timestamps for at least 10 years after the timestamp has been issued. [127, 128]
Contrary to RIA’s announcement, the risk of SHA-1 forgery is not present as
there are no signs of the second-preimage resistance of SHA-1 being broken in
the foreseeable future. We were unable to find an analysis that could describe the
potential benefits for the timestamping of DDOC files.
A timestamp over the whole content of a DDOC file could help to verify
(without requesting offline records from the CA) that the signatory’s certificate
was issued during the validity period of the CA’s certificate and that the OCSP
timestamp response was created during the validity period of the OCSP
responder’s certificate. However, to provide such continuity, the timestamping
should be done before the corresponding certificates expire. The OCSP
certificates for DDOC signatures created before 2011 have already expired. The
OCSP certificate “SK OCSP RESPONDER 2011” used since 2011 will only
expire on 2024-03-18, which is two years after the BalTstamp’s TSA certificate
would have expired.
The timestamping of the whole signature file can provide some level of trust in
the event the CA’s or TSA’s private key gets compromised in the future. However,
these benefits are not specific to DDOC files.
2.11. PIN verification mechanism
The Estonian ID card enforces cardholder verification using PIN and PUK codes,
similar to the usage in EMV payment cards and mobile phone SIM cards. The
PIN security mechanism ensures that without the knowledge of the PIN codes, an
unauthorized person who has access to the cardholder’s ID card cannot perform
cryptographic operations with the card.
The ID cards are preconfigured with three random security codes – PIN1 (4
digits), PIN2 (5 digits) and PUK (8 digits). In general, PIN1 is used for
authorizing cryptographic operations with the authentication private key, PIN2
for authorizing cryptographic operations with the digital signature private key,
and PUK to unblock and change the values of PIN1 and PIN2. The cardholder is
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expected to preserve the secrecy of the PIN codes until the expiration or
revocation of the ID card, or even after, if the confidentiality of the documents
encrypted for the ID card has to be maintained.
The signature operations with PIN2 reset the card’s active security state,
meaning that each signature given using the digital signature key has to be
confirmed with a separate input of PIN2. This is not enforced for signing and
decryption operations with PIN1. The reason is mainly convenience, as the TLS
protocol may require frequent re-authentication to the server (see Section II-D
in [15])13.
Estonian legislation does not regulate or even mention the PIN verification
mechanism. The use of this mechanism results from the security requirements of
QSCDs laid out in eIDAS ANNEX II 1 (d), namely that the electronic signature
creation data used for electronic signature creation must be reliably protected by
the legitimate signatory against use by others. The eIDAS technical standard EN
419 211 for QSCDs prescribed by [107] describes the PIN verification
mechanism, but does not set any specific security requirements for the retry
counter or the length of the PIN. The decision to use this particular PIN
configuration was made by the authors of the first EstEID specification [4]. The
use of this PIN mechanism in the ID cards is described in Section 6.2.8 of SK
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) [129] and Certificate Policy (CP) [130] as
a method of activating private keys.
We note that the ID cards issued up to fall 2014, as an alternative to the PIN
verification mechanism, also provide a legally unregulated passphrase
authentication feature (see Section 6.1).
2.11.1. PIN envelope
The security envelope containing the PIN codes is handed over to the cardholder
together with the ID card when the cardholder visits a PPA customer service
point to receive the card. The card manufacturer configures PIN codes in the
ID card personalization phase and prints them on a security envelope, which is
then delivered together with the ID card to the document issuer. In this process
the card manufacturer learns the PIN codes, but is required to not store them.
The employees of the document issuer cannot learn the codes (and hence abuse
the ID card) without opening the security envelope. When receiving the ID card,
the cardholder has to sign the confirmation which states: “I confirm that I have
received the above mentioned document and PIN codes in an intact envelope.”.
The SK CPS (Section 6.4.1.1 in [131]) requires the PIN codes to be protected in
such a way that it is impossible to read them without breaking the security
element and that the cardholder has the prerogative to refuse any PIN codes with
an altered security element. In the history of the ID card there have been two
13As an alternative, the PIN code could be cached and resent automatically by the software
running on the user’s computer. This, however, will not work when a smart card reader with a
PIN pad is used (see Section 2.14.1).
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cases where it was found that in practice the security envelopes did not satisfy
this requirement, allowing the codes to be viewed through the envelope (see
Section 6.11). We note that in the eID schemes used in other countries (e.g.
Finland and Germany) the PIN envelopes are delivered to the cardholders over a
separate channel, thereby reducing the risk of abuse before the ID card has
reached the cardholder.
2.11.2. Preventing PIN guessing
To prevent the brute-forcing of PIN codes, the card maintains a verification retry
counter which is decreased after each incorrect PIN verification try. The current
value of the counter for each PIN code is publicly readable from the card. A
verification with the correct PIN restores the retry counter to its initial value. If
PIN1, PIN2 or the PUK is entered incorrectly 3 consecutive times the
corresponding code gets blocked. If PIN1 or PIN2 gets blocked, it can be
unblocked or changed using the PUK code. If the PUK gets blocked, it can only
be unblocked by the document issuer using the card management operations (see
Section 2.11.4).
It is interesting to note that knowledge of the PUK effectively allows the
recovering of the PIN1 and PIN2 values by brute-forcing the respective PINs and
resetting the retry counter after every 3 consecutive wrong guesses. The card
issuer can also perform such a brute-force attack against the PUK code using the
card management operations.
While the probability of guessing the 4-digit PIN1 or 5-digit PIN2 in 3 tries is
very small (0.03% and 0.003%, respectively), opportunistic attacks in
environments where a large number of ID cards are inserted in potentially
compromised terminals are practical. As we have discussed in Section 3.3
of [16], a malicious terminal can brute-force PINs by attempting one PIN try per
ID card and continue the attack when the cardholder returns with the PIN retry
counter reset. It is unlikely that after using the ID card in such a terminal, the
cardholder would notice that the PIN retry counter has decreased.
The PIN length requirements for the Estonian ID card are rather low compared
to, for example, German Act on Identity Cards and Electronic Identification [132]
which requires the use of 6-digit PIN codes.
2.11.3. PIN change
Cardholders can change the original PIN and PUK codes and increase their length
up to 12 digits. Technically PIN codes can contain any byte value, but since
the standard PIN entry device only accepts digits, the convention is to construct
PIN codes from only digits. Non-blocked PIN1, PIN2 and PUK codes can be
changed by authenticating with the correspond code. Blocked PIN1 and PIN2
codes can be changed using the PUK. On a PIN change, the card requires the value
of the new code to be different from the current value. The client-side support
for changing the codes has been implemented in the official ID card client-side
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software (see Section 2.13). The ID card application DigiDoc4 (released in July
2018) introduced several PIN quality requirements. Namely, the new PIN code
cannot be: an increasing or decreasing sequence of numbers; a sequence of a
repeated number; part of the personal ID code or the birthdate of the cardholder
(YYYY, MMDD or DDMM) [133].
Cardholders are not urged to change the original codes after receiving their
ID card. The portion of cardholders who do change them is unknown. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that more advanced cardholders change the codes to match the
codes of their other eID tools which they have already memorized. The PUK
codes, however, are rarely changed.
We note that eID schemes in other countries (e.g., Finland and Germany)
enforce the change of the PIN code by implementing the so-called transport PIN
codes. The card requires the transport PIN codes to be changed before the
cryptographic functionality of the card can be used.
2.11.4. Issuance of new PIN envelopes
A PIN replacement service is provided for cardholders in the event they forget
their PIN codes or the PINs get blocked. At the end of 2018, it was reported that
nearly 4 000 cardholders apply for a new PIN envelope each month [134].
Currently the service is only provided in PPA customer service points, while
before 2019-03-01 the service was also provided in SK customer service points
for a small fee. As of 2020-01-01, PPA has also introduced a fee of 5 EUR for a
new PIN envelope [135].
The PIN replacement procedure is implemented using card management
operations (see Section 19.6 in [9]). To replace PIN codes, the cardholder has to
fill and sign the PIN replacement application. The PIN replacement service
includes technical constraints that do not enable the replacement of PIN codes
for non-valid ID cards and certificates [136].
After visual authentication of the cardholder, the person providing the service
takes the PIN envelope from a heap of pre-printed security envelopes. The unique
envelope identification number is entered into the system and over the end-to-
end encrypted channel between the card and the manufacturer’s backend the PIN
codes corresponding to the specified envelope are written to the ID card.
The SK CP (Section 6.4.1.1 in [70]) requires the mechanism for replacing the
PIN codes to ensure, by technical means, the impossibility of the PPA employee
viewing or storing the replacement PIN codes during the whole process. The
incidents of transparent PIN envelopes (see Section 6.11) showed that this
requirement in practice is not always satisfied.
In 2016, in the context of the remote ID card update process, the concept of
a virtual PIN envelope was introduced. The new PIN codes were delivered to
the user’s computer by encrypting them using the cardholder’s authentication key.
The decrypted codes were then shown on the screen and the user was asked to
write them down (see Section 5.4).
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2.12. Personal data file
The ID card chip contains a publicly readable personal data file, which consists of
16 records containing the same information as printed on the card (see Table 1).
Table 1: Contents of a personal data file stored on an ID card [16]. IDEMIA-
powered ID cards have introduced some slight differences (see page 16 in [13]).
No. Content Example Length (bytes)
1 Surname ŽAIKOVSKI Max 28
2 First name line 1 IGOR Max 15
3 First name line 2 Max 15
4 Sex M 1
5 Nationality code POL 3
6 Date of birth 01.01.1971 10
7 Personal ID code 37101010021 11
8 Document number X0010536 8 or 9
9 Expiry date 13.08.2019 10
10 Place of birth POOLA / POL Max 35
11 Date of issuance 13.08.2014 10
12 Permit type Max 50
13 Notes line 1 EL KODANIK / EU CITIZEN Max 50
14 Notes line 2 ALALINE ELAMISÕIGUS Max 50
15 Notes line 3 PERMANENT RIGHT OF RESIDENCE Max 50
16 Notes line 4 LUBATUD TÖÖTADA Max 50
In practice, the personal data file is read by various physical systems to
identify the cardholder. In our paper “Using the Estonian Electronic Identity
Card for Authentication to a Machine” [16] we studied this use case in detail. We
found that several large merchants in Estonia allow the ID card to be used as a
customer loyalty card, providing access to rewards once the ID card is inserted in
the merchant’s terminal. Similarly, the ID card can be used to authenticate to
self-service printing machines and self-checkout machines in libraries.
Pharmacies use the ID card chip to look up the drugs prescribed using the digital
prescription system. In some public and less public security installations the
ID card can be used as an entrance card to unlock the door and gain access to
restricted areas. [16]
We found that many chip terminals read more data from the personal data file
than necessary to identify the cardholder (Section 5 in [16]). It is, however, not
known whether this data is stored and processed by the service providers.
It is important to note that this use case provides very little security guarantees
as we were able to build an ID card emulator that is accepted as a genuine ID card
by all the chip terminals tested. We note that the verification of the ID card’s
physical security features did not help as we were able to successfully transplant
our programmed chip onto a real ID card without damaging any of the card’s
physical security features (Section 4.3 in [16]).
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We analyzed the possible technological improvements that could provide
cryptographic security and improve usability, therefore enabling wider use of the
ID card as a physical authentication token (Section 6 in [16]). With the
introduction of NFC-capable IDEMIA-powered ID cards in 2018, the ID card
has the potential to be used as a secure and convenient physical authentication
token, but not in its current configuration (see Section 3.5.3)
2.13. ID card software
Standard operating systems do not contain support for the Estonian ID card,
therefore additional ID card software has to be installed to make full use of the
ID card. Historically, the main components of the ID card desktop software have
been: drivers and middleware for communication with the ID card; the ID-card
Utility to change PIN codes and update the ID card; the DigiDoc Crypto
application for file-based encryption and decryption; the DigiDoc Client
application for digital signature creation and validation; and browser extensions
for authentication and digital signing in a web environment.
The development of the first ID card software started in 2002 and was financed
by SK until the Estonian Informatics Centre (Riigi Infosüsteemide Arenduskeskus
– predecessor of RIA), in 2008 with support from the European structural funds,
announced a tender for the development of ID card software [20].
At the end of 2008, Smartlink OÜ was contracted to develop the ID card
software using an open source development model. The contract consisted of an
8-month development period and a 36-month software support period. Support
for Linux, Mac and different browsers had to be developed. After repeated
extensions of the deadline, a working software was not delivered and in July
2010 the development of the ID card software was given over to SK. [137, 138]
At the end of 2010, a new ID card desktop software version DigiDoc3 was
available to users (November 2010 for Linux and Mac, January 2011 for
Windows) [113]. At the end of 2014, the software development migrated from
svn.eesti.ee to GitHub [139]. In July 2018, the DigiDoc4 client was
introduced. The main change was its visual design and integration of the ID-card
utility, DigiDoc Crypto and DigiDoc Client into a single application.
The main distribution point for the ID card software is the website id.ee,
where installers for Windows and Mac can be downloaded. On Mac computers
the DigiDoc4 client can also be installed from Apple’s App Store. In Windows,
the minidriver component, which enables ID card authentication using Internet
Explorer and Google Chrome, is automatically installed on the computer through
the Windows update mechanism the first time the ID card is plugged into the
computer. For Ubuntu users, the ID card software is distributed using a package
repository maintained by RIA. [140]
Support for automatic software updates was implemented starting in ID card
software version 3.5, released on 2011-11-10. In version 3.9, released on
2014-07-01, a “kill switch” functionality was implemented, meaning that the
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software would fail to run if the currently installed software version was not
supported or if the automated software version check had not succeeded during
the past 12 months [113].
As of 2019, the ID software is used in approximately 600 000 computers [141].
Since 2018, the DigiDoc client application has also been provided for Android and
iOS mobile operating systems. The name of the mobile app is RIA DigiDoc and
it can be installed from Google Play and Apple’s App Store, respectively [142].
The ID card software has not managed to completely avoid closed-source
software dependencies. With the introduction of the IDEMIA-powered ID cards
on 2018-12-03, the ID card software started to ship IDEMIA’s AWP software
package whose source code is not available [143]. This continued until open
source support for communication with the IDEMIA-powered ID cards was
implemented in OpenSC. On Linux and Mac the switch to OpenSC was done
starting with the ID card software version 19.10, released on 2019-11-05. For
Windows OS the proprietary AWP software and minidriver are still used to
communicate with the IDEMIA-powered ID cards. [113]
2.13.1. Vulnerabilities
Over the years, the ID card software has experienced several security
vulnerabilities, however, only a few of the flaws have gained public attention.
2.13.1.1. Certificate leakage in ID card browser extension
In November 2010, Antti Andreimann published proof-of-concept code [144]
demonstrating that malicious JavaScript code served by a website can abuse the
ID card browser extension to read a user’s ID card certificate without the user’s
consent. The flaw had been present since the introduction of the browser
extension and had been known for at least 5 years [145]. Interestingly, if there
were several certificates in the Windows certificate store, the risk was not present
as the certificate selection window was displayed [145].
In their response, RIA downplayed the impact [146, 147] and SK responded
that it was a legal problem, as an illegal collection of personal data was forbidden
by law [148]. Nevertheless, the flaw was fixed in the ID card software released on
2011-01-23 by introducing a mandatory certificate selection window [149].
2.13.1.2. Directory traversal vulnerability
In July 2013, in the process of auditing the i-voting server-side source code, Renee
Trisberg discovered a directory traversal vulnerability in the code handling BDOC
files [150]. The same flaw was also present in the ID card software, allowing an
attacker to overwrite any files on the victim’s computer (with their system user
privileges), if the attacker was able to persuade the user to open a specially crafted
BDOC14 or DDOC file [151].
14The BDOC attack vector is not mentioned in the release notes as the BDOC format was not
actively used at that time. The updated ID card software version removed the support for BDOC
but reintroduced it in a later version.
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On 2013-08-22, RIA and SK published an announcement on their websites
urging the public to install ID card software version 3.7.2 that fixes the
vulnerability [152, 153]. Criticism was expressed in the media towards the
authorities regarding the insufficient public announcement, the critics demanding
responsibility be taken for the technical solutions of the ID card [151, 154].
On 2013-08-27, there were nearly 30 000 users who had not accepted the
automatic update to version 3.7.2 that fixed the vulnerability [155]. At that time
there was also a number of users of older versions that did not even support
automatic updates and hence had to install the new version manually [151].
2.13.1.3. ID card authentication man-in-the-middle attack using
browser signing extension
At the end of 2020, we noticed that several Estonian e-services (swedbank.ee,
coopbank.ee, bigbank.ee, inbank.ee, unicredit.ee, jetoil.ee,
rahvaalgatus.ee and portal.smart-id.com) were not using TLS client
certificate authentication to authenticate their users, but the ID card browser
extension instead. To our surprise, the ID card browser signing extension was
quietly extended in 2017 [156] to allow e-service providers to request raw
signatures using the authentication key (rather than only using the digital
signature key). Since the e-service provider’s identity is not included under the
signature, a malicious e-service provider could use this feature to ask a user to
sign a value that would allow them to impersonate the user in any other e-service
that enables ID card authentication, regardless of whether it was using TLS or
the browser extension.
On 2020-12-17, we shared the attack’s proof-of-concept video [157] with RIA.
RIA decided to remove the option to sign using the authentication key from the
ID card browser extension. However, an agreement was made to wait until the
most prominent e-service swedbank.ee had moved back to using the TLS client
certificate authentication feature. Swedbank made this move on 2021-01-14 and
later explained that the browser extension was used for authentication because
they considered it to be more reliable [158].
On 2021-01-28, a new ID card software, version 20.12, was released, and
on 2021-02-03 RIA published a press release [159] urging users to update their
software.
2.13.1.4. Other vulnerabilities
The release notes of the ID card software [113] contain several security related
fixes. Most of them are due to the complexity of XML parsing, resulting in an
invalid signature being recognized as valid. The latest security issue in the
release notes is dated 2017-08-15. However, it is likely that security bugs are still
regularly found but fixed quietly, as our recently reported vulnerabilities in the
digital signature validation code [160, 161] have not been marked as a security
issue in either the release notes or the commit message.
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2.14. Smart card readers
A smart card reader is an essential component for the electronic use of the ID card,
but only very few computers have a built-in smart card reader.
In 2002, the cheapest smart card reader available in the market was priced at
354 kroons (24 EUR) [41]. In 2003, Elion stores started to distribute an ID card
starter package with a smart card reader and a CD containing the ID card
software installer. The price of the package was 20 EUR which was still above
the expectations of the average consumer [20]. In 2007, Elion made a bulk deal
with OMNIKEY GmbH which brought the Omnikey CardMan 1021 smart card
reader to the Estonian retail market for around 6 EUR, which was below the
average market price of the reader [20, 162].
In 2014, an Estonian designer brought the +iD smart card reader to the market.
The reader was the smallest and lightest device of its kind available for full size
smart cards [163]. Currently there are several versions of the reader, some of them
selling for as low as 10 EUR.
2.14.1. Smart card readers with PIN pad
In 2010, malware analysts observed a modification of the banking trojan Zeus.
The modified version was able to use a smart card connected to the victim’s
computer to make fraudulent bank transactions in several Russian online
banks [164]. The attacks against the ID card and Estonian online banks were
believed to be just a matter of time, therefore RIA recommended that ID cards
should only be placed in the reader when the ID card functionality was actually
used [165].
Later, as a solution to the malware problem, RIA made the recommendation
that on high-risk computers which are used by several persons, a smart card
reader with a PIN pad should be used [166]. Readers with a PIN pad allow PIN
code entry on the PIN pad, which is then sent directly to the smart card, thereby
preventing a potentially infected computer from learning the code and using it in
the future without the cardholder’s consent.
The malware can still abuse the ID card once the cardholder has entered the
PIN on the PIN pad, but this attack is more complicated. In the case of PIN2 it
only allows the forging of a single signature after the cardholder has entered the
code. Another problem of standard smart card readers with a PIN pad is that they
also work in a so-called pass-through mode, allowing the PIN verification
commands to be also received from the computer. Malware can abuse this to
slowly brute-force the PIN by performing one try after each successful user
authentication that resets the PIN retry counter. Alternatively, the malware can
execute a phishing attack, asking for the PIN code to be entered from the
computer and using it later without the cardholder’s consent.
In 2011, Martin Paljak discovered that a secure PIN entry on the HP USB
keyboard with a built-in smart card reader (model KUS0133) actually did not
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provide the claimed security as the entered PIN code was transmitted to the
computer [167]. These HP keyboards with a built-in smart card reader were a
very popular product in the private and public sector in Estonia.
In 2012, RIA initiated talks with Gemalto for a bulk purchase of the smart
card reader with PIN pad, IDBridge CT710 [168] (also known as Ezio Shield),
personalized for Estonia. RIA convinced Elion to make a bulk purchase from
Gemalto and in fall 2013 the readers were available in the retail market for as
little as 20 EUR, which is below the average market price of the reader. It was
promised that the public authorities would buy the readers in a centralized public
procurement, but this never happened, leaving Elion with a large stock of
readers. [169, 170]
The product was graphically customized for the Estonian market: the
Gemalto logo was relaced with the ID card help line number and the user
interface was provided in Estonian [171]. An important security feature provided
by this reader is the so-called PIN firewall, which blocks PIN verification and
PIN change commands received from the computer [171]. This means that even
if malware gains access to the cardholder’s PIN codes, the malware cannot pass
them to the smart card. However, the card is still open to an attack once the
cardholder enters the code on the PIN pad.
We found that the passphrase authentication feature on the ID cards issued up
to fall 2014, in practice, allows the security advantages provided by the smart card
readers with PIN pad to be bypassed (see Section 6.1.1). Fortunately, as of today
there have been no public records of malware that attempted to abuse the Estonian
ID card connected to an infected computer.
2.15. Validity lifecycle of the ID card and its certificates
ID cards and the certificates therein are issued with a specific validity period,
depending on the identity document type and the right of residence, but most
frequently for the validity period of 5 years. Before 2007 ID cards were issued
with a longer validity period than the certificates therein (see Section 3.1.1), but
from 2007 the ID cards and certificates were issued with the same validity period.
Nevertheless, there are some slight differences in the validity life cycle of the
ID card and the certificates, which we desribe below.
Before the ID card is handed out to the cardholder, the certificates are legally
not yet valid (see clause 16 (4) of EITSETA). After handing out the ID card, the
PPA employee registers the ID card certificates as valid (clause 4.4.1.1 of [172]).
If the cardholder already has an ID card of the same type, the PPA employee
revokes the previous ID card and the certificates therein. This ensures that the
cardholder can only have one electronic identity document of a particular type
valid at a time.15
15In practice, we have observed several cases where this workflow has failed, resulting in the
previous ID card certificates remaining valid.
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The relying parties are expected to verify the validity of the certificates before
relying on the certificate (see clause 7 in [65]) and the law only gives the digital
signature a legal effect if at the time of signing the certificate was valid (article 32
(1)(b) of eIDAS)16.
During the validity period of certificates, the validity of certificates can be
temporarily suspended or permanently revoked. While technically possible, the
suspension or revocation of only one certificate from the pair (i.e., authentication
or digital signature) is not practiced.
The suspension of certificates is useful in cases when the ID card has been
lost or stolen, as validity can be suspended instantly without the need to submit
a signed application. To request certificate suspension, the cardholder has to call
the ID card helpline that is available around-the-clock and identify himself using
basic personal data (name and personal identification code). To restore the validity
of the certificate (e.g., in case the ID card is later found) the cardholder has to
submit a signed application. The law allows certificates to also be suspended by
the CA and other authorities. The validity of the certificates, however, can only
be restored by the party who requested the suspension.17
To revoke the certificates, a signed application is required from the cardholder
or other eligible party. Revocation or suspension of the certificates does not have
an effect on the validity of the identity document. The document issuer does not
provide a service for replacing revoked certificates, therefore to renew revoked
certificates, the cardholder has to apply for a new ID card. However, historically
there have been cases where the replacement of expired (Section 5.2) and revoked
(Section 6.4.1) ID card certificates has been provided. There has also been a
precedent for extending certificate validity and hence the validity of the digital
identity card beyond the date printed on the card (Section 3.4.4).
The life cycle of identity documents does not allow the validity of the ID card
to be temporarily suspended. To revoke an ID card, the cardholder has to submit a
signed application. With the revocation of the ID card the certificates therein are
also revoked. The ID card is automatically revoked in cases where the person dies
or a resident obtains citizenship (see Section 6.10 for the issues in applying this
mechanism in practice).
In the event a person changes their name (e.g., due to marriage), the ID card
with the previous name remains valid until the ID card with the new name is
received or until the end of its validity. This conflicts with the standard practice
of CAs revoking the certificate if the personal details specified therein become
inaccurate.
16See Section 2.10.3 for the technical problems fulfilling this legal requirement.
17The problems with the suspension mechanism when applied by a party other than the
cardholder has been analyzed by us in [18].
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2.16. Certificates and personal data therein
By the definition of public-key certificate, the purpose of a certificate is to bind
a public key to an entity. To achieve this purpose, the certificate has to contain
enough information to unambiguously identify the entity to whom it has been
issued. In the case of the Estonian ID card, the certificates contain the cardholder’s
full name and personal identification code (personal ID code). The personal ID
code is a unique 11-digit number that generally remains fixed for the lifetime of
the person and therefore is widely used in public and private databases to identify
persons. The personal ID code is also usually used in civil contracts to identify
the contracting parties. The ID code is not purely a serial number, since the first 7
digits of the code encode the gender and date of birth of its holder.
The data contained in the certificate allows additional personal data about its
holder to be inferred. The validity period of the certificate usually corresponds to
the validity period of the identity document in which the corresponding private key
resides. In some cases the validity period may be used to deduce the cardholder’s
right of residence.
The Organization Name (O) field of the certificate’s subject name can be used
to determine the identity document’s type. The value “ESTEID” corresponds to
identity card and residence permit card, “ESTEID (DIGI-ID)” corresponds to
digital identity card and diplomatic identity card, “ESTEID (DIGI-ID
E-RESIDENT)” corresponds to e-resident’s digital identity card, and “ESTEID
(MOBIIL-ID)” corresponds to digital identity card in a mobile-ID format.
From the end of 2018, with the introduction of IDEMIA-powered ID cards,
the abovementioned document type was removed from the certificate’s subject
name. However, an additional certificate policy field was introduced, which now
encodes not only the type of identity document, but also provides quite detailed
information about the certificate holder’s right of residence (see Section 1.2
in [70]).
The certificate validity services can be used to obtain additional information
about the certificate’s life cycle and hence about its holder. For example, the
certificate revocation information accumulated in CRLs can be used to deduce the
time when the cardholder visited the document issuer to receive their new ID card
and the old one was revoked.
This information and also some other pecularities of the ecosystem allowed us
to deduce many interesting details, some of which played a crucial role in finding
the answers to the important research questions of this study.
2.17. LDAP certificate repository
With the introduction of the ID card in 2002, all valid certificates issued to the
ID card holders have been made available for lookup in the public LDAP directory
service ldap://ldap.sk.ee maintained by SK [173]. Initially, it was possible
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to search for certificates using a first name, last name or personal ID code. The
only restriction applied was the maximum number of responses returned in one
query to protect against server overload [174]18.
The ability to find a personal ID code using the person’s name led to
controversy. On 2005-01-19, TV investigative programme Pealtnägija
(Eyewitness) showed that the personal ID code found in the LDAP repository
could be used to not only find out the date of birth for prominent Estonian
persons, but that it could also be used to authenticate to the two biggest Estonian
banks over the phone and ask the bank to block the person’s payment card [175].
In 2006, the Chancellor of Justice published an opinion [176] on whether the
publication of personal ID codes on the internet is lawful. The Chancellor found
that the technical solution for certificate verification via LDAP did not comply to
the applicable law and that the recipients of ID cards were not clearly informed
that their personal ID codes and names would be made available via the internet
to everyone. The Chancellor suggested the modification of the system, requiring
a first name, last name and personal ID code for certificate lookup.
As a response, on 2006-06-07 the parliament of Estonia amended the Identity
Documents Act adding clause 94(6), which states that the certificates are
connected to the personal data of the certificate holder and are publicly verifiable
through the personal ID code. In addition, on 2006-12-05 the LDAP service was
reconfigured to allow certificate lookup if at least the full personal ID code is
known [177]. The Chancellor of Justice considered the solution to be an
acceptable short-term compromise, but suggested that looking for a long-term
solution should continue.
We note that despite the added restrictions, as the search space for all possible
personal ID codes is small, it is possible to retrieve all certificates and then
perform a reverse search by the person’s name, thereby circumventing this
restriction. In later years, to protect against such crawlers additional restrictions
were added to the LDAP service limiting the number of certificates that can be
queried in a particular time frame (see Section III-B in [178]).
The existence of an LDAP certificate repository has been publicly motivated
by the need to verify certificates [175]. We find this motivation questionable, as
the authenticity of the certificate is verified by verifying the CA’s signature on the
certificate and the validity of the certificate is verified using CRLs and OCSP
validity services, where the validity of a certificate is verified by querying the
serial number of the certificate. To some extent, the LDAP repository could be
used as a validity service, as SK’s Certification Practice Statement [129] states
that only valid and unexpired certificates are published in LDAP.19 The data
connection to the LDAP service, however, is not cryptographically protected,
therefore the use of LDAP for certificate validity checking comes with risks.
18The LDAP service returned a maximum of 50 entries per query.
19Unfortunately, we (and others [179]) have frequently observed the LDAP repository to be out
of synchronization, containing revoked certificates and not containing the valid ones.
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Before eIDAS came into force requiring SK to provide the OCSP service free of
charge, some service providers did indeed use the LDAP service for certificate
validity checks (see Section IV-B9 in [15]).
Traditionally, LDAP in a PKI is not used as a validity service, but to distribute
certificates and CRLs to the relying parties. In the context of the Estonian
ID card, the problem of certificate distribution is largely solved, because
certificates are attached to each digital signature and authentication transaction,
thereby making it available to the corresponding relying parties for verification.
The only use case where the certificate lookup service provides a benefit is
encryption, giving convenient means for the sender to obtain a recipient’s public
key without requesting it from the recipient.
The consideration of the name and personal ID code of a person as public
data in Estonia [174] quite sharply contrasts with the European notion of privacy.
A similar approach to privacy is also observable in other fields in Estonia, for
instance, making the data about the real estate persons’ own publicly
available [180].
On 2018-11-14, with the introduction of IDEMIA-powered ID cards, a new
LDAP directory service ldaps://esteid.ldap.sk.ee was made available over
a TLS connection [173].
2.17.1. Certificates analyzed in this study
A significant part of analysis in this work is based on an ID card certificate
dataset that we collected over the years by crawling the LDAP certificate
repository. While our dataset of more than 7 million ID card certificates is not
complete, we believe that it contains a representative sample of ID card
certificates issued throughout the years. Figure 2 shows the distribution of
ID card certificates in our dataset by issuance month (based on the certificate’s
notBefore field) for different ID card platforms. Due to the crawling process,
the dataset lacks certificates issued from 2002 to 2007 and certificates which
have been valid for a short period of time. Therefore, in general, our findings






























































































































































































































Figure 2: ID card certificates analyzed in this work (by month of issuance)
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2.18. @eesti.ee email address
Two email addresses on the @eesti.ee domain are automatically assigned to each
Estonian resident. One address is in the form personal_ID_code@eesti.ee and
the other is in the form name.surname@eesti.ee. The eesti.ee SMTP server
does not store emails and works only as an email forwarder. To receive emails to
the assigned addresses, the person has to log into the citizen portal eesti.ee and
configure email forwarding to their personal email address (or several addresses).
For the recipients who have not configured the forwarding, the eesti.ee
SMTP server will reject the email right after the RCPT TO command, before the
body of the message is even transmitted. The VRFY command supported by the
SMTP server allows a check to be performed, without sending an email, to
determine whether the person has configured the forwarding. As of August 2020,
from around 1.4 million persons with an Estonian personal ID code, more than
389 000 have configured email forwarding for their @eesti.ee email addresses.
To avoid email address collisions for namesakes, in the first years the
addresses were generated in the format firstname.lastname_NNNN@, where
NNNN corresponds to four random numbers [174]. From the end of 2005, to make
the addresses easier to remember and use, the addresses were assigned without
the _NNNN postfix. To avoid collisions for namesakes, an address
name.surname.1@ was assigned to the second namesake,
name.surname.2@ to the third, and so on. Persons who were assigned a new
email address as a result of this reform retained the old address with the _NNNN
postfix and hence have three addresses in total. In case the name of the person
changes, a new address is automatically assigned to the person and the old
address is removed. According to RIA, the old address is marked reserved and is
never assigned to any other person (namesake), not even to the same person if the
person decides to switch back to the previous name.
The email address personal_ID_code@ is restricted such that only authorized
institutions can send email to this address. The owner of the address, however,
cannot separately disable email forwarding for potential spam emails addressed to
the unrestricted name.surname@ address. From 2019-02-19, for the persons who
have configured email forwarding, the emails sent to the personal_ID_code@
address are also stored on a virtual “mailbox” that can be read through the citizen
portal eesti.ee [181].
The email address in the form name.surname@ has been embedded in the
subjectAltName extension of the cardholder’s authentication certificate.
However, starting with IDEMIA-powered ID cards the address in the form
personal_ID_code@ is now included in the certificate. According to RIA, the
email addresses in the form name.surname@ will not be assigned for new
cardholders anymore, while those who had it assigned in the past will be able to
continue using them. This decision has most likely been motivated by the fact
that the correct assignation of name.surname@ email addresses has turned out to
be a challenging task in practice. We discuss this further in Section 6.5.
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3. CHIP PLATFORMS AND IDENTITY DOCUMENT
TYPES
The Estonian state issues several types of identity documents that contain
contact-type smart card chips that provide cryptographic functionality. These are
the identity card, the digital identity card, the residence permit card, the
e-resident’s digital identity card and the diplomatic identity card. We will use the
common term “ID card” to denote all of these identity document types. The
Estonian state also issues the digital identity card in a mobile-ID format
(Mobile-ID), which also contains a smart card chip that provides cryptographic
functionality, but as it implements a different protocol and is also different on the
architectural level, we will not cover Mobile-ID in this work.
Over the years, the ID cards have been largely issued using five different
smart card chip platforms: MICARDO, MULTOS, jTOP SLE66, jTOP SLE78
and IDEMIA. In this chapter we will document each of these chip platforms and
consecutively introduce the identity document types that have been issued using
these platforms. The timeline of identity documents and ID card platforms used
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MICARDO jTOP SLE66 jTOP SLE78 IDEMIA
Figure 3: Timeline of identity documents and ID card platforms used in Estonia
3.1. MICARDO platform
The first ID card type, introduced in January 2002, was the identity card
implemented on top of several slightly different MICARDO platform versions.




The identity card is issued to Estonian citizens and citizens of the European
Union. The first identity cards were issued in January 2002. The cards were
distributed to their cardholders at a public ceremony held on 2002-01-28 [21].
The electronic functionality was implemented using the MICARDO smart
card operating system. MICARDO-powered identity cards had been produced
for 9 years until the JavaCard platform jTOP SLE66 was introduced in 2011 (see
Section 3.3).
Figure 4: A MICARDO-powered identity card issued from 2002-01-01 to 2010-
12-31 [182]. Cards issued before 2007-09-03 contain the line “omaniku allkiri”
(owner’s signature) instead of “kasutaja allkiri” (user’s signature).
The visual appearance of the card is shown in Figure 4. Over the 9 years, the
visual appearance of the identity card only changed when on 2007-09-03: (1) the
Estonian translation of “holder’s signature” was changed from “omaniku allkiri”
(owner’s signature) to “kasutaja allkiri” (user’s signature); (2) the document’s
expiration year was removed from the variable laser image on the top left corner
of the back of the card; and (3) the laser engraved contour of the Estonian map
was moved to cover the facial image. The description of the visual security
features for all Estonian identity documents are available in the EU Council
PRADO website [183]. An unknown number of MICARDO-powered identity
cards were also issued with a chip that had a squared contact layout (see
Figure 5).
Figure 5: A MICARDO-powered identity card with a squared contact layout
designed chip [174]
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Initially, the identity cards were valid for 10 years, but their certificates were
only valid for 3 years. The cardholders were therefore provided with a remote
certificate renewal solution (further discussed in Section 5.2) to ensure
cryptographic functionality for the entire document validity period. However,
starting from 2007-01-011, the validity of the identity cards and certificates were
both set to five years [45, 184], hence the remote certificate renewal solution was
not needed for these cards. The last of MICARDO-powered ID cards, as seen
from our certificate dataset, expired on 2017-03-22.
3.1.2. MICARDO-powered ID cards
The electronic functionality of the card was implemented using the smart card
operating system “MICARDO Public Version 2.1 64/32 Release 1.0” produced
by “ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH” (later known as “Sagem Orga GmbH”,
“Morpho Cards GmbH”, OT-Morpho, and most recently known as IDEMIA) [4].
The MICARDO operating system provides a defined set of functionality which
can be configured by the card issuer. This is done by creating different types of
file objects and setting access rules for the files and operations performable with
PIN codes and cryptographic keys. The functionality of the MICARDO card
operating system is fully documented in the MICARDO User Manual [185].
The specification of the electronic functionality and its implementation on
MICARDO Public 2.1 was developed by the Estonian company “ID Süsteemide
AS” in close co-operation with ORGA [186]. The resulting functionality and the
communication interface was documented in the EstEID card specification that
was first published on 2002-11-20 (v2.01) [4]. The EstEID card specification
later became the Estonian standard EVS 827:2004 [6] which is now withdrawn.
According to the EstEID specification (Section 3.1 in [9]), starting from
January 2006 the chip platform was upgraded to “MICARDO Public 3.0”. From
the ID cards issued we see that the switch was actually done later on 2007-09-03.
According to a presentation [187] by a CMB employee, the upgrade was done
because the old chip was not available anymore, hence the MICARDO Public 2.1
OS had to be ported to a new microcontroller.
The MICARDO-powered ID card chips support both the T=0 and T=1
transmission protocols as defined by the ISO/IEC 7816-3 standard [188] and can
be identified by their cold and warm ATR (answer to reset) bytes. The cards
issued before the upgrade have cold2 and warm3 ATRs, which are different from
the cold4 and warm5 ATRs of the upgraded cards (Section 3.1 in [9]), therefore
the systems had to be updated in 2007 to recognize the new cards.
1For cardholders who applied for the document in 2006, but the decision was made and the card
issued in 2007, the validity of the card was still 10 years. Therefore, there are ID cards with 10-year
validity also issued in 2007 (the latest was issued in May 2007).
23B FE 94 00 FF 80 B1 FA 45 1F 03 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 43
33B 6E 00 FF 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30
43B DE 18 FF C0 80 B1 FE 45 1F 03 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 2B
53B 5E 11 FF 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30
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The asymmetric keys for a cardholder’s authentication and digital signature
certificates were generated inside the card using 1024-bit RSA with a random
public exponent chosen by the RSA key generation algorithm as implemented by
the MICARDO operating system (see Section 4.1.1).
3.1.2.1. MICARDO platform versions
By analyzing several MICARDO-powered ID cards issued from 2002 to 20116,
we found that over the years, ID cards were actually issued using three slightly
different MICARDO platform versions. First, we made an extensive comparison
using all readable information from the card by scanning the whole smart card file
system. The metadata was read from the FCP (file control parameters) and FMD
(file management data) fields of all DF (dedicated file) and EF (elementary file)
files and the contents of all EF files were read. The differences found are listed
below.
1. Cards issued in 2002:
• These are the only cards in which the FMD of the MF (master file)
report the chip identifier as Infineon 30 (0x1E), which matches the
one specified in the MICARDO User Manual (Section 8.4.4.
in [185]), and hence should correspond to Infineon’s SLE66CX320P
microcontroller. Other cards have a different chip identifier.
• These are the only cards that comply to the MICARDO User Manual
by having the EF_ATR file be a transparent file (Section 4.10 in [185]).
The others have a formatted EF_ATR file that contains a single record.
• The Image ID specified in the FMD of the MF is set to 0x000000
while the MICARDO User Manual specifies 0x000001 (Section
8.4.4. in [185]).
• The EF_Rule file in the PKCS#15 directory (MF/5015) has the
maximal record length of 40, while in other cards it is decreased to
26 (most likely to save space).
• The RSA public key exponent length specified in the key generation
template is set to 4 random bytes, while in other cards it has been
decreased to 3 bytes.7
• The FMD of the EF_TIN file contains the customer identifier
548-a002 and customer specific version and release
001548CS01.V02.
• The cards have 21 765 bytes of free space reported in the FCP of the
DFs, which may suggest that the chip in these cards has a smaller
EEPROM size.
6ID cards issued in: 2002-01, 2003-04, 2004-04, 2005-04, 2007-05, 2009-04 and 2010-09.
7The reason for avoiding 4-byte public exponents was that Microsoft Windows 98 SE was not
able to handle certificates with correctly ASN.1-encoded 32-bit public exponents.
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2. Cards issued from 2003 to 2007-09-03:
• The cards in the FMD of the MF report the chip identifier as Infineon
34 (0x22).
• The Image ID specified in the FMD of the MF is set to 0x020000
while the MICARDO User Manual specifies 0x000001.
• The FMD of the EF_TIN file contains the customer identifier
548-a003 and customer specific release 001548CS02.V01.
• The cards have only 5 570 bytes of free space reported in the FCP of
the DFs.
3. Cards issued from 2007-09-03:
• The cards in the FMD of the MF report the chip identifier as Infineon
45 (0x2D).
• The Image ID specified in the FMD of the MF is set to 0x030000
while the MICARDO User Manual specifies 0x000001.
• The FMD of the EF_TIN file contains the customer identifier
548-a004 and customer specific release 001548CS03.V01.
• The cards have 22 334 bytes of free space reported in the FCP of the
DFs. This is almost 16KB more than in the MICARDO cards issued
from 2003 to 2007-09-03, but only 569 bytes more compared to the
MICARDO cards issued in 2002.
• These cards have new cold and warm ATRs. The electrical
communication parameters encoded in the ATR enable slightly faster
data transmission between the card and terminal.
To verify whether the MICARDO-powered ID cards did indeed use three
different chips as reported by the MICARDO operating system, we decapsulated
the microcontroller from the chip and observed it using a high-magnification
(1000x) digital microscope. After removing the chip module from the card we
noticed that for the cards issued in 2002 and cards issued from 2003 to
2007-09-03, the microcontroller was covered by black opaque epoxy8 while for
the cards issued from 2007-09-03, the epoxy was transparent. In both cases the
epoxy was successfully dissolved by dipping it into 96% sulfuric acid heated at
200 ◦C. Photos of the chip modules and microcontrollers are shown in Figure 6.
The cards issued in 2002 were likely embedded with a SLE66CX320P
microcontroller as specified in the MICARDO User Manual. According to the
CMB presentation (slide 3 in [187]) the cards issued from 2003 to 2007-09-03
may have used Infineon’s 16KB microcontroller SLE66CX160P9, while the
cards issued after that used Infineon’s 68KB microcontroller SLE66CX680PE.
8Hard opaque tamper-evident coating on a chip is required by FIPS 140-2 standard [189].
9This also corresponds to the Estonian EU notification on SSCDs [190], where for the ID cards
issued until 2016-12-31, the certification reference is specified as TUVIT-DSZ-ITSEC-9121-2001,
which corresponds to the certification of Infineon’s SLE66CX160P microcontroller.
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(a) Cards issued in 2002 (SLE66CX320P)
(b) Cards issued in 2002 with squared contact layout chip (SLE66CX320P)
(c) Cards issued from 2003 to 2007-09-03 (SLE66CX160P)
(d) Cards issued from 2007-09-03 (SLE66CX680PE)




The MICARDO Public v2.1 chip card operating system had been certified
according to ITSEC10 (IT Security Evaluation Criteria) E4 evaluation level. The
product was certified on 2001-08-28 by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(TÜViT) in Germany under certification reference TUVIT-DSZ-ITSEC-
9126-2001 [191, 192]. However, based on the analysis below, we concluded that
the MICARDO product used in the Estonian ID cards was not the exact product
that had passed the ITSEC certification.
The certification report (Section 1.1 in [192]) states that the subject of the
certification was smart card operating system MICARDO Public identifiable by
value 0xD276000028FF051E000001 specified in the FMD of the MF. According
to the MICARDO User Manual (Section 8.4.4. in [185]), the FMD data contains
the ORGA registration identifier, chip identifier and operating system image
identifier. We note that none of the MICARDO cards issued contain the same
FMD data as specified in the certification report. The closest match was the
ID cards issued in 2002, where the only difference was that the operation system
image identifier was 0x000000 instead of 0x000001 as certified. We believe that
these cards issued in 2002 were a pre-certified version of the product, as the
MICARDO-powered EstEID specification [3] had already been drafted on
2001-06-07, before the product passed the certification on 2001-08-28.
The evaluated security functionality of the MICARDO operating system
included physical protection provided by Infineon’s SLE66CX320P
microcontroller. The microcontroller was certified on 2000-08-04 by TÜViT
under the reference TUVIT-DSZ-ITSEC-9115-2000 [193] and later recertified
on 2002-09-12 by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
under reference BSI-DSZ-ITSEC-0175-2002 [194]. Since the security of the
MICARDO operating system embedded on a different chip had not been
evaluated, the certification report (Section 1.4 in [192]) states that the use of a
different microcontroller may lead to recertification. However, we see that the
ID cards issued from 2003 and after 2007 contain Infineon chip identifiers 0x22
and 0x2D (see Section 3.1.2.1 above), which are different from the certified chip
identifier 0x1E (SLE66CX320P). Furthermore, contrary to the MICARDO User
Manual, these cards have a formatted EF_ATR file that contains a single record
and the operation system image identifier on these cards are 0x020000 and
0x030000 which are different from the 0x000001 that has been subject to
certification. Therefore, we conclude that at least formally the MICARDO cards
used in Estonia were not the product that had been certified.
In the course of this research, we discovered a security flaw in the MICARDO
mutual authentication protocol that was covered by the certification (see
Section 5.1.4). This shows that the ITSEC certification process of the
MICARDO platform at least to some extent failed to assure the security of the
product.
10ITSEC is one of the predecessors of the Common Criteria certification standard.
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We note that even if the security of the MICARDO operating system held, it
could not guarantee the security of the final smart card solution, as the MICARDO
operating system had to be configured using a secure configuration. This issue
was well ilustrated by a misconfiguration we found in all MICARDO-powered
ID cards, which allowed card management operations to be performed using PIN2
(see Section 6.2).
3.2. MULTOS platform
The MULTOS platform was introduced at the end of 2010 and was used until
the end of 2014 exclusively for issuance of the newly introduced digital identity
cards. The digital identity card and the MULTOS platform are described in the
subsections below.
3.2.1. Digital identity card
In October 2010, a new type of identity document digital identity card (Digi-ID)
was introduced. Since this document can only be used electronically, it can be
personalized in PPA customer service points and issued instantly. The purpose of
the Digi-ID is to provide a backup solution in the event the cardholder’s identity
card cannot be used. The Digi-IDs are distributed by the ID card manufacturer
to PPA with the private keys pre-generated (Section 6.1.2.1 in [195]). The only
electronic personalization that has to be done in the PPA service point is certificate
loading in the card. Instead of high-security laser engraving, heat-transfer printing
is used to print cardholder details on the Digi-ID blank [196]. Similarly as in the
case of the identity card, a person can have only one valid Digi-ID. Usually
persons apply for Digi-ID when applying for the identity card. The certificates
for MULTOS-powered Digi-IDs were issued with the validity period of 3 years.
According to PPA, the validity was limited to 3 years due to the durability of the
plastic material used for the card. The Digi-ID certificates can be distinguished
from the identity card certificates, since Digi-ID certificates have the Organization
Name (O), in the Subject Distinguished Name field, set to “ESTEID (DIGI-ID)”
(the identity card certificates have the value set to “ESTEID”) [197]. The barcode
on the back of the card encodes the document number.
Figure 7: A MULTOS-powered digital identity card issued from 2010-10-01 to
2014-11-30 [182]
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3.2.2. MULTOS-powered ID cards
The MULTOS platform is used exclusively in Digi-ID cards issued from 2010-10-
01 to 2014-11-30 (see Figure 7). The subsequent Digi-ID cards are implemented
on the jTOP SLE78 platform (see Section 3.4.4) and have a slightly different
coloring.
The card is built on the MULTOS I4E11 platform [199] produced by KeyCorp
and is masked on Infineon’s SLE66CX???PE12 chip (see Figure 8). We are not
aware of any security certifications for this MULTOS platform.
The MULTOS card application was developed to mimic the MICARDO
interface described in the EstEID specification. The EstEID application for the
MULTOS-powered ID cards was coded in a legacy C programming language by
a contractor from the Estonian company “ID Süsteemide AS” [186].
The development of the MULTOS-powered ID card platform was already
completed in 2008. At that time it was believed that MULTOS would be a
manufacturer-independent platform to which all applications would move in the
future. Therefore, the MULTOS platform was devised as the future platform for
the Estonian ID card, but its use was delayed due to the reorganization of CMB.
Later, after Gemalto bought Keycorp, it became evident that MULTOS would not
be a fully open platform and hence the MULTOS platform was abandoned,
giving preference to the JavaCard platform instead. [184, 200]
The MULTOS-powered ID cards are limited to 1024-bit RSA keys and are
only able to communicate over T=0 transmission protocol [9]. The cards can be
identified by their cold13 and warm14 ATRs (Section 3.1 in [9]). The warm ATR
is a copy of the cold ATR from the MICARDO-powered ID cards and hence the
warm ATR of MULTOS cards falsely offers T=1 transmission protocol [201].
From our certificate dataset we see that in total, approximately 15 thousand
MULTOS-powered Digi-ID cards have been issued. The last card expired on
2017-11-26.
Figure 8: The chip module and microcontroller (SLE66CX???PE) used in
MULTOS-powered ID cards
11The official documents [9,198] have a typo as they refer to the implementation “IE4”, which is
non-existent.
12According to I4E specification the EEPROM size can either be 8 KB, 16 KB, 36 KB or 64 KB.
133B 6E 00 00 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30
143B FE 94 00 FF 80 B1 FA 45 1F 03 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 43
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3.3. jTOP SLE66 platform
Starting in 2011, a new platform based on Infineon’s JCLX80JTOP20ID
platform [198], further identified as the Estonian ID card platform jTOP SLE66,
was used to manufacture the identity card. The same platform was also used for
the new identity document type residence permit card introduced in 2011. The
jTOP SLE66 platform and all further Estonian ID card platforms are based on
JavaCard technology, therefore we will start this section by briefly introducing
JavaCard technology and the related GlobalPlatform standard.
3.3.1. JavaCard and GlobalPlatform
JavaCard technology allows smart card application developers to write smart
card applets using a subset of the Java programming language. The card
operating system implements a JavaCard runtime environment and provides
isolation between multiple JavaCard applets co-residing on a single smart card.
The functionality provided by JavaCard is identified by the JavaCard
standard’s API version. The operating system manufacturer can choose which
subset of JavaCard API to implement, and can provide additional proprietary
APIs, for example, to provide direct access to big number arithmetic. However,
the use of proprietary APIs does not provide the cross-vendor applet
interoperability that the JavaCard technology aims to achieve.
JavaCard platforms usually rely on the GlobalPlatform specification [202] for
applet management. JavaCard applets can be installed and removed, but for
security purposes the platform forbids the retrieval of installed applet instances
and related data from the card.
GlobalPlatform card management operations with the card have to be
performed over a secure channel based on symmetric or asymmetric keys. The
GlobalPlatform standard defines several secure channel protocol versions and
configurations the platform may implement. Several security domains can reside
on a card and a separate set of card management keys can be used to manage
each security domain and the applets associated with it.
3.3.2. jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards
The jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards were built on top of Infineon’s product
JCLX80jTOP20ID masked on Infineon’s SLE66CX800PE chip [203] (see
Figure 9). The cards run the jTOP (Java Trusted Open Platform) JavaCard
operating system developed by Trusted Logic. The platform has a 75KB
user-accessible EEPROM, and is compliant with JavaCard 2.2.1 API and
GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 specification [203]. The platform also includes libraries
available in JavaCard 2.2.2 API (page 8 in [204]). On this platform, the EstEID
functionality was implemented in a JavaCard applet, which was the intellectual
property of the ID card manufacturer (page 18 in [205]).
61
Figure 9: The chip module and microcontroller (SLE66CX800PE) used in
jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards. The components are barely visible as the
microcontroller is fully covered by protective mesh shielding (described by
Infineon as “Active Shield”).
The jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards support both T=0 and T=1 transmission
protocols and can be identified by their cold15 and warm16 ATRs (Section 3.1
in [9]). Compared to the previous ID card platforms that used 1024-bit RSA keys,
the jTOP SLE66 platform uses 2048-bit (and 2047-bit) RSA keys. The jTOP
SLE66-powered ID cards were issued from January 2011 until the end of 2014.
The last jTOP SLE66-powered ID card expired at the end of 2019.
The manufacturing of the first jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards faced issues. In
January 2011, PPA recalled 46 ID cards that have been issued before 2011-01-
18 for cardholders who had requested an urgent document issuance [206]. From
the last byte of the warm ATR of the affected cards (see Section 3.1 in [9]), we
see that the chip on these cards was not fully personalized, as the GlobalPlatfom
card’s life cycle state encoded in the last nibble corresponds to OP_READY (0x01)
instead of the expected SECURED (0x0F) state. After the ID card manufacturer
fixed the issue, the warm ATR of the card changed. Since the ID card software
relied on the ATR to identify the Estonian ID card, the ID card software had to be
updated [207].
At the end of 2011, a critical security flaw was found in the EstEID JavaCard
applet v3.0 (see Section 6.4) and starting from 2012, a fixed EstEID applet v3.4
was installed on the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards [208].
3.3.3. Identity card
With the switch to the jTOP SLE66 platform, the design of the identity card was
updated (see Figure 10). The chip was moved to the back of the card to be in
compliance with EU requirements for the residence permit card (see below). This
caused increased technical support requests as cardholders’ were accustomed to
inserting the ID card in the reader with the cardholder’s photo facing upward.
Additionally, two barcodes, encoding the personal ID code of the cardholder and
the document number, were added on the back of the card in the updated design.
153B FE 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 A8
163B FE 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 80 31 80 66 40 90 A4 16 2A 00 83 0F 90 00 EF
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Figure 10: A jTOP SLE66/SLE78-powered identity card issued from 2011-01-
01 [182]
3.3.4. Residence permit card
With the introduction of the jTOP SLE66 platform, the residence permit card
was launched (see Figure 11). The residence permit card is issued to non-EU
third-country nationals residing in Estonia and was introduced to implement
Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 [209], which established uniform format
requirements for residence permits issued by EU member states to third-country
nationals. The Estonian-specific design elements were the two barcodes on the
back of the card that (the same as for the identity card) encoded the personal ID
code of the cardholder and the document number.
Figure 11: A jTOP SLE66/SLE78-powered residence permit card issued from
2011-01-01 [182]. The 6-digit Card Access Number (CAN) was introduced for
the SLE78-powered cards.
The residence permit card contains a separate contactless smart card chip (see
Figure 12) that contains an ICAO-compliant electronic machine-readable travel
document (eMRTD) ePassport application. The chip stores digitally signed
cardholder data, including biometric data (a 480x640 pixel facial image and the
cardholder’s fingerprints). However, to read that information wirelessly, the
terminal has to authenticate to the eMRTD applet and establish a secure channel
using the Basic Access Control (BAC) mechanism [210]. To create the BAC key,
the machine-readable zone (MRZ) of the residence permit card has to be
optically read to extract the document number, expiration date and cardholder’s
date of birth. However, since the fields comprising the BAC key are also stored
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on the EstEID applet in the personal data file, a contact reader can be used to
construct the BAC key without needing to optically scan the MRZ.
To slow down BAC brute-force attacks, the BAC implementation of the
eMRTD applet implements an incremental delay: after the first incorrect BAC
try, the delay increases to 1 second; after the second try to 2 seconds; and after
the third try it increases and stays at 10 seconds until a successful BAC is
performed.
To provide integrity for the data stored on an eMRTD, the document issuer
signs hashes of eMRTD data files and provides the signature together with the
hash values in the EF.SOD file. However, the eMRTD chip on the jTOP
SLE66-powered residence permit card has defects that prevent ICAO-compliant
document inspection systems from verifying the signature. While the EF.SOD
specifies SHA-256 as a hash function used to calculate hash values, the actual
hash values contain SHA-1 hashes of the data files. Furthermore, the signature
on the document signer certificate is not valid (signs a wrong hash), effectively
preventing the verification of the authenticity of the data stored in the eMRTD.
To prevent eMRTD cloning attacks, the eMRTD applet supports the Chip
Authentication mechanism (Section 6.2 in [210]) using the elliptic curve
brainpoolP224r1.
The fingerprints of a cardholder are usually considered to be more sensitive
biometric data than a facial image, therefore to access fingerprints, an additional
Extended Access Control (EAC) mechanism with terminal authentication should
be used. However, we found that contrary to the requirements of EU
regulation [209], the fingerprints stored on the jTOP SLE66-powered residence
permit card can be publicly read even without establishing a secure channel
using the BAC mechanism.
The specification of the contactless eMRTD chip is not publicly available. The
chip provides an ISO/IEC 14443 Type A contactless interface with a random 4-
byte UID. The historical bytes of the ATS17 (answer to select) encode ASCII
string MTCOSp, which may suggest that the eMRTD functionality is implemented
using the MTCOS Pro line of products.
Figure 12: A contactless eMRTD chip and antenna in a residence permit card
173B 89 80 01 4D 54 43 4F 53 70 02 01 05 38
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3.3.5. Common Criteria certification peculiarities
According to the information provided in the EU QSCD list [190] prepared by
the Estonian authorities, the jTOP SLE66 platform used by the Estonian ID cards
was Common Criteria certified on 2009-10-27 by the National Cybersecurity
Agency of France (ANSSI) under the reference ANSSI-CC-2009/34 [211]. The
certification process was based on the composite evaluation, where the object of
evaluation was product JCLX80jTOP20ID, which was the result of embedding
the jTOP JavaCard platform on top of a chip that had been independently
certified by the chip manufacturer. The SLE66CX800PE chip was certified on
2008-05-27 by BSI under the reference BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008 [212].
The certification report for the JCLX80jTOP20ID platform (see Section 1.2.1
in [211]) describes how to correctly identify the unique product that had passed
the certification. The historical bytes of the ATR among other things identify the
software version of the product.
We found that contrary to the certification report, the expected patch version
identifier 2.0 (0x20) was set to 0 (0x00) in the warm ATR of the actual jTOP
SLE66-powered ID cards. This implies that the software version embedded on
the chips used by the Estonian ID card were missing the version 2.0 patch, which
was subject to certification.
Since the historical bytes of the ATR can be changed in the personalization
phase through a JavaCard API call, the accuracy of the information contained in
the ATR was confirmed by also retrieving the same software version identifier
from the CPLC (Card Production Life Cycle) data using the
GlobalPlatform [213] GET DATA command with a tag value of 0x9F7F. This
CPLC data cannot be changed by the ID card manufacturer in the card
personalization phase.
On 2016-05-27, we informed the ID card manufacturer [214] about the
discovered inconsistency. The ID card manufacturer explained that Infineon did
not load 2.0 patch since this patch was only relevant for the ICAO LDS
(eMRTD) application which was not used in Estonian ID cards.
As the certification report [211] does not state that the security objectives
claimed in the security target are also met for a product that did not contain the
patch, we have to accept this manufacturer’s explanation at face value.
Another issue that questions whether the platform version delivered in the
Estonian ID cards had been subject to the Common Criteria evaluation process is
the fact that the RSA key generation algorithm implemented on the card, returns
a 2047-bit RSA modulus 38% of the time when asked to generate a 2048-bit
RSA key (see Section 4.3.1). While this is not a security issue, one would
consider that such a basic functional bug would have been discovered in the
extensive testing performed by the evaluation facility. According to the
certification report [211], the evaluation of the JCLX80jTOP20ID platform was
peformed by Serma Technologies in France.
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3.4. jTOP SLE78 platform
Commencing at the end of 2014, the new jTOP SLE78 platform was used to
produce the identity card, residence permit card and digital identity card. While
all the previous Estonian ID card platforms used Infineon’s SLE66 chip
controller family, this platform used the improved Infineon’s SLE78 security
controller. The move away from the SLE66 microcontroller family was also
motivated by the demonstration at the Black Hat 2010 conference, which showed
that an expensive but practical attack against the SLE66 family of
microcontrollers was possible [215].
The visual design of the identity card and residence permit card stayed the
same as shown in Figure 10 and 11. The visual appearance of the digital identity
card became more colorful (see Figure 14). The jTOP SLE78 platform was also
used to power the newly introduced e-resident’s digital identity card and
diplomatic identity card described in the subsections below.
3.4.1. jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards
The jTOP SLE78 platform was implemented on top of Infineon’s product “jTOP
ID on SLE 78” [216] 18 using product configuration SLJ52GCA080CL [198].
The platform is masked on Infineon’s SLE78CLX800P [217] chip (see
Figure 13), runs jTOP ID JavaCard operating system developed by Trusted
Logic, has an 80KB EEPROM, supports JavaCard 3.0.4 API and complies to
GlobalPlatform 2.2.1 specification [216].
The chip supports both T=0 and T=1 transmission protocols and can be
identified by their cold19 and warm20 ATRs. The warm ATR, however, is
identical to the warm ATR of the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards, therefore the
updated EstEID specification recommends using the EstEID applet version
identifier (Section 3.1 in [10]) to identify the card application.
Initially, the jTOP SLE78 platform used 2048-bit RSA keys, but due to
Infineon’s RSA key generation flaw (see Section 6.7), the switch to ECC keys
using NIST curve P-384 was made at the end of 2017. The RSA key generation
flaw was found in a component that was certified by the Common Criteria
certification process. Therefore, the Common Criteria certification of the
platform and the failure of this process are further analyzed in Section 6.7.5
under Infineon’s RSA key generation flaw.
The jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards were issued until the end of 2018 and thus
the last ID cards will expire at the end of 2023.
18In the Common Criteria certificate the product is identified as jTOP INFv#46 (SLJ 52G).
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Figure 13: The chip module and microcontroller (SLE78CLX800P) used in jTOP
SLE78-powered ID cards
3.4.1.1. EstEID applet versions
The EstEID functionality in the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards was
implemented as a version 3.5 EstEID JavaCard applet. Over the years, the
EstEID applet received several updates. As the development of the EstEID applet
was done by the ID card manufacturer and the authorities in secrecy, the exact
changelog is not available. Below we list the most significant EstEID applet
version 3.5 changes of which we are aware.
According to the EstEID specification (Section 1.3 in [10]) the jTOP SLE78-
powered ID cards should return version identifier 3.5.1 or higher. However, the
lowest version identifier we have observed on the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards
is version 3.5.2.
In fall 2015, EstEID applet version 3.5.3 was released to fix the public key
encoding (see Section 6.6).
In order to replace the certificates with incorrectly encoded public keys,
EstEID applet version 3.5.7 was released on 2016-06-20. This version was
installed on new cards and also in the applet update process. Beginning with this
version, RIA acquired the copyright ownership of the EstEID applet from the
ID card manufacturer [218].
On 2017-10-25, EstEID applet version 3.5.8 was released as a response to the
discovery of Infineon’s RSA key generation flaw (see Section 6.7). This version
replaced 2048-bit RSA keys with ECC keys using NIST curve P-384. The switch
to ECC keys also resulted in an updated EstEID specification document [12] being
released by RIA.
3.4.2. Identity card
Starting from 2014-10-17, the jTOP SLE78 platform was used to issue the
identity card. As the chip contact layouts of jTOP SLE66 and jTOP SLE78 cards
look the same, there is no visual feature that can be used to distinguish jTOP
SLE66-powered identity cards from jTOP SLE78-powered identity cards (see
Figure 10). However, jTOP SLE78-powered identity cards have the document
numbers starting from AA0850000 and EA0040000 [219].
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3.4.3. Residence permit card
Starting from 2014-12-19 [208], the jTOP SLE78 platform was used to issue
residence permit cards with document numbers starting from BB0002000,
FB0000100 and PB0010000 [219].
The jTOP SLE78-powered residence permit card had a new eMRTD
contactless chip. The chip provided an ISO/IEC 14443 Type B contactless
interface with a random 4-byte PUPI. The specification for the contactless
eMRTD chip is not publicly available and the ATS21 does not encode any known
product identifier.
In addition to the BAC mechanism, the eMRTD implementation on the jTOP
SLE78-powered residence permit card supports the Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol that can be used to establish a secure
channel with the applet. As a password, the PACE implementation allows the use
of the key derived from the MRZ (the same that is used by BAC) or a 6-digit
Card Access Number (CAN) that is printed on the front of the residence permit
card (see Figure 11). The PACE implementation uses the elliptic curve
brainpoolP256r1.
To slow down brute-force attacks, the eMRTD applet implements separate
counters for BAC using MRZ, PACE using MRZ and PACE using CAN as a
password. After each unsuccessful BAC/PACE establishment, the delay
incrementally increases (0.2, 3.3, 6.4 and 10.6 seconds) and stays at 10.6 seconds
until a secure channel is successfully established using that particular mechanism
and password.
Similar to jTOP SLE66-powered residence permit cards, the signature on the
document signer certificate is not valid (signs a wrong hash), effectively
preventing the verification of the authenticity of the data stored in the eMRTD.
Most likely because of this, on 2018-06-26, PPA issued a deviation list22 [221]
that contains document numbers of 169 422 jTOP SLE78-powered residence
permit cards with the defect code id-Deviation-LDSSODSignatureWrong.
As with jTOP SLE66-powered residence permit cards, to prevent eMRTD
cloning attacks, the Chip Authentication mechanism using the elliptic curve
brainpoolP224r1 is supported.
Contrary to the eMRTD applet of the jTOP SLE66-powered cards, the
fingerprints are not readable on jTOP SLE78-powered cards as they are likely
protected by an EAC mechanism. European Commission decision C(2011)
5499 [222] required the PACE protocol to be implemented by 2014-12-31 at the
latest. According to PPA [223], the new chip supporting the PACE protocol was
implemented in residence permit cards starting from 2014-11-03. This means
that there may also be jTOP SLE66-powered residence permit cards that have
been shipped with this eMRTD chip and the CAN printed on the card.
213B 88 80 01 00 00 00 00 77 81 91 00 6E
22A deviation list is a machine-readable data file that is used by the document issuing state to
notify relying parties of a non-conforming travel documents (Section 7 in [220]).
68
3.4.4. Digital identity card
The digital identity card issuance switched from MULTOS to jTOP SLE78
platform starting from 2014-12-01 [208]. These cards had document numbers
starting from N0100000 [219]. Along with this switch, the visual appearance of
the Digi-ID card became more colorful (see Figure 14).
Figure 14: A jTOP SLE78-powered digital identity card and e-resident’s digital
identity card issued from 2014-12-01 [182]
Starting from 2018-05-01, the validity period of digital identity cards was
extended from 3 to 5 years. Starting from 2018-11-01, the cardholders of still
valid digital identity cards that were valid for a 3-year period, were offered the
opportunity to extend the validity of their certificates for an additional 2
years [224]. In total there were approximately 32 000 such cardholders, most of
them e-residents (see the next section). The validity extension service was not
provided in PPA service points but was instead only offered remotely through the
use of the remote ID card applet replacement solution (see Section 5.4). The
remote update possibility was discontinued on 2019-04-30 [225].
3.4.5. E-resident’s digital identity card
On 2014-12-01, together with the switch from MULTOS to the jTOP SLE78
platform for Digi-ID issuance, the e-resident’s digital identity card (e-resident’s
Digi-ID) was introduced. The e-resident’s Digi-ID is issued to persons who are
not residents of Estonia, but who have obtained an Estonian personal ID code
through the e-Residency program [226]. In the context of the Identity Documents
Act (IDA), the e-resident’s Digi-ID is considered to be a subtype of Digi-ID,
hence the term digital identity card in the law may also refer to the e-resident’s
digital identity card. In this work, however, we will use separate terms and
abbreviations to refer to the particular document type.
The validity period of the e-resident’s Digi-ID is inherited from Digi-ID and
hence the validity period was also extended from 3 to 5 years for e-resident’s
Digi-ID on 2018-05-01. The visual design of the e-resident’s Digi-ID is the same
as for Digi-ID (see Figure 14). The document type can only be distinguished
through the certificates. The certificates of the e-resident’s Digi-ID have the
Organization Name (O) set to “ESTEID (DIGI-ID E-RESIDENT)”, while
Digi-ID certificates have “ESTEID (DIGI-ID)” [197].
69
In the case of substantial public interest, the Minister of the Interior can
decide to issue the e-resident’s Digi-ID to a person without an application from
that person. Over the years, several world-famous persons have received an
e-resident’s Digi-ID without them having asked for it [227]. This conflicts with
the standard practice of CAs issuing the certificate based on a subject’s
application and acceptance of Terms and Conditions.
3.4.6. NFC-enabled digital identity card
In November 2014, the ID card manufacturer announced an NFC-enabled
ID card pilot based on the jTOP SLE78-powered Digi-ID [200]. In March 2016,
a video demonstrating the contactless Digi-ID prototype was published in the
media [228].
The prototype was implemented on top of Infineon’s “jTOP ID on SLE 78”
product using the dual-interface product configuration SLJ52GCA080CL [216].
The certificates for the NFC-enabled Digi-IDs were issued with the validity
period set to 2 years. In our certificate dataset we identified 50 such
NFC-enabled Digi-IDs issued in 2014-12, 2015-03 and 2015-04, mostly to the
employees of RIA, SK, PPA and the ID card manufacturer.
Even though qualified certificates for electronic signatures were issued for this
NFC pilot platform, this NFC-enabled platform has been documented neither in
law nor SK certificate policies. The conformance to SSCD requirements has not
been assessed either, since the platform has not been included in the list of SSCDs
used in Estonia [198].
3.4.7. Diplomatic identity card
On 2017-02-01, IDA introduced a diplomatic identity card (diplomatic ID card).
Diplomatic ID cards are issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to
replace the old diplomatic and service cards that did not provide the electronic
functionality. The document numbers on the diplomatic ID cards start with A1,
A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3, D1, D2, E1, F1, HC, G1, G2, G3 and G4,
depending on the diplomatic status type (Section 2.2.1 in [229]). The design of
the diplomatic ID card is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: A jTOP SLE78-powered diplomatic identity card issued from 2017-
02-01 [230]
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In the context of IDA, the diplomatic ID card is considered to be a subtype of
the identity card, hence the term identity card in the law may also refer to the
diplomatic ID card. SK, however, does not define the diplomatic ID card in their
policies, but issues certificates for the diplomatic ID card under the Digi-ID
certificate policy (i.e., the certificates of the diplomatic ID card have the
Organization Name (O) set to “ESTEID (DIGI-ID)” in the Subject Distinguished
Name field, the same as for Digi-IDs).
The validity period of the diplomatic ID card in IDA is regulated separately
from the identity card and its validity period has been set to 5 years from the
introduction of the diplomatic ID card.
3.5. IDEMIA platform
The latest generation Estonian ID card platform was introduced at the end of 2018.
The cards are manufactured by IDEMIA (formerly Oberthur Technologies), but
the personalization is performed by the Estonian company Hansab AS [131]. The
IDEMIA-powered ID cards have a completely new design featuring a color photo
of the cardholder, new security elements and a new smart card chip that has a new
style contact layout and includes a contactless interface (see Figure 16, 17, 19 and
20). The added QR code at the back of the identity card encodes a link to the
PPA website where the validity of the document can be verified23. The IDEMIA
platform was used to issue every type of ID card starting from 2018-12-03. For
cardholders who applied before 2018-12-03, the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards
were issued [134].
The new smart card platform is powered by the ID-One Cosmo v8.1 JavaCard
open platform developed by Oberthur Technologies (now known as IDEMIA).
The platform is embedded on the NXP P6022M VB microcontroller
manufactured by NXP Semiconductors GmbH (see Figure 21). The platform has
a 144KB EEPROM, supports JavaCard 3.0.4 API and complies to
GlobalPlatform 2.2.1 (ID Configuration v1.0) specification.
The chip supports both T=0 and T=1 transmission protocols and returns the
same cold and warm ATR24 [13]. Digital signature and authentication keys are
ECC keys using NIST P-384 curve.
In contrast to the previous generation digital identity cards (and e-resident’s
digital identity cards), the private keys on the IDEMIA-powered digital identity
cards are not pre-generated, but are generated on the card by PPA in the
personalization process (Section 3.2.1 in [70]). An additional change is that
document numbers on IDEMIA-powered digital identity cards start with NA,
while document numbers on IDEMIA-powered e-resident’s digital identity cards
start with UA.
23For example, https://www2.politsei.ee/qr/?qr=AS0000302.
243B DB 96 00 80 B1 FE 45 1F 83 00 12 23 3F 53 65 49 44 0F 90 00 F1
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Figure 16: An IDEMIA-powered identity card [231]
Figure 17: The IDEMIA-powered residence permit card issued until
2020-09-30 [231]
Figure 18: The IDEMIA-powered residence permit card issued from
2020-10-01 [231]
Figure 19: An IDEMIA-powered diplomatic identity card [183]
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Figure 20: An IDEMIA-powered digital identity card and e-resident’s digital
identity card [231]
Figure 21: The chip module and microcontroller (NXP P6022M VB) used in
IDEMIA-powered ID cards
3.5.1. IAS-ECC applet
On IDEMIA-powered ID cards the electronic functionality, which in previous
ID card platforms was implemented by the EstEID applet, has been implemented
using ID-One IAS-ECC V2 applet that was developed by IDEMIA. The applet
is based on the Identification Authentication Signature – European Citizen Card
(IAS-ECC) specification v1.01 [232] developed by the French smartcard industry
association. The applet on top of the ID-One Cosmo v8.1 platform has been
Common Criteria certified as a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD), thereby
fulfilling the certification requirement of qualified electronic signature creation
devices as required by eIDAS Article 30. The switch to the IAS-ECC applet was
made mainly because the EstEID applet used in the previous generation Estonian
ID card platforms had not been certified as is now required by eIDAS.
While most of the functionality provided by the EstEID applet has remained,
the communication interface between the card and reader has changed. The main
differences compared to the EstEID applet are: (1) the IAS-ECC applet is not the
default selected applet25 and hence it has to be explicitly selected by the reader
25The implicitly selected applet now is the GlobalPlatform Issuer Security Domain, except on
residence permit cards where the eMRTD applet is the default selected applet.
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after establishing a connection to the card; (2) certificates are stored in different
locations; (3) each personal data file record is stored in a separate file; (4) key
usage counters are not maintained; (5) to read the PIN retry counters an empty
VERIFY command must be sent26. [233]
3.5.2. EE-GovCA2018
The certificates for IDEMIA-powered ID cards are issued by the intermediate
CA ESTEID2018 under a new separate SK root CA EE-GovCA2018, which is
used exclusively to issue certificates for Estonian state-issued identity
documents. Several changes have been introduced in the ID card certificates: (1)
CRLs are still issued, but the URL has been removed from the certificates; (2)
the Organization Name (O) and Organizational Unit (OU) fields have been
removed from the certificate’s subject name; (3) the cardholder’s personal ID
code in the SerialNumber (SN) field of the subject name now contains the
“PNOEE-” prefix; (4) the email address in the authentication certificate is now in
the form personal_ID_code@eesti.ee. [233]
3.5.3. Contactless interface
The IDEMIA-powered ID cards are dual-interface cards (see Figure 22) that can
be also used to communicate with the chip over the contactless interface. The
contactless interface supports the ISO/IEC 14443 Type A standard and returns a
random 4-byte UID and an ATS27 containing the same historical bytes as the
contact interface. To prevent unauthenticated contactless reading of the card, the
card requires the commands sent over the contactless interface to be sent over a
secure channel established with the PACE protocol using the elliptic curve NIST
P-256. To establish the secure channel the 6-digit Card Access Number (CAN)
printed on the ID card must be used as a password in PACE. The PACE protocol
prevents offline password brute-force attacks, but to slow down online CAN
brute-force attacks, the PACE implementation on the IAS-ECC applet introduces
a 30 second delay after 10 consecutive tries to establish PACE using an incorrect
password are made. [234]
The secure channel can also be optionally used over the contact interface to
secure communication between the card and the application. Unfortunately, the
privacy guarantees provided by the secure messaging are questionable, as the
CAN is visible at the front of the card and the authorities have not informed the
cardholders about the privacy sensitive nature of the CAN.
26This command is blocked when using smart card readers with a PIN pad and PIN firewall (see
Section 2.14.1).
273B 8B 80 01 00 12 23 3F 53 65 49 44 0F 90 00 A0
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Figure 22: A dual-interface chip and antenna in an IDEMIA-powered ID card
3.5.4. Residence permit card
In the previous generation residence permit cards the eMRTD applet was
implemented as a separate contactless chip. On the dual-interface
IDEMIA-powered ID cards the eMRTD applet is loaded next to the IAS-ECC
applet and is the default selected applet28 as expected by eMRTD inspection
systems.
To communicate with the eMRTD applet over both contact and contactless
interfaces, a secure channel has to be established. To establish a secure channel
either BAC or PACE can be used.
To slow down BAC brute-force attacks, after 15 consecutive incorrect
passwords a 3 second delay is introduced in the BAC process. The PACE
implementation on the eMRTD applet uses the elliptic curve BrainpoolP384r1
and allows the use of either CAN or MRZ as a password. To slow down CAN
and MRZ brute-force attacks, the PACE implementation on the eMRTD applet
maintains a separate incorrect password counter for CAN and MRZ. After 10
consecutive incorrect passwords of either type are used to establish PACE, a 15
second delay is introduced in the PACE process for that password type. It is
interesting to note that the delay is not removed even after PACE is successfully
established using a correct password, leaving the eMRTD applet in a
permanently impaired state.
To prevent eMRTD cloning attacks, Chip Authentication using the elliptic
curve brainpoolP256r1 is supported. The eMRTD applet on the
IDEMIA-powered ID cards also supports the Active Authentication mechanism
(Section 6.1 in [210]). To prove the authenticity of the eMRTD chip, in the
Active Authentication process, the chip signs a random challenge (provided by
the terminal) using ECDSA with the elliptic curve brainpoolP256r1.
With the introduction of IDEMIA-powered ID cards the personal ID code of
the cardholder is now included in the MRZ and hence its authenticity is provided
in the eMRTD of residence permit cards.
28The eMRTD applet is also the default selected applet on the contact interface. It can be
explicitly selected using the AID A00000024710FF.
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The visual design of the residence permit card changed on 2020-10-01 (see
Figure 18). The EU member states were required to issue newly-designed
residence permit cards on 2020-07-10 at the latest, however, they were allowed
to use up the existing card stocks for an additional six months, i.e. until
2021-01-10 [235].
Starting from August 2021, the EU requires national identity cards to be
equipped with an eMRTD applet [236]. Estonia plans to start shipping the
identity card with an eMRTD applet starting in July 2021 (page 10 in [237]).
3.5.5. Common Criteria certification
The ID-One Cosmo v8.1 platform was Common Criteria EAL5+ certified on
2017-09-05 by ANSSI under the reference ANSSI-CC-2017/49 [238]. The
platform is a composite product based on NXP P6022y VB microcontroller that
was certified on 2016-10-11 by BSI under the reference
BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016 [239]. The ID-One IAS-ECC V2 applet was
EAL5+ certified by ANSSI on 2018-05-04 under the reference
ANSSI-CC-2018/1729 [240].
The certification report of the IAS-ECC applet states that other JavaCard
applets can be loaded next to the IAS-ECC applet, provided that the applet
loading guidelines of the certified ID-One Cosmo v8.1 platform are followed
(Section 1.2.2 in [241]). This means that additional non-certified applets can be
loaded on the ID card without invalidating the certification of the IAS-ECC
applet and hence the legal requirements for qualified electronic signature creation
devices. Since the ID card chip has a significant amount of free space, RIA is
considering opening the ID card platform to third-party JavaCard application
developers [242].
3.5.5.1. Compliance issues
While studying the Common Criteria certification reports, we discovered that the
software revision on the ID card chip of our IDEMIA-powered digital identity
card, issued on 2019-01-02, did not correspond to the product identified in the
Common Criteria certification report.
According to the certification report for the IAS-ECC applet (Section 1.2.2
in [241]), the certified product consists of three components: (1) the NXP
microcontroller certified under the reference BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016; (2)
the ID-One Cosmo v8.1 platform certified under the reference
ANSSI-CC-2017/49 and which has been the subject of maintenance
ANSSI-CC-2017/49-M01; (3) and the ID-One IAS-ECC v2 applet in
configuration #3.
29The ID-One IAS-ECC V2 applet was certified in 4 configurations. RIA and SK have confirmed
that the Estonian ID card implements configuration #3.
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After the initial certification of the ID-One Cosmo v8.1 platform (2017-09-05),
three new revisions of the platform were the subject of certificate maintenance:
M01 (2017-11-20), M02 (2019-01-24) and M03 (2020-01-21) [238]. To identify
which revision of the platform had been installed on the ID card chip, we followed
the instructions in the Security Target document (Section 2.4.3 in [243]) and used
the GET DATA command with the tag value 0xDF52 to read the card identification
data. This identified patch version 090871, which corresponds to the revision
covered by the maintenance report for M02 (Section 2 in [244]).
From this we can see that while the ID-One IAS-ECC V2 applet had been
certified to be used on top of revision M01 of the ID-One Cosmo v8.1 platform,
the Estonian ID card chip contained revision M02 of the platform.
We informed RIA and SK about these findings on 2020-04-28. RIA’s
response was that according to IDEMIA the maintenance of the platform had no
impact on the certification of the applications built on top of it. ANSSI confirmed
this [245] by stating that they forgot to add such a statement in the maintenance
reports for M01 and M02, but that it had been added to the maintenance report
for M03. The question of whether the addition of such a statement to the
certification maintenance report of the platform can retrospectively fix the
applet’s compliance to the certification requirement of eIDAS, we leave as an
open issue.
Regardless of the issue discussed above, we note that the M02 revision of the
ID-One Cosmo v8.1 platform only passed the maintenance assurance on
2019-01-24, meaning that the Estonian ID cards issued in the period from
2018-12-03 to 2019-01-24, strictly speaking, did not meet the eIDAS legal
requirements for qualified electronic signature creation devices.
On 2020-07-21, the Director General of ANSSI wrote a clarification
letter [246] stating that even though the maintenance report was only signed on
2019-01-24, the decision had been shared with IDEMIA on 2018-10-28 and
hence the product issued by IDEMIA since 2018-12-03 is fully in accordance
with ANSSI decisions.
3.6. ID card test cards
Over the years, SK has offered ID card test cards that can be used by developers
and system integrators to test a system’s compatibility with different ID card
platforms [247]. The test cards fully replicate the visual appearance of the
ID cards, including all the security features on it. The only difference from the
real ID cards is that the test card has the word “SPECIMEN” placed on the front
of the card and the identity information on the card is that of a fictitious
cardholder.
The public-key certificates on these cards are issued under SK test CA
hierarchy and SK provides test services where ID card test cards can be used.
Before 2010, the test certificates were issued by intermediate CA TEST-SK,
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chaining up to the SK production root CA. This was against Mozilla’s CA root
store policy as it requires each intermediate CA of a trusted root CA to be
documented and audited. As a result, on 2009-12-01, SK revoked intermediate
CA TEST-SK. [248]
In addition to standard operations, the MICARDO-powered ID card test cards
could have also been used to test the card management operations as the card
management keys on these test cards were set to the example values used in the
specification (Section 14.3.2 in [5]).
The jTOP SLE66-powered ID card test cards were used by foreign researchers
to test the susceptibility of the Estonian ID card’s decryption functionality to the
padding oracle attacks (see Section 6.3).
At the end of September, 2017, the ECC-enabled jTOP SLE78-powered
ID card test cards were provided to service providers free of charge to facilitate
the mitigation of the Estonian ID card crisis (Section 6.7).
3.7. SEB employee card
In September 2012, SEB introduced a corporate identity card (SEB employee
card) built on top of Estonian ID card platform jTOP SLE66 and integrated with
a separate contactless interface so that it could be used as a door card (see
Figure 23) [249].
Figure 23: A jTOP SLE66-powered SEB employee card [249]
The SEB employee card has been included in this work as it uses (with minor
differences) the same technical, legal and organizational solution as the Estonian
ID card. The main difference is that the qualified certificates for the SEB
employee card are not issued under the SK intermediate CAs “ESTEID-SK”
which are used to issue qualified certificates for the state-issued identity
documents. These certificates are instead issued under the SK intermediate CAs
“EID-SK 2011” and “EID-SK 2016”.
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The SEB employee card can be used to create digital signatures with the same
legal status as digital signatures created with the Estonian ID card. The only
legal difference when compared to the Estonian ID card is that the authentication
certificate of the SEB employee card does not have the state issued identity
document status as provided by IDA. However, we have observed that in practice
web servers configured for ID card authentication may allow (unless explicitly
forbidden in the configuration) authentication with certificates issued by any SK
intermediate CA (see Section III-B in [15]).
In the issuance process, SEB acts as a registration authority (RA) and has the
right to suspend and revoke certificates. The certificates are issued with the
validity period of 5 years. The main difference in the authentication certificate is
that it contains the employee’s SEB email address and includes the additional
key usage “Microsoft Smart Card Logon” in the extended key usage
extension [250]. The certificates of SEB employee cards are not published in the
LDAP certificate repository. From 2015-03-30 to 2017-11-01, SEB employee
card certificates were also issued to the employees of SEB sister companies in
Latvia and Lithuania [251].
The switch to the jTOP SLE78 platform for the SEB employee card was done
later than for the Estonian ID card – only in August 2015. The jTOP SLE78-
powered SEB employee cards were also hit by Infineon’s RSA key generation
flaw (see Section 6.7) and the affected certificates were revoked in November
2017. The issuance of SEB employee cards (using ECC keys) later resumed, but
only for SEB Estonia employees.
The issuance of SEB employee cards was terminated in April 2019 [251] as
ID card manufacturer Gemalto ceased its operations in Estonia [55]. As of March
2020, SK has revoked all valid SEB employee card certificates and has ceased to
provide certification services to SEB [251].
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4. ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY PROVIDED BY
ID CARD PLATFORMS
The main cryptographic functionality provided by the ID card is the on-card key
generation of the cardholder’s asymmetric authentication and digital signature key
pairs and the execution of private key operations with them.
In this chapter we study the asymmetric cryptography algorithm
implementations of each ID card platform. We measured the performance of key
generation and private key operations on the platforms and attempted to reverse
engineer the implementation of the RSA key generation algorithm by studying
the properties of the keys generated by the platform. While two of the ID card
platforms use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the cardholder’s keys, we
focus mainly on RSA, as the implementation of the RSA key generation
algorithm can vary significantly. The properties of the generated RSA keys were
analyzed based on the methods from the paper “The Million-Key Question –
Investigating the Origins of RSA Public Keys” by Svenda et al. [252].
The properties of RSA implementations described in this chapter were used
in the research outlined in Section 6.8 to verify whether the public keys
contained in the ID card certificates had been generated by the on-card key
generation algorithm on the respective ID card platform.
The timing for private key operations was measured by taking 100 000
measurements for each operation. The measurements were repeated at least
twice to verify that the observed timing variance was stable. For RSA
measurements, a 48-byte value was signed and a ciphertext containing encrypted
48-byte plaintext was decrypted. For ECC measurements, a 48-byte hash value
was sent to the card for signing. The performance was only measured for the
transmission of the command that sends the data and returns the result of the
cryptographic operation, excluding any preprocessing such as setting security
environments and performing PIN verification. Hence, the time was measured
for sending a single smart card application protocol data unit (APDU) command
and receiving its response, except for the 2048-bit RSA case where sending a
256-byte ciphertext required two APDUs. The APDU commands were sent over
T=0 transmission protocol.
The sections below analyze each ID card platform separately with the final
section providing a summary comparison of all the platforms.
4.1. MICARDO platform
The MICARDO-powered ID cards use 1024-bit RSA. In the subsections below
we analyze 1024-bit RSA as implemented by the MICARDO operating system.
We note that unlike smart card microcontroller chips used for later ID card
platforms, the SLE66 microcontrollers used by the MICARDO platform do not
have an internal clock generator, which means that the performance of the chip is
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proportional to the clock frequency supplied by the terminal. The chips used in
later ID card platforms apparently have a built in clock as their performance does
not depend on the clock frequency supplied by the terminal.
For the experiments, we used Gemalto IDBridge CT30 (formerly GemPC
Twin/TR) smart card reader which supplies a 4.8 MHz clock frequency to the
chip, while most of the smart card readers in the market supply a 4 MHz clock
frequency [253].
4.1.1. RSA key generation
To study the RSA key generation algorithm implemented by the MICARDO
platform, we analyzed more than 2 million 1024-bit RSA key pairs generated by
7 MICARDO-powered ID cards issued between 2002 and 2011. To generate and
export the RSA keys, we exploited the flaw which allows the performance of
card management operations using PIN2 (see Section 6.1). We note that the keys
could have also been generated using the MICARDO-powered ID card test cards
as the card management keys are known for these cards (see Section 3.6).
The MICARDO product supports RSA keys with a modulus length of up to
1024 bits. RSA key generation is performed using the GENERATE PUBLIC KEY
PAIR command specifying the file identifier (FID) of the public key file in the
APDU data field. The key generation routine reads the length of the expected
RSA modulus N and the length of the public exponent e from the public key file
(Section 4.7.3 in [185]). The maximum length of the exponent e can be set to
either 2, 3 or 4 bytes. The value of the public exponent e cannot be set – it is
generated randomly. The private key is stored in the Chinese remainder theorem
(CRT) form (Section 4.7.2 in [185]). The FID of the file where the private key
should be stored is specified in the EF_KeyD file. The key generation routine uses
the key slot corresponding to the current security environment. The generated
RSA modulus N and public exponent e are written to the public key file together
with an RSA PKCS#1 signature over the values. The public key is either signed
by the corresponding private key or by a key specified in the security environment.
The time distribution for 1024-bit RSA key generation on the tested cards is
shown in Figure 24 (the outliers in the boxplot cover < 5% and > 95%
percentiles). The cards generated 1024-bit RSA keys in 15.2 seconds on average
(min – 4.7 seconds, max – 86.0 seconds).
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Figure 24: MICARDO: Time distribution for generating 1024-bit RSA keys
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From the exported private keys we found that MICARDO implemented a non-
standard RSA key generation algorithm as the generated primes were not fully
balanced – the primes were never 512 bits long. The length of p varies from 513
to 520 bits (with equal probability) while the length of q varies respectively from
511 to 504 bits to produce a 1024-bit modulus N. Due to this imbalance, a 1024-
bit RSA key generated by the MICARDO platform provides a lower security level
than the standard 1024-bit RSA.
Figure 25 shows the distribution of the most significant byte (MSB) of p, q
and N. Since the length of the primes is variable, the MSB is defined as the top 8
bits starting from the most significant bit that has been set. We note that the plots
are the same also when looking separately at the MSB of primes with the same
length. As we can see, the MSB of p and q has a bias that could be explained by
some other nonstandard behavior of the algorithm, for instance, the primes being
generated in a special form. The distribution of the most significant byte of N
suggests that the rejection sampling method is used, meaning that the primes are






























































































Figure 25: Distribution of most significant bytes of p, q and N from 1024-bit RSA
keys generated by MICARDO platform. Lighter regions in the heatmap indicate
where the MSB pair of p and q is less likely to appear and the darker regions –
more likely.
The RSA algorithm requires public exponent e to be invertible, i.e., being
co-prime to ϕ(N) = (p− 1)(q− 1). A key generation algorithm will determine
whether the selected primes are valid for the selected public exponent e when
calculating the modular inverse to find the private exponent d. In the event that
the values are not co-prime (i.e., the modular inverse cannot be found), the
algorithm has to either select a different e or generate new primes until the
private exponent d can be found. Today, it is a standard practice to use the public
exponent value e = 65537. Since it is a prime number, the probability that it
would not be co-prime to ϕ(N) is insignificant (1/65537). As it has a special
binary form, the exponentiation can be done very efficiently by implementing
exponentiation by squaring. The random exponent e used by MICARDO has a
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larger probability of having common factors (e.g., 3, 5, 7) with p− 1 (or q− 1)
and therefore would not be valid for the chosen p and q primes. In the generated
keys dataset, we see that the public exponents that have small prime factors are
less represented. This means that when a randomly chosen e is not co-prime to
ϕ(N), another e is chosen so that the card does not need to regenerate the primes.
For example, a randomly selected odd e should be divisible by 3 in 33.33% of
the cases, while we find that only 8.37% of the chosen public exponents are
divisible by 3. Furthermore, we find that among the generated exponents, the
prime exponents preceded by prime exponents are less frequent when compared
to prime exponents preceded by non-prime exponents (which are more likely to
be rejected). This means that when e is not co-prime to ϕ(N), the current e is
incremented instead of choosing a new public exponent randomly.
Based on this information, we can define the possibly used MICARDO 1024-
bit RSA key generation algorithm (see Algorithm 1).




2: p← getPrime(p_len) {some bias in MSB is introduced}
3: q← getPrime(1024− p_len) {some bias in MSB is introduced}
4: N← p ·q
5: if bit_length(N)< 1024 then




10: Set the least significant bit of e {make odd}
11: d← e−1 mod ϕ(N)
12: if not d then
13: e← e+2
14: go to 11
15: end if
16: return p, q, d, e, N
4.1.2. RSA private key operations
The MICARDO and later ID card platforms implement RSA signing using the
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 standard [254]. The value to be signed is received from the
terminal, PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is applied to it, the signature value is calculated
and then returned to the terminal.
Typically, for performance reasons, a hash value of data that needs to be
signed is signed. The PKCS#1 and other digital signature standards expect the
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ASN.1 DER-encoded DigestInfo structure to be signed, as, in addition to the
hash value, it also encodes the algorithm identifier of the hash function used.
Exceptions are older TLS protocol versions where a plain hash value of TLS
protocol handshake has to be signed using PKCS#1 v1.5 in the client certificate
authentication process. Starting with TLS v1.2, in the case of the RSA algorithm,
the DigestInfo structure containing the hash value has to be signed.
The PKCS#1 v1.5 standard requires that the data that has to be signed is
padded to the byte length of the modulus, where the padding is at least 3 bytes.
Therefore the maximal length of data that can be signed is 3 bytes less than the
RSA modulus size. The MICARDO platform, however, limits the value to be
signed to 48 bytes (Section 5.1.3.7 in [185]). The result is that the
MICARDO-powered ID cards can only be used to sign at a maximum SHA-224
hash values as the SHA-256 DigestInfo structure occupies 51 bytes. This
caused issues when using the MICARDO-powered ID cards with the TLS v1.2
protocol [255].
As an alternative, MICARDO supports the on-card hash calculation of data to
be signed using the digital signature key (Section 15.2 [8]). In the on-card hash
calculation process, the SHA-1 value of the data blocks received from the terminal
is calculated, encapsulated in the DigestInfo structure and signed by applying
PKCS#1 v1.5 padding to it. It is also possible to retrieve the calculated SHA-1
value without signing it. The on-card hash calculation has not been popular in
practice, as it is only useful in cases where the terminal is unable to calculate the
hash value itself due to limited resources.
The MICARDO and later ID card platforms support RSA decryption of
ciphertexts padded according to the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 standard [254]. The
PKCS#1 v1.5 standard requires that the data that has to be encrypted is padded to
the byte length of the modulus, where the padding is at least 11 bytes. Therefore
the maximal length of data that can be encrypted is 11 bytes less than the RSA
modulus size. The padding is in the format 0x00||0x02||PS||0x00||D, where
PS is a nonzero random padding at least 8 bytes in length and D is the plaintext
data that needs to be encrypted. During decryption, the card removes the
padding, returing decryption failure if the padding cannot be found.
The RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption scheme is known to be vulnerable to a
padding oracle attack [256] as it allows an attacker to forge a signature by
learning whether the decryption of specially crafted ciphertexts contain valid
PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. The complexity of the padding oracle attack depends on
how permissive the padding check is – a more permissive check requires less
oracle calls to forge a signature. The MICARDO platform verifies that the
decrypted result starts with 0x00||0x02 and contains 0x00 somewhere after the
first two bytes but not in the last byte (prohibiting empty plaintexts). We note
that the decryption functionality of the Estonian ID card has been discussed in
the context of padding oracle attacks, but the attacks have been found to lack
practical exploitation scenarios (see Section 6.3).
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It is interesting to note that contrary to other ID card platforms, the MICARDO
platform does not require PIN2 verification after each decryption operation with
the digital signature key.
On the MICARDO-powered ID cards, while using a 4.8 MHz smart card
reader, RSA signing takes 0.964 seconds on average and RSA decryption 0.954
seconds on average. The timing distributions for the RSA signing and decryption
operations for the MICARDO platform are shown in Figure 26. The signing and
decryption operations experience a similar non-constant-time behavior as we can
see several peaks following a symmetric timing distribution.
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Figure 26: MICARDO: Timing distributions for RSA private key operations
4.2. MULTOS platform
The MULTOS-powered ID cards use 1024-bit RSA. We could not perform RSA
key generation and export operations as we did not have access to a
non-personalized card running the MULTOS platform. However, we used the
public keys from our certificate dataset to study the potential RSA key generation
algorithm implemented by the MULTOS platform. Our findings are outlined in
the subsections below.
4.2.1. RSA key generation
According to the developer of the EstEID application for the MULTOS ID card
platform, the RSA key generation algorithm was implemented using low-level
code and the generation of a 1024-bit RSA key could take anywhere from 5
seconds to 2 minutes [186].
In our dataset we have 29 262 certificates issued for the MULTOS-powered
ID cards. The public keys have random public exponents of up to 31 bits in
length, mimicking the use of non-standard exponents as implemented by the
MICARDO platform. All exponents, however, are prime numbers, the smallest
exponent being the 24-bit prime 8565203. The use of prime exponents
guarantees that the probability of e being co-prime to ϕ(N) is significant.
We looked at the average distance between e and its previous prime to
determine whether the algorithm selects candidate primes for public exponent e
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using random sampling method or incremental search method (Section 3.1.1
in [252]). Primes which have a large gap between them and the previous prime
are more likely to be selected in the incremental search. We calculated that for
31-bit primes, the incremental search resulted in an average distance of 36, while
the random search had a distance of 20. Since we found that the distance for
31-bit public exponents from the MULTOS-powered ID card certificates is 36,
we can conclude that the algorithm uses the incremental prime search method.
The distribution of the MSB values of the keys from the MULTOS-powered
ID card certificates is shown in Figure 27. Such a distribution is the result of the
RSA key generation algorithm setting the two most significant bits of p and q to
112 in order to guarantee that the generated modulus N is exactly 1024 bits long
(see Section 3.2.2 in [252]).
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Figure 27: Distribution of the MSB of N from the MULTOS-powered ID card
certificates
Based on the above, we can define the possibly used MULTOS 1024-bit RSA
key generation algorithm (see Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2: The possibly used MULTOS 1024-bit RSA key generation
algorithm
1: p← getPrime(512) {sets the two most significant bits}
2: q← getPrime(512) {sets the two most significant bits}




7: d← e−1 mod ϕ(N)
8: if not d {rare event} then
9: go to 1 or 6
10: end if
11: return p, q, d, e, N
4.2.2. RSA private key operations
The maximal size that can be signed using the MULTOS-powered ID card is 123
bytes, which is two bytes less than the maximal length allowed by the PKCS#1
v1.5 padding for a 1024-bit RSA modulus. The MULTOS-powered ID cards do
not support on-card hash calculation of data to be signed.
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The implemented PKCS#1 v1.5 padding check in the decryption process is
very permissive as it only looks for a zero byte after the first byte in the decrypted
result and returns everything that follows.
On the MULTOS-powered ID cards, RSA signing takes 0.603 seconds on
average, while decryption takes 0.657 seconds on average. The timing
distributions for RSA signing and decryption operations on the MULTOS
platform are shown in Figure 28. Contrary to the other ID card platforms, the
decryption and signing processes as implemented by the MULTOS platform has
a high variance in time. This variance in the timing could be the result of
applying some form of RSA blinding [257] in modular exponentiation to prevent
side channel attacks.
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Figure 28: MULTOS-powered ID card: Timing distributions for RSA private key
operations
4.3. jTOP SLE66 platform
The jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards use 2048-bit RSA. Since we discovered that
the ID card manufacturer had imported 2048-bit RSA keys generated outside the
card on some of the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards (see Section 6.8), we also
describe the key import functionality supported by the platform in the subsection
below.
4.3.1. RSA key generation
To study the RSA key generation algorithm and the properties of the generated
keys, we exported 2048-bit RSA keys generated using blank jTOP SLE66
JavaCards. One million keys were generated using the default public exponent
e = 65537 and an additional 63 000 keys were generated using a random public
exponent. These additional keys were generated as the EstEID applet for jTOP
SLE66-powered ID cards mimicked the behavior of the MICARDO platform and
generated the keys using a random public exponent.
Since key generation is implemented in low-level native code on JavaCard
platform, access to the manufacturer’s proprietary EstEID JavaCard applet was
not required. The JavaCard API provides the method KeyPair.genKeyPair()
that can be used by a JavaCard applet to initiate key generation. The algorithm
identifier and keylength is specified when initiating the KeyPair object.
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The jTOP SLE66 platform supports 2048-bit RSA key generation using the
KeyPair.ALG_RSA_CRT algorithm, i.e., the key pair is stored in a KeyPair object
with the private key being stored in CRT format. Key generation in a non-CRT
format using the KeyPair.ALG_RSA algorithm is only supported by the platform
for up to 1024-bit RSA.
The JavaCard specification requires implementations to support arbitrary
public exponent values for at least up to 4 bytes in length. The exponent can be
set using the RSAPublicKey.setExponent() method. If no public exponent
value is set, the key generation process will use the default value of e = 65537.
The jTOP SLE66 platform accepts and is able to generate RSA key pairs with
any odd value e of up to 4 bytes in length. From the jTOP SLE66-powered
ID card certificates, we saw that the EstEID applet on the jTOP SLE66-powered
ID cards initiated key generation using a random exponent of up to 31 bits in
length.
The time distribution for 2048-bit RSA key generation on the jTOP SLE66
platform is shown in Figure 29. Key generation using the default public exponent
e = 65537 takes 33 seconds on average (min – 4 seconds, max – 238 seconds).
However, key generation using a random public exponent takes 87 seconds on
average (min – 4 seconds, max – 1824 seconds) with 5% of the keys taking
longer than 318 seconds (5 minutes and 18 seconds) to generate. In this case key
generation is significantly slower, because a random exponent e has a larger
probability of having common factors with ϕ(N). In contrast to the MICARDO
platform, the RSA key generation algorithm provided by the JavaCard API has to
generate the key pair using the specified e, and therefore it has to search for new
primes until p−1 and q−1 are co-prime to e.
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Figure 29: jTOP SLE66: Time distribution for generating 2048-bit RSA keys
We note that the additional time introduced by the generation of keys with a
random exponent and the rejection of 2047-bit RSA keys (see below) significantly
decreased the throughput of the jTOP SLE66 ID card production line. This created
a strong incentive to seek time-saving shortcuts and most likely was the reason
why the ID card manufacturer decided to ignore the requirements and, during
the ID card update process, imported keys generated outside the ID card (see
Section 6.8).
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The key generation algorithm can test whether the selected prime is valid for
the specified e by checking whether p− 1 is co-prime to e (i.e., by calculating
the greatest common divisor (GCD) between p− 1 and e). If p− 1 is not co-
prime to e (i.e., GCD(p−1,e)> 0), the algorithm can regenerate the prime until
it is compatible. The alternative is to not test the compatibility of the primes
separately, but regenerate both primes in the event that the private exponent d
cannot be found. The regeneration of both primes if ϕ(N) is not co-prime to e
will take more time than only regenerating the incompatible prime, but will save
two GCD computations if ϕ(N) turns out to be co-prime to e.
To deduce which approach of prime compatibility checking is used by the
jTOP SLE66 key generation algorithm, we measured the average key generation
time when the exponent e values 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 13 are used (using 10 000
samples for each e). We then compared these values with the average key
generation time when the public exponent value e = 65537 is used, as the
probability that the chosen prime will not be compatible is insignificant
(1/65537). The results from these measurements along with the expected values
for both approaches are given in Table 2.
e GCD(p−1,e) e−1 mod ϕ(N) jTOP SLE66
3 2.00 4.00 1.93
5 1.33 1.78 1.78
7 1.20 1.44 1.44
9 2.00 4.00 3.96
11 1.11 1.23 1.24
13 1.09 1.19 1.20
Table 2: The key generation time increase rate in respect to the public exponent
e and the key generation algorithm used. The values given are the factors by
which the time rate increases when compared to the key generation time when
e = 65537.
We see that the time increase for the jTOP SLE66 key generation algorithm
closely matches the expected increase when both primes are regenerated if the
private exponent d cannot be found. The exception is e = 3, in which case an
optimized key generation algorithm is likely used, as in this case the probability
that at least one prime will not be co-prime to 3 is high.
The key generation algorithm has an uncommon property, because
approximately 38% of all generated moduli are 2047 bits long. This ratio is close
to the theoretical ratio of 38.6294% when p and q are chosen uniformly from the
distribution of 1024-bit primes. Usually RSA key generation algorithms use
either the rejection sampling method (regenerating primes until their product is
of the required length) or sample the primes ensuring that a k-bit prime is larger
than
√
2 ·2k−1 (Section 3.2 in [252]). However, all primes generated by the jTOP
SLE66 platform are 1024 bits in length with no apparent constraints put on the
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Figure 30: Distribution of the most significant bytes of p, q and N from the 2048-
bit RSA keys generated by the jTOP SLE66 platform (e = 65537)
The bit distribution of primes is uniform, except that the most significant and
the least significant bit are always set. The most significant byte of p (but not
q) has a small bias – the probability of observing value 128 (100000002) is half
that of observing a value greater than 128. We believe that this may be caused
by a random number generator (RNG) “quality check” built into the RSA key
generation algorithm which rejects RNG outputs that contain zero in the MSB.
We found that this check only affects the initial selection of p, because the bias in
p is barely observable in keys generated for public exponent e = 9, as in this case
the probability that the primes will be regenerated is significant.
To determine whether the algorithm selects candidate primes using the
random sampling method or the incremental search method, we analyzed the
average distance between p and its previous prime. We calculated that for
1024-bit primes, the incremental search results in an average distance of 1410,
while the random search has a distance of 710. These average distances will be
slightly larger when the square region sampling method or the rejection sampling
method is used, as the resulting primes will also be slightly larger. Since we
found that the distance for 1024-bit primes generated by the jTOP SLE66
platform is 1410, we can conclude that the algorithm uses the incremental prime
search method.
Based on the analysis given above, we can define the possibly used jTOP
SLE66 2048-bit RSA key generation algorithm (see Algorithm 3).
4.3.2. RSA key import
The jTOP SLE66 platform supports 2048-bit RSA key import using the CRT
format by initiating the RSAPrivateCrtKey object using the algorithm
KeyBuilder.TYPE_RSA_CRT_PRIVATE. The CRT private key components p, q,
d mod (p − 1), d mod (q − 1) and q−1 mod p can be set with the methods
setP(), setQ(), setDP1(), setDQ1() and setPQ(), respectively. Only odd p
and q values can be set. Setting inconsistent CRT component values causes the
card to crash when a private key operation is performed.
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Algorithm 3: The possibly used jTOP SLE66 2048-bit RSA key
generation algorithm (in case e is not 3)
Input: e (default: 65537)
1: While MSB of RNG buffer is 0, obtain a new RNG bufffer
2: p← randomBits(1024)
3: q← randomBits(1024)




8: d← e−1 mod ϕ(N)
9: if not d then
10: go to 5
11: end if
12: N← p ·q
13: return p, q, d, N
The platform also supports 2048-bit RSA key import in the non-CRT format.
This can be done by creating an empty RSAPrivateKey object using the
KeyBuilder.buildKey() method, specifying the algorithm type
KeyBuilder.TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE and the KeyBuilder.LENGTH_RSA_2048 key
length. The modulus and private exponent can be set using the setModulus()
and setExponent() methods. The jTOP SLE66 platform accepts any odd
private exponent d from 1 to 2048 bits in length and any odd modulus N from 1
to 2048 bits in length. However, private key operations with a modulus smaller
than 10 bits in length produce an incorrect result and operations with a modulus
smaller than 9 bits causes the card to enter an endless loop.
The keys imported using the non-CRT format are not usable in practice, as
private key operations using a non-CRT key usually take around 30 seconds,
instead of 1.4 seconds as is the case of RSA keys imported using the CRT
format. Such a delay is not observed when importing 1024-bit RSA keys. It is
somewhat unexpected to see that 2048-bit RSA import in the non-CRT format is
even partially supported by the platform, as on-card 2048-bit RSA key
generation in the non-CRT format is not supported at all.
4.3.3. RSA private key operations
The maximal size that can be signed using the JavaCard API call provided by
the jTOP SLE66 platform is 245 bytes, which is 8 bytes less than the maximal
length allowed by the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding for a 2048-bit RSA modulus. The
jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards support the on-card hash calculation of data to be
signed, but do not provide an option to retrieve the calculated SHA-1 value.
The PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption padding check implemented by the JavaCard
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platform is very strict as it checks that the first two bytes in the decrypted result are
0x00||0x02 followed by at least 8 nonzero bytes and then a zero byte somewhere
after the nonzero padding.
On the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards (EstEID v3.4 applet), RSA signing
takes 1.413 seconds on average using the authentication key and 1.416 seconds
on average using the digital signature key. RSA decryption takes 1.440 seconds
on average using the authentication key and 1.443 seconds on average using the
digital signature key. We noticed that the EstEID applet added some overhead, as
our JavaCard applet on the jTOP SLE66 platform achieved an average of 1.375
for RSA signing and 1.403 for decryption. This overhead may have been caused
by the additional state checks required (e.g., check if PIN has been entered). The
timing distribution for RSA signing and decryption operations on the jTOP
SLE66 platform are shown in Figure 31. The signing and decryption operations
experience identical non-constant-time behavior as eight peaks with different
distances from each other are visible in the distribution.
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Figure 31: jTOP SLE66: Timing distributions for RSA private key operations
4.4. jTOP SLE78 platform
The jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards issued before 2017-10-25 use 2048-bit RSA.
However, due to the discovery of Infineon’s RSA key generation flaw
(Section 6.7), the ID cards issued and renewed starting from 2017-10-25 use
ECC with NIST curve P-384.
4.4.1. RSA key generation
To study the RSA key generation algorithm and the properties of the generated
keys, we exported 2048-bit RSA keys generated using blank jTOP SLE78
JavaCards. Since the jTOP SLE78 platform supports 2048-bit RSA key
generation using the CRT and non-CRT format, we generated 1 336 000 keys
using the CRT format and 135 800 keys using the non-CRT format. We used the
default public exponent e = 65537 as the ineffectual practice of generating keys
with a random public exponent was discontinued for the EstEID v3.5 applet
deployed on the jTOP SLE78 platform.
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The time distribution for 2048-bit RSA key generation on the jTOP SLE78
platform is shown in Figure 32. Key generation in the CRT format takes 13.430
seconds on average (min – 2 seconds, max – 100 seconds), while key generation
in the non-CRT format is slightly faster – 13.220 seconds on average (min – 1
second, max – 91 seconds).
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Figure 32: jTOP SLE78: Time distribution for generating 2048-bit RSA keys
(e = 65537)
Private key operations using the private key in the CRT format only take
around 0.3 seconds on average, while using the private key in non-CRT format
takes around 0.8 seconds on average. Since the private key operations on the
jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards take around 0.4 seconds, we can conclude that
the EstEID applet uses RSA keys generated in the CRT format.
The distribution of the MSB of p, q and N is shown in Figure 33. As we
can see, the distribution matches that of Infineon’s faulty RSA key generation
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Figure 33: Distribution of the most significant bytes of p, q and N from the 2048-
bit RSA keys generated by the jTOP SLE78 platform (e = 65537)
From the paper “The Return of Coppersmith’s Attack: Practical Factorization
of Widely Used RSA Moduli” by Nemec et al. [258], we already know that the
faulty Infineon RSA key generation algorithm generates candidate primes for
2048-bit RSA in the form p = k ·M + (65537a mod M), where M is a 971-bit
constant (the product of the first 126 primes M = 2 · 3 · 5 · . . . · 701), k is a 53-bit
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random number and a is a 255-bit random number. Such prime candidate
generation method guarantees that the candidate will not have prime divisors up
to 701, increasing the probability that the candidate is a prime from 1/355 (in the
case of naive sampling of odd integers) to 1/60 (in the case of Infineon’s
approach above) on average.
Produit in [259] analyzed the keys generated by the jTOP SLE78 platform
and observed that in practice k and a are not truly random as some of the most
significant bits are fixed and have other biases. This observation allowed the
original attack described in [258] to be significantly optimized.
4.4.2. RSA private key operations
The JavaCard implementation of PKCS#1 v1.5 signing and decryption matches
that of the jTOP SLE66 platform – the maximal size that can be signed is 245
bytes and the decryption padding check is strict. However, the EstEID applet of
the jTOP SLE78 platform has a bug – the maximal size that can be signed using
the digital signature key is only 127 bytes. It is possible that the bug in the EstEID
applet is interpreting the APDU data length byte as a signed integer. This would
result in byte values larger than 127 being interpreted as negative numbers, hence
leading to an error condition when used.
The jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards support the on-card hash calculation of
data to be signed and provide an option to retrieve the calculated SHA-1 value.
However, support for on-card hash calculations has been removed from EstEID
v3.5.7 and higher versions.
In contrast with the previous ID card platforms, the EstEID applet of the jTOP
SLE78 platform does not support decryption with the digital signature key.
On the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards RSA signing takes 0.391 seconds on
average using the authentication key and 0.411 seconds on average using the
digital signature key, while decryption using the authentication key takes 0.503
seconds on average. We noticed that the EstEID applet adds significant overhead,
as our JavaCard applet on the jTOP SLE78 platform achieved an average of
0.304 for RSA signing and 0.318 for decryption. The timing distributions for
RSA signing and decryption operations on the jTOP SLE78 platform are shown
in Figure 34. The signing and decryption operations experience similar
non-constant-time behavior as several peaks are visible in the distribution.
280 290 300 310 320 330 340
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(b) decryption
Figure 34: jTOP SLE78: Timing distributions for RSA private key operations
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4.4.3. ECC key generation
Compared to the RSA key generation process where the algorithm has to find two
large prime numbers, the generation of an Elliptic Curve (EC) key pair is trivial.
In Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) the private key is simply a random number
that is smaller than the size of the EC group and the public key is calculated by
multiplying the base point of the curve with the private key.
The JavaCard API provides the method KeyPair.genKeyPair() that can be
used by a JavaCard applet to initiate key generation. To generate a NIST P-384
EC key the KeyPair object has to be initiated by specifying the algorithm
identifier KeyPair.ALG_EC_FP and the keylength 384. The JavaCard API does
not implement the standard named curves. The applet has to manually set the
domain parameters of the curve on the ECPrivateKey and ECPublicKey
interface objects.
We generated 2 million EC keys using the NIST P-384 curve on the jTOP
SLE78 platform. The card generates EC keys in 0.365 seconds on average (min
– 0.336 seconds, max – 0.414 seconds). The timing distribution for ECC key
generation on the jTOP SLE78 platform is shown in Figure 35. The key generation
process experiences non-constant-time behavior as there are several peaks visible
in the distribution.
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Figure 35: jTOP SLE78: Timing distribution for generating NIST P-384 EC keys
4.4.4. ECC private key operations
The signing operation using EC keys is implemented using the Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). In ECDSA the DigestInfo structure is
not used, but a raw hash value of the data to be signed is signed. The hash values
that are longer that the size of the curve are truncated by ECDSA to the bit-length
of the curve. Therefore, for the NIST P-384 curve used by the platform, it is
optimal to use hash function SHA-384 as it provides the same security level of
192 bits as the 384-bit curve.
ECC support was introduced in the EstEID applet v3.5.8 released on
2017-10-25. The EstEID applet accepts 20, 28, 32, 48 or 64-byte hash value to
be signed using ECDSA. These lengths correspond to the output of the hash
functions SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. As a response,
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the card returns 96-byte signature value r||s, which is a concatenation of the
48-byte ECDSA signature components r and s. The JavaCard API method
signPreComputedHash() returns ECDSA signature components r and s in a
DER-encoded ASN.1 structure consisting of two INTEGER values in a SEQUENCE,
therefore the EstEID applet has to parse the DER structure and extract the
components.
In the ECC version of the EstEID applet, the decryption functionality is
provided by the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement using the
cardholder’s authentication key (see Section 2.9.1.1).
For ECDH calculations, the card expects a 97-byte value which is a public key
point on the curve in the uncompressed format – the byte 0x04 followed by the 48-
byte x and y coordinates of the point. The JavaCard runtime performs the check
to verify that the received public key point is on the curve. As a response, the
card returns a 48-byte shared secret which is the x-coordinate from the result of
the received public key point multiplied by the cardholder’s authentication private
key. The shared secret can then be used by the decryption software to derive the
symmetric encryption key.
On the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards, the ECDSA operation takes 0.308
seconds on average using the authentication key and 0.314 seconds on average
using the digital signature key, while the ECDH operation using the
authentication key takes 0.481 seconds on average. The EstEID applet adds some
overhead, as our JavaCard applet on the jTOP SLE78 platform achieved an
average of 0.252 seconds for ECDSA and 0.440 seconds for ECDH. The timing
distributions for ECDSA and ECDH operations on the jTOP SLE78 platform are
shown in Figure 36. We see that both operations experience non-constant-time
behavior as eight peaks of similar size are clearly visible.
We note that the authors of the paper “Minerva: The curse of ECDSA nonces;
Systematic analysis of lattice attacks on noisy leakage of bit-length of ECDSA
nonces” [260] have analyzed the jTOP SLE78 platform (Table 1 in [260]) but have
not found that the non-constant-time implementation can be exploited to recover
the bit-length of the scalar used in the scalar multiplication of ECDSA.
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Figure 36: jTOP SLE78: Timing distributions for ECC private key operations
using NIST P-384 curve
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4.4.4.1. Invalid ECDSA signatures
The ECC-enabled EstEID applet has a bug that results in an invalid ECDSA
signature being returned once per around every 60 000 signatures on average.
The returned invalid signature values contain a pattern. The component r for the
invalid signatures starts with two zero bytes and the component s starts with byte
0x02. Additionally, in half of the cases the 0x02 byte is followed by 0x30 or
0x31, which is a valid DER header for encoding a 48-byte INTEGER value. The
observed rate of invalid signatures closely matches the probability of 1/65536 for
observing r with two zero bytes in the leftmost position. Since we found no valid
signatures where the r component would have two zero bytes in its leftmost
position among the produced signatures, we concluded that the faulty signature
is caused by the ASN.1 DER parsing as implemented by the EstEID applet in
cases when the component r contains two zero bytes in its leftmost position.
We had already noticed the bug in the test cards running the EstEID applet
v3.5.8 (v0.5 2017-09-21) and informed RIA about it on 2017-10-05. The bug,
however, was not fixed and is also contained in the production version of the
EstEID applet v3.5.8 shipped as of 2017-10-25.
4.4.4.2. Randomness in ECDSA signing process
From the security perspective, the move from RSA to ECC increases the reliance
on the unpredictability of the RNG built into the chip. In the case of RSA
PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme the use of good randomness is only required in
the key generation process, whereas in the case of ECC, the ECDSA signing
process requires unpredictable randomness for every signature. The quality of
randomness in ECDSA is crucial, since the recovery of the private key from
signatures becomes possible if only a few bits of the secret nonce k used in the
ECDSA signing process are biased [261–263].
RFC 6979 standard [264] defines the deterministic generation of secret nonce
k based on hash h to be signed and the private key d. The JavaCard API,
however, does not support deterministic ECDSA and the ECDSA API in the
JavaCard specification does not allow the nonce to be specified.
This issue is especially concerning due to the observation that the random
number generator on the jTOP SLE78 platform produces numbers that are
missing some properties of a random sequence (see Section 6.1 in [252]).
To test the randomness of EC private keys and ECDSA nonces, we generated
and exported 2 million P-384 private key values. For each generated key we used
on-card ECDSA to sign a 20-byte hash h with the JavaCard API method
signPreComputedHash(). Using the private key d and hash h, we recovered the
48-byte secret nonce k from the signature (r,s) by computing k = s−1(h + rd)
mod n. In total, we obtained 91 MB of randomness from the private keys and 91
MB from the ECDSA nonces. The collected random data was tested using the
Dieharder random number test suite [265], which did not detect any statistical
issues in the data.
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4.5. IDEMIA platform
The IDEMIA-powered ID cards are currently using ECC with the same NIST P-
384 curve as used in the jTOP SLE78 platform. As we did not have access to
a blank JavaCard powered by the IDEMIA platform, we were unable to perform
key generation operations and related measurements. The observations described
below have been made using a personalized IDEMIA-powered ID card.
4.5.1. ECC private key operations
The IAS-ECC applet on IDEMIA-powered ID cards provides ECDSA and
ECDH functionality similar to that of the EstEID v3.5.8 applet on the jTOP
SLE78 platform. The ECDSA operation using the authentication key requires
hash values of up to 48 bytes, while the ECDSA operation with the digital
signature key requires values of exactly 48 bytes.
The timing distributions for ECDSA and ECDH operations on the
IDEMIA-powered ID card are shown in Figure 37. The ECDSA operation using
the digital signature key takes 0.334 seconds on average, while using the
authentication key takes only 0.288 seconds on average. The ECDH operation
using the authentication key takes 0.127 seconds on average. Contrary to the
jTOP SLE78 platform, ECDSA and ECDH implementations on the IDEMIA
platform exhibit constant-time behavior.
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(a) ECDSA (authentication key)
328 332 336 340 344
Time (ms)
(b) ECDSA (digital signature key)
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Figure 37: IDEMIA-powered ID card: Timing distributions for ECC private key
operations using NIST P-384 curve
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4.6. Summary comparison
The summary for the asymmetric cryptography performance of the ID card
platforms is shown in Table 3 and 4. The value specified in parenthesis is the
lower bound that we obtained with our implementation on the chip used by the
ID card platform.
Operation
1024-bit RSA 2048-bit RSA
MICARDO MULTOS jTOP SLE66 jTOP SLE78
Key generation 15.2 ? 87 (33) 13.4
RSA signing (auth) 0.964 0.603 1.413 (1.375) 0.391 (0.304)
RSA signing (sign) 0.964 0.603 1.416 (1.375) 0.411 (0.304)
RSA decryption (auth) 0.954 0.657 1.440 (1.403) 0.503 (0.318)
RSA decryption (sign) 0.954 0.657 1.443 (1.403) –




Key generation 0.365 ?
ECDSA signing (auth) 0.308 (0.252) 0.288
ECDSA signing (sign) 0.314 (0.252) 0.334
ECDH key agreement (auth) 0.481 (0.440) 0.127
Table 4: ECC performance on the ID card platforms (average times in seconds)
As expected, the newer platforms provide better performance and asymmetric
cryptography with a higher security level. ECC is significantly faster than RSA,
performing key generation and cryptographic operations in less than half a
second. While ECC was already supported by the jTOP SLE66 ID card platform
introduced in 2011, the switch to ECC was only triggered in fall 2017 by the
discovery of the flaw in the RSA implementation on the jTOP SLE78 platform.
The migration from RSA to ECC, however, could not have happened any earlier,
as ECC support for TLS client certificate authentication was only introduced in
TLS v1.21 and the move to the BDOC digital signature file format supporting
ECC only started in 2016.
It is interesting to find that the RSA algorithm on each ID card platform is
implemented with slight differences. It is interesting to note that only on the
IDEMIA platform the cryptographic operations exhibit constant-time behavior.
The differences in the timing behavior also show that the math operations on each
platform are implemented differently. It would be useful to further research the
exact reasons behind these differences.
1The widely used OpenSSL library only introduced support for TLS v1.2 in OpenSSL v1.0.1
released on 2012-03-14.
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5. ID CARD REMOTE UPDATE SOLUTIONS
The ability to remotely update some components of the ID card after it has already
been issued has been an important feature, that has helped the card issuer to sustain
the validity of certificates and even fix critical security flaws. While some of
the ID card remote update scenarios are limited to simple certificate overwriting,
some scenarios go as far as replacing the whole EstEID applet on the card.
This chapter describes the ID card remote update functionality used
throughout the years for different ID card platforms and analyzes the security of
the implementations. We start by first introducing the EstEID secure messaging
protocol which is used to perform card management operations on the ID card
platforms that implement the EstEID specification.
5.1. EstEID secure messaging
The Estonian ID card supports several card management operations that can be
performed by the card issuer after the ID card has been personalized and delivered
to the cardholder. To authenticate the card issuer, the card management commands
sent to the card have to be sent over a secure messaging protocol. The secure
messaging protocol is applied to the smart card APDUs exchanged between the
card and the card issuer’s backend.
In the card personalization phase several card-specific symmetric 3DES keys
are loaded on the card, each used to authenticate a particular card management
operation (see Section 19 in [9]). For PIN reset operations and the generation
of new RSA key pairs, a secure messaging session must be negotiated using the
card management keys CMK1 and CMK2a, respectively. Card management keys
are used to derive unique session keys, which are then used to secure the actual
smart card command (C-APDU) and response (R-APDU) pairs. The same secure
messaging protocol is also used for passphrase authentication using 3DESKey1
and 3DESKey2 (see Section 6.1.1).
For card management operations such as certificate overwriting, changing
active key references and creating additional application structures on the card, a
secure messaging session is not established. However, to provide integrity for the
APDUs exchanged, a message authentication code (MAC) is applied to the
APDUs using the card management keys CMK2b and CMK3 directly.
The secure messaging protocol is defined in Sections 5.5.2, 5.5.3 and 5.6 of
the MICARDO User Manual [185]. The same protocol has been reimplemented
in EstEID implementations on subsequent ID card platforms. In this section we
provide the description of the EstEID secure messaging protocol and describe the
security flaws found in it.
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5.1.1. EstEID secure messaging protocol
The EstEID secure messaging protocol consists of a session key negotiation
phase and a secure messaging phase in which cryptographically protected
APDUs are exchanged. The EstEID secure messaging protocol is depicted in
Figure 38. The figure shows the content of the APDU data field for C-APDU and
R-APDU pairs. The C-APDU header and R-APDU status word (SW) fields are
sent in clear text. These values are not depicted in the figure. The number in














Figure 38: EstEID secure messaging protocol
5.1.2. Session key negotiation phase
The goal of the key negotiation protocol is to negotiate two 16-byte session keys
SK1 (used for encryption) and SK2 (used for MAC), and the 8-byte send
sequence counter SSC which serves as an IV (initialization vector) for
encryption and MAC calculations. The values are negotiated based on a specific
3DES card management key (CMK) which is shared between the card and the
host (terminal). The session key negotiation process involves mutual
authentication, guaranteeing that the session key can only be derived by the
parties who share the CMK. The security of the protocol relies on the
randomness provided by the card and the terminal.
The protocol starts with the card returning 8-byte randomness RND.ICC as
a response to the host’s GET CHALLENGE command. The host then generates its
8-byte randomness RND.IFD and a random 32-byte session key share K.IFD.
The host concatenates values RND.IFD, RND.ICC and K.IFD, and encrypts them
with the CMK using 3DES in CBC mode without padding and an IV set to zeros.
The ciphertext is sent to the card with the MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command.
By finding the card’s randomness RND.ICC in the decrypted plaintext, the card
is convinced that the host knows the CMK. As a response, the card returns the
encryption of RND.ICC, RND.IFD and its randomly generated 32-byte session
key share K.ICC (encrypted using an IV set to zeros). By decrypting the ciphertext
and finding its randomness RND.IFD in the plaintext, the host is convinced that
the card knows CMK.
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The session keys are derived by XORing the 32-byte values K.IFD and K.ICC.
The first 16 bytes of the result are used as SK1 and the remaining 16 bytes as SK2.
The 8-byte SSC is constructed by concatenating the last four bytes of RND.IFD
and RND.ICC.
5.1.3. Secure messaging phase
The APDU commands and responses sent over a secure messaging session have
integrity protection and are optionally encrypted. The secure messaging format
follows the so-called Encrypt-then-MAC approach. The original APDU data in
the command and response APDUs is encrypted with SK1 by applying 3DES in
CBC mode with SSC as the IV. It is important to note that the secure messaging
protocol is only able to encrypt APDU data, therefore the C-APDU header which
includes the command identifier and parameters P1 and P2 cannot be concealed.
Similarly, the status word (SW) of the R-APDUs is sent in clear text.
The MAC protects the C-APDU header (and R-APDU SW) and encrypted (if
encryption is applied) APDU data. The MAC is calculated using SK2 by applying
the retail MAC (ISO 9797-1 MAC algorithm 3) in CFB mode with SSC as the IV.
The SSC is incremented before each command and response APDU is produced.
This prevents message reordering and replay attacks.
5.1.4. Card impersonation attack
The MICARDO User Manual [185] in Section 5.5.2 claims that “the negotiation
of session keys involves mutual authentication of the chip card and the external
world”. However, we found a flaw in the MICARDO session key negotiation
protocol that allows an attacker to impersonate the card without knowing the
CMK.
5.1.4.1. Attack
The attack works by answering the host’s MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command
with a modification of the same ciphertext that was sent by the host itself
(so-called reflection attack). An important observation is that the host will accept
the response of the MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command as valid if the host’s
RND.IFD value is located in the second plaintext position of the card’s encrypted
response (for this particular attack we assume that the host will ignore the
verification of RND.ICC in the first plaintext position). Due to the fact that the
plaintext data fields (RND.IFD, RND.ICC and K.IFD) align to the block
boundaries of the 3DES cipher (8-byte block size), it is possible to forge a valid
response without knowing the CMK key. In order to do so, the attacker’s
response must be the host’s own ciphertext with the first 2 blocks modified. The
first ciphertext block must be moved to the second position and the new first
ciphertext block must be set to zeros, as the first block of the original ciphertext
was encrypted using an IV of zeros.
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Even though the host’s key share K.IFD (and hence the forged K.ICC) is not
known to the attacker, the session keys derived by the host are, however, known
due to the properties of the XOR operation. All the bytes of K.IFD ⊕ K.ICC
will be zeros, except for the first 8 bytes, because during the decryption of the
forged ciphertext, a wrong IV will be used by the host to decrypt the first block
of K.ICC. We know, however, that these first 8 bytes is the value of the second
ciphertext block of the host’s ciphertext XORed with the second ciphertext block
of the forged ciphertext.
Since the host’s RND.IFD is not known to the attacker, the 4 bytes of the SSC
value are unknown. The whole SSC, however, can be trivially recovered from the
first C-APDU received in the negotiated secure messaging session. To recover the
SSC, the MAC process has to be reversed – the MAC has to be decrypted using
SK2 and the MACed data.
We implemented a proof-of-concept card impersonation attack on a JavaCard
and tested it against our own protocol implementation on the host’s side. The
pseudocode of the attack is shown in Algorithm 4. The square brackets represent
the byte slicing operator.
Algorithm 4: Card impersonation attack (card’s side)
1: RND.ICC← random(8)
2: Return RND.ICC as a response to host’s GET CHALLENGE
3: req← C-APDU data from host’s MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
4: resp← 0000000000000000hex || req[0 : 8] || req[16 : 24]
5: Return resp as a response to host’s MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
6: SK1← req[8 : 16]⊕ resp[8 : 16] || 0000000000000000hex
7: SK2← 0000000000000000hex || 0000000000000000hex
8: req_MACed← C-APDU data of first MAC-protected C-APDU
9: SSC← retail_MAC_reverseSK2(req_MACed)
There seem to be two scenarios where this card impersonation attack could
be exploited in practice. The first exploitation scenario is the remote ID card
update process that involves the generation of new key pairs. The attack would
allow qualified certificates for keys generated outside the ID card to be obtained.
Another exploitation scenario is the new PIN envelope issuance process, which
would allow the attacker to simulate a successful change of PIN codes, without
the operations being actually performed on the ID card (at first glance, however,
it seems that this does not give any benefit to the attacker).
5.1.4.2. Mitigation
The correct protocol-level fix would be to protect the ciphertexts exchanged in
the MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command against modification using a MAC. This,
however, would require the EstEID implementation on the card’s side to be
updated, which is not feasible.
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To mitigate this particular attack, the host could reject the APDU responses of
the MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command, when the decryption of the first block does
not contain the RND.ICC that was obtained using the GET CHALLENGE command.
This, however, is vulnerable to an impersonation attack in a man-in-the-middle
scenario, where the response from the real card is modified by replacing K.ICC
with a copy of K.IFD from the host’s ciphertext. To prevent both attacks, the host
must reject MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE responses where a ciphertext block in any
position of the card’s ciphertext matches a ciphertext block in any position of the
host’s ciphertext.
5.1.4.3. Disclosure
We informed RIA of the flaw on 2016-02-03. As a response, the ID card remote
update implementation for the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards (Section 5.4) was
modified to introduce the mitigation measure described above. We are not aware,
however, if the mitigation measure was also applied for the implementation used
to issue new PIN envelopes.
5.1.4.4. Failure of ITSEC certification process
After we realized that the EstEID secure messaging protocol was a
reimplementation of the MICARDO secure messaging protocol, which was
ITSEC certified by certification body TÜViT (Section 3.1.3), we decided to
disclose the flaw to TÜViT. On the grounds that the certificate was no longer
valid and that the documentation had been deleted 10 years after the certification,
TÜViT expressed no interest in the flaw [266].
On 2018-10-25 and 2018-11-13, we submitted a message using the contact
form available on morpho.com and idemia.com asking for security contacts to
report the security vulnerability in the MICARDO product. In both cases we
received a confirmation from IDEMIA that our message had been received, but
no one ever contacted us back on the matter.
We observed that the newer versions1 of the MICARDO card operating
system have been Common Criteria certified by BSI, with the latest certificate
issued in 2014 under certification reference BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 for the
product “MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC v1.2”. On 2019-01-23, we contacted BSI
asking them to verify if these related products certified by BSI were also affected
and to use their authority to ensure that the information about the flaw reached
the affected parties. On 2019-02-20, BSI responded with IDEMIA’s project
manager specified in the email’s CC field, asking for more details on the flaw,
which we provided on 2019-02-25. On 2019-03-29, BSI responded with the
findings that these other certified MICARDO products were not affected, since
1MICARDO certifications in question: BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006, BSI-DSZ-CC-0390-2007,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007, BSI-DSZ-CC-0602-2009, BSI-DSZ-CC-0391-2009, BSI-DSZ-CC-
0603-2010, BSI-DSZ-CC-0604-2010, BSI-DSZ-CC-0673-2010, BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 and
BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014.
104
they do not use the unauthenticated DES-based symmetric authentication
protocol. To cite BSI: “The ITSEC certified MICARDO product was
implemented according to a very old HPC specification in the framework of the
German Health Care System. This specification shows the security problem of an
unauthenticated DES-based symmetric authentication protocol, but this was
detected several years ago and appropriately fixed for following specification
versions as those are used e.g. for the MICARDO products listed above.” [267]
This case (and the case described in Section 6.7) shows that the security
certification process does not guarantee an absence of security flaws. Even
though the flaw was later found in the specification, this information did not
reach the affected parties, which in this particular case led to the flawed protocol
being reimplemented on the later Estonian ID card platforms.
5.1.5. MAC protection using the CMK directly
For the card management operations secured with the CMK2b and CMK3 keys,
the APDUs are MAC-protected without establishing a secure messaging session.
The MAC is calculated using the respective card management keys directly by
applying the retail MAC in CBC mode with the IV set to zeros.
It is important to note that this type of MAC protection provides very weak
integrity properties. The MAC is not bound to any session-specific information,
which means that the C-APDUs observed can be successfully replayed against the
card at a later time. Furthermore, while the card’s R-APDUs are MAC protected,
the MAC is not bound to the C-APDU for which the R-APDU has been produced.
This means that by observing one MAC-protected R-APDU with the status word
0x9000 (success), the same R-APDU can be replayed to the backend as a response
to another command, convincing the backend that the command was executed
successfully without actually passing the C-APDU to the card.
We informed RIA on 2016-02-12 of this weakness and its effect on the remote
update process.
5.2. MICARDO-powered ID cards
The MICARDO-powered ID cards issued from 2002 were valid for 10 years,
while the validity period of certificates was set to 3 years. On 2004-12-03, SK and
the Ministry of the Interior agreed that the state would pay SK for the renewal of
certificates whose 3-year validity period will be soon ending. From January 2005,
cardholders were provided with a certificate update possibility either in customer
service points of CMB and SK or remotely over the internet. The certificates could
be updated free of charge if the remaining validity of the certificate was less than
105 days. While suspended and revoked certificates could not be updated, it was
possible to update (including remotely) expired certificates, as long as the ID card
itself was valid. The customer service points of SK (branches of Swedbank and
SEB) provided a paid service to update certificates that qualified for the free of
charge update described above. [74, 268].
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On the client side, the remote updating was implemented using an ActiveX
component which served as a communication relay between the SK backend and
the smart card connected to the user’s computer. The solution, however, only
worked with Microsoft Windows and Internet Explorer. Later, when the new
generation ID card desktop software launched at the end of 2010, the remote
update functionality was also implemented in the ID-card utility and hence was
also available for other operating systems [269].
For the ID cards produced since 2007, the validity term of the document and
certificates were aligned to 5 years, therefore for these cards the updating of
certificates was not used. The last MICARDO-powered ID card with a validity of
10 years expired on 2016-12-31. The remote update service, however, was
already closed down on 2016-01-01, due to SK’s decision to deprecate the
certification of 1024-bit RSA keys.
5.2.1. Remote update protocol
The EstEID implementation on MICARDO-powered cards was preconfigured to
provide a list of card management operations, which could be performed remotely
after card issuance (see Section 17 in [5]). The operations were authenticated
using symmetric 3DES card management keys loaded by the card manufacturer in
the personalization phase. To provide the RSA key regeneration option, the cards
had two pairs of RSA key slots. The key reference could be updated to specify
which pair of authentication and digital signature key was currently active. In
general, the certificate update process consisted of generating new RSA keys in
the inactive slots, reading out the public keys, overwriting the certificate files and
updating the key references to point to the newly generated keys.
Below we provide the description of the remote update protocol steps. The
description is based on a non-public specification [270] shared by SK.
1. The personal ID code and the document number is read from the personal
data file. The personal ID code is required to derive the correct card
management keys and the card’s eligibility for certificate update is checked
using the document number.
2. The active key references are read from the first record of the EEEE/EF_SE
file (FID: MF/EEEE/0033) to find which RSA key slots are inactive and
hence can be used to store the new keys.
3. The inactive key slots are flagged for key generation by updating the
appropriate records in the EEEE/EF_KeyD file (FID: MF/EEEE/0013). The
UPDATE RECORD command is MAC-protected using the CMK2b key. The
prerequisite is a successful cardholder verification using PIN1.
4. Cardholder verification using PIN1 is performed (required to execute the
commands in the next step).
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5. A secure messaging channel is established using the CMK2a key, and over
the MAC-protected (unencrypted) secure messaging session:
(a) The authentication key pair is generated using the GENERATE PUBLIC
KEY PAIR command.
(b) The public key is read from the MF/EEEE/1000 file.
(c) The digital signature key pair is generated using the GENERATE
PUBLIC KEY PAIR command.
(d) The public key is read from the MF/EEEE/1000 file.
6. The files storing authentication (FID: MF/EEEE/AACE) and digital signature
(FID: MF/EEEE/DDCE) certificates are overwritten. The UPDATE BINARY
commands are MAC-protected using the CMK2b key. The prerequisite is a
successful cardholder verification using PIN1.
7. The active key references are changed in the first record of the EEEE/EF_SE
file. The UPDATE RECORD command is MAC-protected using the CMK2b
key. The prerequisite is a successful cardholder verification using PIN1.
The generation of the authentication key pair is done first, because both public
keys are signed using the authentication key. An interrupted certificate update
process can be restarted by executing the process from the beginning. If, however,
the key generation (step 5) is completed successfully, the protocol resumes with
the certificate overwrite (step 6).
In the event a card generated an RSA key with a 32-bit public exponent, the
key was regenerated until the randomly chosen exponent was smaller than 32 bits.
This was done because Microsoft Windows 98 SE only accepted 32-bit exponents
if they were encoded in 4 bytes, ignoring the ASN.1 DER encoding rules, which
specify that the most significant bit is the sign bit (correct certificate encoding
is further discussed in Section 6.6). This only affected the MICARDO-powered
ID cards issued in 2002. For the later cards, the maximum exponent size was
decreased to 3 bytes (see Section 3.1.2.1).
The same protocol was also used for updating certificates in CMB and SK
customer service points. In the process the cardholder was asked to enter PIN1.
In case PIN1 was unknown, the cardholder was issued a new PIN envelope [271].
5.2.2. Security analysis
In this section we provide a brief security analysis of the remote update protocol.
We note that the remote update protocol described above has been built utilizing
the most secure functionality provided by the card’s configuration. Therefore,
the security risks described below could not have been mitigated by utilizing a
different functionality provided by the card.
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5.2.2.1. Bringing a card to an inconsistent state
As described in Section 5.1.5, the MAC protection applied for the commands
using the CMK2b key provides very weak integrity properties. In the remote
update context it means that an attacker can, for example, prevent certificate
overwrite or prevent the change of active key references without the backend
being able to detect it. While not a security threat by itself, the flaw allows an
attacker to bring the card to an inconsistent state.
5.2.2.2. Exporting the generated key
The file identifier, where the GENERATE PUBLIC KEY PAIR writes the private
key of the generated RSA key pair, is stored in the EEEE/EF_KeyD file. By
exploiting the flaw which allows card management operations to be performed
using PIN2 (see Section 6.2), the attacker can modifying the private key file
identifier in the EEEE/EF_KeyD file to point to a publicly readable file. After the
remote update process, the attacker could export the generated RSA keys from
the card, thereby breaching the legal requirement that the private key must reside
on a secure signature creation device. In practice, this attack would have required
intercepting the APDU commands sent to the smart card – sending a few extra
APDUs before the APDUs from step 5 of the protocol have been transmitted.
5.2.2.3. Obtaining a certificate for a key generated outside the card
The flaw in the MICARDO key negotiation phase of the secure messaging
protocol (see Section 5.1.4) allows the attacker to impersonate the card in step 5
of the remote update protocol. This would allow the attacker to trick the backend
into believing that the public key returned has been generated by the card and
hence the corresponding private key resides on the card, while the public key
provided in the impersonated session actually corresponds to a private key
generated by the attacker. As in the case described above, the legal requirement
that requires the private key to reside on a secure signature creation device would
be breached.
5.2.2.4. Disclosure
The security issues described above were discovered after the remote update
functionality of the MICARDO-powered ID cards was already discontinued,
therefore no action was required to handle these risks.
5.3. jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards
For the ID cards based on the jTOP SLE66 platform, the ID card remote update
capability was used starting from 2016-03-18 to update certificates containing an
invalid ASN.1 DER encoding (see Section 6.6 for more details). The updating of
jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards was terminated on 2017-07-01, due to the eIDAS
technical requirements (see Section 6.6.2.2).
108
The remote update process used the card management key CMK2b to
overwrite the authentication and digital signature certificates. The RSA keys in
the process were not regenerated, therefore SK had to update their CP (Section
4.2.5 in [272]) which previously required certificate replacement based on a
newly generated key pair.
Due to the weak security properties of the MAC-protection using the CMK2b
key (Section 5.1.5), the attacker could interfere with the process, e.g., by
preventing some parts of the certificate from being overwritten or writing the
authentication certificate in the digital signature certificate file and vice versa.
This, however, does not give any advantage to the attacker, other than turning
certificates on the card into an inconsistent state without the backend being able
to detect it.
Figure 39 shows the sequence diagram of the remote certificate update process.
The diagram has been drawn from the APDU traces collected in the remote update
process performed on 2016-06-29. The activities colored in blue are user GUI
activities.
Backend Host Card
Agree to the terms of use








1 EstEID read cert(auth)
read cert(sign)







Figure 39: jTOP SLE66: Sequence diagram of the remote certificate update
process
5.4. jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards
The remote update solution for the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards was
introduced in spring 2016. It was first used starting from 2016-06-22 [273] to
update certificates containing an invalid ASN.1 DER encoding (see Section 6.6).
For an unknown reason, the EstEID v3.5 applet deployed on the jTOP
SLE78-powered ID cards did not support certificate updating using the card
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management operations. Therefore, a simple certificate overwrite (as it was done
for the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards) was not possible and hence the whole
EstEID applet had to be reinstalled. Later, in fall 2017, the readiness of such a
remote applet updating solution turned out to play a crucial role in solving
Infineon’s RSA key generation flaw (see Section 6.7), enabling the cardholders
to remotely update their cards from 2017-10-25 to 2018-03-31. The same
solution was used, starting from 2018-11-01 to 2019-04-30, to extend the validity
period for certificates on Digi-IDs and e-resident’s Digi-IDs from 3 to 5 years
(see Section 3.4.4).
In 2016, the author of this work participated in the security review of the
remote update protocol. Therefore some protocol peculiarities documented
below may have been introduced as a result of the feedback provided in the
protocol design process.
5.4.1. Remote applet update protocol
The sequence diagram of the remote applet update process is shown in Figure 40.
The diagram has been drawn from the APDU traces of the remote update
processes performed on 2016-06-29 and 2017-10-26. Since the APDU header is
not encrypted, the protocol can be reverse-engineered to a great extent. The
protocol steps are split into 14 protocol sessions based on the smart card applet in
which the activities take place. The activities starting with the “secure_” prefix
are performed over an EstEID secure messaging session. The activities colored
in blue are user GUI activities. The activities colored in brown are extra APDUs
introduced in the protocol in 2017. The activities colored in gray are smart card
requests for which we were unable to determine a purpose.
5.4.1.1. Applet management
To provide JavaCard applet management functionality, the jTOP SLE78 platform
implements GlobalPlatform (GP) Card Specification 2.2.1 [202]. The applet
management operations such as applet installation and deletion are authenticated
using the GP Issuer Security Domain (ISD) keys which are loaded on the card by
the card platform manufacturer and handed over to the ID card manufacturer
together with the cards. The card management APDUs are sent over a secure
messaging session established using the GP Secure Channel Protocol (SCP).
5.4.1.2. Handling of new PIN codes
The PIN codes are stored and handled by the EstEID applet, therefore the PIN
codes of the old EstEID applet can not be retained. The new PIN codes were
encrypted using the authentication key of the old EstEID applet, and after PIN1
verification they were decrypted and shown to the user on the screen (session 6).
To verify whether the user had written down the new codes, the entry of the new
PIN1 was requested in the next step (session 7).
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1 EstEID bind CPLC to document number
init GP SC()
delete AID(‘UPD1’)
2 GP ISD delete old UPD1 applet
read PIN counters()














5 UPD1 personalize UPD1 applet




Confirm new PIN codes are saved
sign PIN1(UPD1 pubkey?)




Enter new PIN1 to proceed
verify PIN1()




install AID(‘EstEID v35’, 12KB)
list AIDs()
config AID(‘EstEID v35’, 144B)






9 EstEID personalize EstEID applet
Enter new PIN1 to sign CSR
verify PIN1()
sign PIN1(EstEID pubkeys?)






11 EstEID write certificates, activate card
Enter new PIN1 to activate
verify PIN1()
sign PIN1(challenge?)
12 EstEID verify keypair, sign something...
init GP SC()
delete AID(‘UPD1’)
13 GP ISD remove UPD1 applet
Update successful
14 EstEID
Figure 40: jTOP SLE78: Sequence diagram of the remote applet update process
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5.4.1.3. The purpose of the temporary applet
Since several applets can reside on a single smart card, only one applet can be
automatically selected by the card without the need for the terminal to send an
explicit SELECT command. At that time, the systems communicating with the
ID card were built under the assumption that the EstEID applet is the implicitly
selected applet. To not break this compatibility, the implicit selection of the
EstEID applet had to be maintained. The Default Selected privilege can only be
set at the applet installation phase and cannot be set if some other applet already
has the privilege. Therefore, before installing the new EstEID applet, the old
applet had to be removed (session 8). To avoid the situation where the ID card
ended up without any applet residing on the card, temporary update applet UPD1
was installed on the card. The applet was configured with the PIN codes of the
new EstEID applet (session 4). A temporary authentication key was generated
for the applet and (only in 2017) an authentication certificate issued by “Trueb
Baltic” that was valid for 10 days was loaded on the card (session 5). The applet
was removed at the end of a successful update process (session 13).
The use of the temporary applet ensures that even if the update process is
interrupted, the ID card always contains an applet-level RSA key bound to the
cardholder’s identity. The temporary RSA public key of the UPD1 applet is
signed by the cardholder’s old EstEID applet’s RSA key, and the new EstEID
applet’s public RSA key is signed by the UPD1 applet’s temporary RSA key.
This guarantees that the attacker, who has obtained the GP ISD key but does not
have access to the cardholder’s authentication key, cannot impersonate the
cardholder in the remote applet update process.
5.4.2. Security of GlobalPlatform SCP02 protocol
The jTOP SLE78 platform implements the GlobalPlatform Secure Channel
Protocol SCP02 implementation option ‘55’ (SCP02_55) (see Section E
in [202]). The purpose of the protocol is to provide encryption and authentication
for the C-APDUs sent to the card (the R-APDUs are not protected). In every
SCP session, the APDU is encrypted and MACed using unique session keys enc
and cmac. The session keys are not negotiated by the card and host, but are
derived from the sequence number seq and a 16-byte symmetric GP ISD key
shared between the card and host. The value of seq is maintained by the card and
incremented by 1 after every successfully completed EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
command.
The protocol is depicted in Figure 41. The number in square brackets
represents the byte length of the value. The square brackets with a colon
represent the byte slicing operator.
The protocol works as follows:
1. Using the INITIALIZE UPDATE command the host sends an 8-byte random





ID[12], seq[2], rc ← rMACcmac(AID)[:6], 3DESenc(rh||seq||rc)[-8:]
[EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE]




Figure 41: GlobalPlatform SCP02 implementation option ‘55’
2. The card responds with a 12-byte card identifier, a 2-byte sequence number
and a 6-byte challenge rc (note that the card’s challenge is not random, but
depends on the cmac of the particular session). In addition, the card returns
the last ciphertext block of the sequence number seq and the challenges
encrypted using padded 3DES in CBC mode with session key enc. This
proves to the host that the card knows the session key enc as the card could
not have otherwise provided the encryption of rh.
3. Using padded 3DES in CBC mode with session key enc, the host encrypts
the sequence number seq and the challenges that have been reordered.
Using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the host sends the last
ciphertext block to the card. The C-APDU is MAC-protected using the
retail MAC in CBC mode with session key cmac. This proves to the card
that the host knows the session keys enc and cmac as the host could not
have otherwise provided a modified encryption of the challenges with a
correct MAC.
4. All further C-APDUs sent to the card are encrypted using padded 3DES in
CBC mode with an IV set to zeros, and are MACed using the retail MAC
in CBC mode over the plaintext version of the APDU. To prevent replay
attacks, the previous MAC value is encrypted and used as an IV for the next
MAC calculation.
5.4.2.1. Untrustworthy R-APDUs
The failure of the GP SCP02_55 protocol to at least provide MAC protection
for R-APDUs returned by the card means that the backend cannot trust the data
returned by the card and it is not even able to verify whether the C-APDUs were
at all executed by the card.
The C-APDU protection provided by the GP SCP02_55 protocol, however,
can be used by the backend to securely install the EstEID applet and set the
applet-specific card management keys (session 4 and 8). The actual success of
the installation can then be verified by establishing an EstEID-level secure
messaging session using the EstEID card management keys (session 5 and 9).
The remote applet update process, however, cannot verify whether, for example,
the deletion of the temporary update applet (session 13) was actually performed.
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5.4.2.2. The same GP ISD key shared among ID cards
It turned out that the GP ISD keys set by the manufacturer are not card-specific,
but are shared among different batches of ID cards. We collected the responses
to the INITIALIZE UPDATE command from identity cards issued on 2015-02-20,
2015-07-02 and 2015-08-31. All three cards responded with the seq number 1
and the same rc value 0xDC8A9A723FE9 showing that the same GP ISD key was
loaded on these cards.
To check if the ID card manufacturer had also failed to diversify GP ISD keys
for the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards, we collected the responses to the
INITIALIZE UPDATE command from a jTOP SLE66-powered identity card
issued on 2013-01-08 and jTOP SLE66-powered residence permit card issued on
2013-09-16. Both cards responded with the seq number 2, the same rc value
0x87C4530FD38B and the card’s cryptogram 0xBFD3C912D020DC07, showing
that the same practice was also employed for the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards.
The use of the same GP ISD key on several cards is a bad practice in general.
If the key is compromised, all the cards sharing the same GP ISD key can be
attacked. The knowledge of the GP ISD key does not allow an attacker to directly
obtain secrets stored by the EstEID applet, because the GP card specification
forbids the retrieval of an applet and its associated data. The loading of
additional (potentially malicious) applets, however, opens the card to attacks
against the on-card bytecode verifier. If the attack is successful, an attacker
would be allowed to bypass the applet isolation enforced by the JavaCard virtual
machine [274]. The knowledge of the GP ISD key would also allow the attacker
who has captured C-APDUs exchanged between the backend and the card to
decrypt the corresponding PIN codes and CMK keys configured for the applet.
In the context of the remote applet update, the use of non-unique GP ISD keys
means that the update process cannot ensure that the applet, PIN codes and CMK
keys are installed in the correct ID card. As a counter-measure, the first step
after a secure messaging session with the applet has been established is to verify
(via secure_read_CPLC() which returns the card’s serial number) whether the
backend is communicating with the EstEID applet installed on the correct ID card.
Furthermore, since the GP SCP02 secure messaging protocol does not involve
any randomness from the card, the C-APDUs captured can be replayed against any
card sharing the same GP ISD key as long as the seq number of the target card
matches the seq of the C-APDUs to be replayed. This, for example, allows the
attacker who has captured C-APDUs from some remote update session to delete
the EstEID applet or install the EstEID applet with the corresponding PIN codes
and CMK keys on any ID card sharing the same GP ISD key.
The response to the INITIALIZE UPDATE command obtained from a jTOP
SLE78-powered identity card issued on 2018-09-04 shows that the ID card
manufacturer has not changed the practice of using the same GP ISD key even
long after being informed of the negative security implications it introduced.
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5.4.2.3. Encryption with IV set to zeros
The APDU data in the GP SCP02 protocol C-APDUs is encrypted using an IV
of all zeros. This means that the encrypted APDU data sent over the same SCP
session which starts with a common plaintext prefix will share the same ciphertext
prefix. Sabt et al. in [275] point out this GP SCP02 protocol deficiency.
Due to the ID card manufacturer’s practice of using the same GP ISD key
among different ID cards, an attacker sniffing communication between the
backend and the ID cards will be able to cross reference ciphertexts sent to
different ID cards. Whether the attacker can deduce something useful from the
similarity of ciphertext blocks depends on how the data in the APDU is arranged.
We informed RIA of this weakness on 2016-02-12, recommending that they
ensured that the plaintext data encrypted for the same GP session starts with a
unique 8-byte block of data.
5.4.2.4. Padding oracle attack
The GP SCP02 protocol follows the so-called Encrypt-and-MAC approach, which
means that the card first has to decrypt potentially modified ciphertext, before
its integrity using the MAC can be verified. This opens the card to the padding
oracle attack [276], allowing an attacker to decrypt ciphertexts, unless special
implementation-level counter-measures are implemented by the platform.
To exploit the flaw, the attacker has to determine the reason why the card
rejects a modified C-APDU (incorrect decryption padding vs correct padding but
incorrect MAC). Since the smart card returns the same status word 0x6982
(security status not satisfied) in both cases, the attacker has to deduce whether the
decryption was successful, and hence the MAC verification was performed,
using some side-channel information, such as execution time or power
consumption of the card.
To measure the power consumption of the card, we built a power consumption
measurement setup (see Figure 42) by adding a 50 ohm resistor to the terminal’s
ground wire and measuring the voltage drop across the resistor using the Hantek
DSO-5200A USB oscilloscope.
Figure 42: Smart card power consumption analysis setup
115
We collected power traces of the jTOP SLE78 card processing malformed
C-APDUs. From the traces (see Figure 43) we see that the card’s power
consumption allows us to clearly distinguish between the cases, therefore the GP
SCP02 implementation on the jTOP SLE78 platform is vulnerable to the padding
oracle attack. From the traces we also see that the timing side channel could be
used to distinguish between the cases. Avoine et al. in [277] have shown that
padding oracle attacks using timing as a side-channel is a common problem







































(b) Status word 0x6982 caused by MAC verificaton failure
Figure 43: Power trace of a jTOP SLE78 card processing malformed GP SCP
C-APDUs
In the context of the remote applet update process, the exploitation of the
padding oracle attack would allow the attacker to decrypt C-APDUs, thereby
gaining access to sensitive data such as the JavaCard bytecode of the EstEID
applet, PIN codes and CMK keys.
The exploitation of the padding oracle attack requires the remote update
backend to send the encryption of the same plaintext repeatedly over many GP
SCP02 sessions, with the attacker modifying the ciphertext and observing the
card’s behavior in handling the malformed ciphertext. In each GP SCP02 session
the attacker can verify only one guess of the plaintext byte. The attacker cannot
replay a single session against a single ID card over and over, because the card
increments the session sequence number seq after every successfully established
session. Establishing thousands of unsuccessful remote update sessions would
most likely be noticed by the backend. However, due to the manufacturer’s
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practice of using the same GP ISD key on several ID cards and the GP SCP02
protocol’s failure to involve randomness from the card, the attacker can replay
the captured C-APDUs against ID cards sharing the same GP ISD key, without
the need to involve the backend. This would, however, require access to a large
number of different ID cards, unless the attacker had collected a large number of
sessions that could be replayed and needed to decrypt only a few bytes of the
ciphertext.
We informed RIA of the flaw on 2016-10-12, recommending that they
increase the cost of the attack by limiting the number of ciphertexts produced
using different seq values.
5.4.3. Obtaining new PIN codes using PIN1
The decision to require only PIN1 to authenticate the remote update process led to
controversy. Contrary to other ID card remote update scenarios, in this case at the
end of the remote applet update process a new PIN envelope is shown to the user.
This means that an attacker who has access to a cardholder’s ID card and 4-digit
PIN1 could perform the remote applet update, thereby obtaining the 5-digit PIN2
and would be able to use the PIN2 functionality of the card (i.e., create digital
signatures).
As a type of counter-measure, RIA introduced an SMS notification for the
cardholders who had registered their phone number in the state portal eesti.ee.
The SMS text (in Estonian) was as follows: “Dear [cardholder’s name]! Your
certificates are updated. If they were not updated by you, call number 1777 or
(+372) 677337.”
This case is another example showing that the ID card ecosystem in practice
fails to isolate PIN1 from PIN2, in some cases allowing the abuse of the PIN1
privilege to escalate to PIN2. In our opinion, adding an extra GUI activity for
PIN2 entry would not have considerably affected the user experience, since the
update process already demands 5 entries of PIN1.
5.5. IDEMIA-powered ID cards
For the IDEMIA-powered ID cards, the remote ID card update functionality has
not yet been used. However, in their 2020 yearbook, RIA announced plans to
develop a solution to remotely update the software and certificates on the chip
of the IDEMIA-powered ID cards as one day, it may become necessary (page 10
in [237]).
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6. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND OTHER ISSUES
In this chapter we analyze a list of security incidents and similar issues that the
Estonian ID card has experienced over the years. We note that some security
issues related to the Estonian ID card were already mentioned in the previous
chapters of this work when discussing the particular topic. Most of the issues
covered in this chapter have been previously publicly disclosed, however, several
issues were found by us and reported during the course of this research.
While the occurrence of an incident cannot be completely avoided, an
important aspect is how the involved parties respond and resolve the incidents
once they occur. Therefore, we have made a significant effort to try to document
the events that took place, and, when possible, provide an analysis describing the
root cause and impact of the incident, the applied mitigation measures and how
effective and timely they were, how the risk was communicated to the affected
parties and the public, and what lessons were learned from the incident and what
improvements were made to the ID card ecosystem.
6.1. Authentication key operations using PIN2
The ID cards powered by the MICARDO, MULTOS and jTOP SLE66 platforms
support the not so well-known passphrase authentication feature, which can be
used to perform cardholder verification using a passphrase instead of a PIN code.
The passphrase authentication is configured in such a way that it creates a design
flaw, as it allows the usage of PIN2 to perform private key operations with the
authentication key (rather than only with the digital signature key). This
functionality has been documented in the EstEID specification, but has been
overlooked by the community and hence has never been called into question. In
the subsection below, we describe the passphrase authentication process and the
related security issues in detail.
6.1.1. Passphrase authentication
In addition to cardholder verification using PIN1 and PIN2 codes, the EstEID
specification provides cardholder verification using so-called passphrases (see
Section 17 in [9]). The passphrase authentication feature is implemented as
follows. From the user’s submitted passphrase, a symmetric 3DES key is
derived, which is then used to establish a mutually-authenticated secure channel
with the card (see Section 5.1.1 for the description of the secure messaging
protocol). Since the operations with the cardholder’s asymmetric keys are
performed over a mutually-authenticated channel, additional cardholder
verification using a PIN code is not required.
Passphrase authentication introduces two 3DES keys: 3DESKey1 to perform
operations with the authentication key and 3DESKey2 to perform operations with
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the digital signature key. Each key is assigned a retry counter with an initial value
of 255, which is decreased whenever an incorrect 3DES key is used to establish a
secure channel. After a successful passphrase authentication the retry counter is
not reset. Once the counter reaches zero, the respective 3DES key cannot be used
and there are no means to reset the counter.
The initial value for the 3DES passphrase keys is set to all zeros and therefore
(because of the 3DES key parity error) cannot be used to initiate a secure channel.
The cardholder can set both keys by updating the EF_Key_DES (FID: MF/0010)
file on the smart card file system. The prerequisite for updating the EF_Key_DES
file is a successful cardholder verification using PIN2. Hence, the knowledge of
PIN2 also allows a cardholder to set the 3DESKey1 which in turn can be used to
perform cryptographic operations with the PIN1-protected authentication key.
It is interesting to note that the preliminary version of the EstEID specification
drafted in June 2001 required PUK verification to set both 3DES keys (see Section
6.2.3.3 in [3]). It is not clear why the PUK code was replaced with PIN2 in the
final specification (see Section 4.2.2.3 in [4]). Requiring the PUK code to set the
3DES keys would not have introduced the security issue, because the PUK code
is intended as a super-PIN that can be used to reset both PIN codes.
Since the 3DES keys are not reset after the PIN codes are changed, the
passphrase authentication feature can be used as a type of backdoor to maintain
persistent access to the private key functionality even after the cardholder has
changed the PINs. The passphrase authentication feature can also be abused to
bypass the security restrictions enforced by the smart card readers with a PIN
pad (Section 2.14.1). Once the cardholder has entered PIN2 on the PIN pad,
malware can set the 3DES keys, thereby having full access to the cryptographic
functionality of the ID card whenever the card is in the reader.
The only security advantage provided by the passphrase authentication is in
the case where an attacker is sniffing the communication channel between the
terminal and the card – the attacker will not be able to see the plaintext and modify
the data. Offline brute-force attacks to recover the passphrase, however, will still
be possible.
The passphrase authentication feature that was first introduced in the
MICARDO platform has also been reimplemented in the MULTOS and jTOP
SLE66 ID card platforms, with the only difference being that the initial value of
the retry counter is 3 and it is reset to the initial value after each successful
passphrase authentication or successful change of the passphrase. The
passphrase authentication feature has never been implemented in the client-side
software and has not been implemented in the EstEID implementation on the
jTOP SLE78 ID card platform. We note that SK’s CPS [129] and CP [130]
documentation (which is subject to audits) have never mentioned this passphrase
authentication feature as a method of private key activation.
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6.1.2. Disclosure
We informed RIA of this design flaw on 2019-02-27. As far as we know, this
has not resulted in any type of action. We note that while all MICARDO and
MULTOS-powered ID cards have already expired, the last jTOP SLE66-powered
ID card only expired at the end of 2019.
6.2. Card management operations using PIN2
While studying the configuration of MICARDO-powered ID cards, we found that
all MICARDO-powered ID cards issued from 2002 to 20111 have a configuration
flaw which can be used to perform all card management operations if the PIN2
code of the ID card is known.
6.2.1. Cause of the flaw
The EstEID specification uses several symmetric 3DES keys. In the MICARDO
operating system the secret keys are stored in the file EF_Key_DES (FID:
MF/0010). The first two records store 3DESKey1 and 3DESKey2, which are
used to enable cardholder verification using the passphrase authentication feature
(see Section 6.1.1). The other records store card management keys (CMK1,
CMK2a, CMK2b and CMK3) loaded by the card manufacturer in the ID card
personalization process (see Section 19 in [9]).
The descriptions of the keys are stored in the read-only file EF_KeyD (FID:
MF/0013). Each key in the MICARDO operating system is identified by a 2-byte
key reference. In order to map the keys defined in EF_KeyD to the secret key
values stored in EF_Key_DES, each secret key in the EF_Key_DES file has the
corresponding key reference value prepended. The access rules of the
EF_Key_DES file allow the cardholder to update the first two records so that the
the passphrases can be set. The prerequisite for updating the EF_Key_DES file is
a successful cardholder verification using PIN2.
The flaw lies in the fact that when updating the records the cardholder can
specify an arbitrary key reference in the first two bytes of the record. When the
cardholder specifies the reference of a card management key for the cardholder’s
3DES key, it will be used by the MICARDO OS to authenticate the
corresponding card management operation. This is because the MICARDO OS
uses the first record with the matching key reference when looking for a secret
key in the EF_Key_DES file. Section 4.7.1 of the MICARDO User Manual [185]
states that the MICARDO OS does not detect the existence of entries with
duplicate key references, the requirement for uniqueness being left up to the
entity who writes the data.
1We verified that the flaw was present on a card issued on 2002-01-17 as well as a card issued
on 2010-09-01.
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The flaw could have been avoided if the cardholder’s 3DES keys were stored
in the last two records of the EF_Key_DES file – in the order they are defined in
the EF_KeyD file. This way, the card management keys set by the manufacturer
would always take precedence over potentially colliding key references set by the
cardholder. Taking into account the above, we classify this flaw as a
misconfiguration of the MICARDO OS.
The EstEID applets of the MULTOS and jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards are
not affected, because their applets ignore the key reference specified when
updating the EF_Key_DES file, instead using the record in which the key was
written, to look up the corresponding CMK key.
6.2.2. Impact
The ability to perform all card management operations can be used to reset PIN
and PUK codes, generate new RSA key pairs, overwrite certificates and create
additional application structures on the card. A less obvious abuse scenario that
can be done in the context of the EstEID applet is the ability to update the
EEEE/EF_KeyD file (FID: MF/EEEE/0013), changing the RSA private key FID
reference to point to a readable and writable file, hence allowing the generation
of exportable keys and the use of imported keys. The access rules set in the
personalization process, however, prevent the RSA private keys that have been
generated in the ID card personalization process from being exported. The flaw
could have been exploited in the ID card remote update process, for example, by
forcing the generated private key to be saved in a publicly readable file, thereby
allowing private key export (see Section 5.2.2 for more details).
6.2.3. Disclosure
We informed RIA of the flaw on 2019-02-27. Since, at that time, all MICARDO-
powered ID cards had already been expired, RIA decided that there was no need
to take action.
6.3. Padding oracle attack in the decryption functionality
In April 2012, Bardou et al. published the research paper “Efficient Padding
Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware” [256]. In this paper the researchers
presented an optimized version of the Bleichenbacher’s padding oracle attack
against the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption scheme [278] and tested the attack
against commonly available cryptographic hardware that impemented the
PKCS#1 v1.5 standard. Also among the devices tested was the Estonian ID card
(jTOP SLE66-powered ID card test card), which naturally was found to be
vulnerable, as it supports the decryption functionality and implemented the RSA
PKCS#1 v1.5 standard.
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Essentially, the researchers found that by sending tens of thousands of
specially crafted ciphertexts to the card (it takes tens of hours due to the
performance limitations of a smart card) and by observing the smart card
responses (whether the decryption was successful, i.e., the decrypted plaintext
contained a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding), it is possible to calculate the
decryption of some ciphertext or forge a signature on arbitrary data.
A potential exploitation scenario could be the case where a machine in which
the ID card is used accepts RSA ciphertexts from some untrusted source,
automatically sends the ciphertexts to the ID card for decryption and allows an
attacker to learn (by error message or some side channel) whether the decryption
was successful or not. Since in practice the decryption function of the ID card is
not used in this manner, the attacker is unable to gain access to such an oracle
and hence this PKCS#1 v1.5 vulnerability in the context of the standard use of
the Estonian ID card is not exploitable.
6.3.1. Incident response
On 2011-11-11, the researchers informed SK about their findings, rating the
severity of the vulnerability as “moderate”, but added that exploitation in practice
may be difficult [279].
SK reported the flaw to CERT-EE and later gave the researchers the response
that a signature forged using such an attack would not be usable in practice, as
the authentication key is used mainly to authenticate to TLS servers. However,
the particular attack was too slow to forge a signature before the attacker’s TLS
handshaking process with the TLS server timed out (see Appendix C in [256]).
We note that the argument used in the CERT-EE response is not sound for two
reasons. Firstly, we found that in practice, the TLS server implementations of 63%
of the Estonian service providers allow the TLS handshaking process to be kept
open for days (see Section F in [15]). Secondly, the padding oracle attack also
concerns the forging of digital signatures, because the MICARDO, MULTOS and
jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards also enabled decryption function with the digital
signature key (see Section 2.9).
6.3.2. Reflections in the media
On 2012-06-08, the news portal Delfi.ee published an article about the findings
of the researchers together with a comment from Cybernetica AS and PPA [280].
Cybernetica’s specialist noted that the findings had been analyzed and there was
no reason to panic. PPA stated that the attack was theoretical and could not be
used to commit a crime, providing an analogy that this was an attack where in
order to break the door, access to the key is first needed.
On 2012-06-25, Ars Technica published an article titled “Scientists penetrate
hardened security devices in under 15 minutes” [281], mentioning that the
Estonian ID card was among the affected devices. As a response to this article,
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RIA on 2012-06-27 published PPA’s press release [282] (English version on
2012-07-03 [283]) refuting the claims made in the article.
On 2012-09-13, two of the authors of the research paper visited Estonia and
gave a guest lecture on the topic at the University of Tartu [279]. The researchers
refused to give their assessment on the practical exploitability of this attack in the
context of the Estonian ID card. A government official later published a
newspaper article accusing the researchers of presenting sensational half-truths
for cheap publicity [284]. The media coverage directed at this theoretical issue
actually might have been an attempt to divert attention from the very practical
security risk affecting the Estonian ID card of which the officials at that time
were well aware (see the following section).
6.4. Security flaw in the ID cards issued in 2011
In September 2012, PPA announced an invitation for cardholders whose ID cards
were issued in 2011 to visit PPA customer service points to renew the electronic
component of their ID cards [285–287].
According to RIA, “During a routine ID card analysis process we discovered
that one of the electronic security measures of the ID card needs to be renewed.
ID card users have no reason to be concerned. The card is secure and all
transactions made with the card are fully reliable. The assessment points to only
one of many security measures – all other security components are still of high
quality.” [285]
The wording of the press release suggested that some purely theoretical risk
was being mitigated and the renewal was just a formality. As a result, this ID card
recall received very little public interest [288]. Only later, in 2017, the authorities
partly acknowledged (see Section 6.4.2) that this was how one of the most serious
security flaws in the Estonian ID card history was to be mitigated.
6.4.1. Incident response
According to two sources, the flaw was discovered by Finnish penetration testers
who were contracted by RIA to perform a code audit of the EstEID v3.0
JavaCard applet shipped on the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards. Most likely the
flaw was discovered at the end of 2011, as the ID cards issued from 2012 were
not vulnerable. According to PPA, in total 120 000 cards issued in 2011 were
affected [285]. This covered all jTOP SLE66-powered identity cards and
residence permit cards. The digital identity cards issued in 2011 were not
affected, because they were powered by the MULTOS platform.
In the first half of 2012, the ID card manufacturer developed a solution that
allowed the vulnerable ID cards to be patched in PPA customer service points.
In the renewal process, the old EstEID JavaCard applet was removed and a new
applet with new RSA keys and PIN codes was installed on the card [289].
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The renewal process was opened from 2012-09-10, the same day the PPA
press release [285] was issued. From the certificate data we learned that the first
cards (issued to SK and PPA employees) were already renewed on 2012-07-12,
apparently to test the ID card renewal functionality.
The entire procedure was reported to take between 5–10 minutes [289]. The
customer service points had a separate priority queue for cardholders coming to
renew their 2011 ID cards [290].
The invitations to renew the card were sent to the affected cardholders via
email and regular mail. The invitation stated that the update was needed to ensure
higher security and reliability of the document [290]. The first invitations were
sent to 40 000 cardholders who had used the card electronically at least once [285].
For the persons registered abroad a new ID card was issued [289].
In the initial press release [285] the cardholders were informed that the
certificates of the non-renewed ID cards would be revoked in March 2013. For
unknown reasons the revocation date was later moved to July 2013 [289]. From
the CRL data we found that the actual revocation took place from 2013-07-24
until 2013-07-28. In total, certificates of 78 760 ID cards were revoked.
According to SK [291], the certificates were revoked based on an official letter
from state authorities and the legal basis for revocation was the Digital
Signatures Act [63], clause 14 (1) 2): “an opportunity for using the private key
corresponding to the public key set out in the certificate without the consent of
the certificate holder”.
The possibility to renew the affected ID cards was also provided to cardholders
after the certificates were revoked. The timeline of ID card updating activity is














































































































































































































































Figure 44: Updating activity of vulnerable 2011 ID cards (source: certificate data)
We noticed that the certificates issued in the PPA renewal process can be
distinguished from the certificates on initially issued ID cards by the value of
RSA public exponent e. For initially issued ID cards, the 2048-bit RSA key was
generated with a 4-byte random public exponent. However, the RSA keys
generated in the PPA renewal process were generated with the public exponent
set to the value 65537. As it later turned out (see Section 6.8), the difference was
due to these keys issued in the PPA renewal process being generated outside the
ID card.
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6.4.2. Decision to hide the nature and the true risk of the flaw
It was already clear in 2012 that the assuring statements of the authorities
contradicted with the actions taken (see slide 17 in [292]). The costly ID card
recall and the revocation of the affected certificates sharply differed from the
usual response of the authorities, where the severity of even practically
exploitable security flaws is downplayed. It was clear that the flaw was actually
very serious and trivially exploitable.
Only in 2017, after the ROCA flaw broke out (Section 6.7), was it disclosed in
the media that the flaw in the 2011 ID cards was exploitable by having access to
the card [288]. Based on this fact, we are quite certain that the flaw manifested in
the possibility of using the ID card without knowledge of the PIN codes. The only
alternative is that the flaw could have been used to extract the private key. This,
however, would require the applet to contain JavaCard private key export code,
but there is no legitimate reason for the applet to contain such code.
It is not hard to see why the authorities in 2011 and even now2 lack the courage
to disclose the details about the flaw. If the nature and the true risk of the flaw
became public, some political parties would immediately question the trust of i-
voting and the results of parliamentary elections that were held in the beginning
of 20113. It would also be evident that the affected ID cards did not satisfy the
legal requirements for secure-signature-creation devices (see Section 2.10.1), and
would also raise a fair but embarrassing question of why the EstEID JavaCard
applet was put into production without it being audited.
The authorities could argue that the nature of the flaw was not disclosed to
prevent the reverse-engineering of the flaw, thereby limiting the number of
people who knew how to exploit it. The result, however, was that the affected
cardholders could not evaluate the risk and implement local mitigation measures.
Furthermore, since the authorities were not honest about the risk, the affected
cardholders did not rush to renew their ID cards.
It is not known on which level the decision to hide the nature and the true
risk of the flaw was made. According to [288], at least to some extent the prime
minister was informed of the flaw. According to the Minister of Finance at that
time, the topic had been discussed among the members of the government, and it
was concluded that the risk was unlikely to occur and there was no need to send
confusing messages [294].
The opportunity for the state and the public to learn from this case was missed.
The manner in which this flaw was mitigated created distrust, which fueled our
research, in hopes of finding the security issues the authorities and the ID card
manufacturer were likely trying to hide.
2According to PPA, information about the flaw is protected under the termless confidentiality
clauses of the ID card manufacturing contract [293].
3The i-voting took place from February 24 to March 2, 2011. At least 12 000 vulnerable ID cards
were issued by that time.
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6.5. Certificates with incorrect @eesti.ee email addresses
In September 2015, SK and PPA announced that in June and July 2015, due to a
software error, the authentication certificates for 4 120 ID cards had been issued
with the wrong @eesti.ee email addresses [295]. In a nutshell, the process of
assigning email addresses lost track of already occupied addresses. Therefore,
certificates were issued with an email address that matched the email address of
the namesake. This led to a situation where two (or more) namesakes had the
same email address specified in their certificate and emails sent to that address
were forwarded to both namesakes.
6.5.1. Mitigation
After the flaw was discovered, the colliding @eesti.ee addresses were
deassigned from the persons to whom they had been wrongly assigned. The
authorities, however, decided not to revoke the certificates containing the wrong
email addresses, stating that “The security or use of the document is not affected
in any way. To solve the problem, the renewal of the certificate in the service is
sufficient.” [295]. Hence, the security risk that emails sent to the address
specified in a valid certificate would reach the wrong person, was not mitigated.
Starting from 2015-09-14, the affected cardholders were invited to PPA
customer service points to renew the certificates of their jTOP SLE78-powered
ID cards. In the certificate update process the entire EstEID applet was
reinstalled and a new PIN envelope was issued to the cardholder. The updating
service was offered for the next 6 months. [295]
The flaw not only affected the initially issued jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards,
but also the Mobile-ID certificates and certificate renewals for the MICARDO and
jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards. We were unable to obtain any information from
SK on how the problem was resolved for these cases and we were also unbable to
obtain details of the issue, as according to SK, the details were confidential and
they did not have the right to share all the information.
In the certificate dataset we observed that the email address collisions had
occurred before the 2015 incident and had also occurred relatively recently. The
latest collision we observed was in a ertificate issued on 2018-04-20, where the
email address siim.jarve.2@eesti.ee matched the address specified in
another person’s (namesake’s) certificate issued on 2018-03-24.
6.5.2. Other issues
In the certificate dataset we noticed that throughout the years there had been
several issues with the correct handling of @eesti.ee email addresses. As far as
we know, none of the issues described below have resulted in a decision to
revoke or replace the affected certificates.
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6.5.2.1. Certificates lacking an email address
In the certificate data we found that from 2010-10-04 to 2011-07-09 a total of
4 878 digital identity card and Mobile-ID authentication certificates were issued
with the email address field set to text value “none”. Most likely this was caused
due to an error in the certificate profile used to issue digital identity card and
Mobile-ID authentication certificates.
6.5.2.2. The email address in digital signature certificates
For a year, from 2011-07-10 to 2012-07-05, contrary to the SK certificate profile
specification [197], the cardholder’s @eesti.ee email address was also included
in the digital signature certificates of all types of identity documents.
6.5.2.3. Email address change without reason
We found 512 persons whose number extension for their @eesti.ee email had
changed over the years without apparent reason (e.g., name.surname@ turning
into name.surname.1@ or vice versa). These 512 persons do not include the
persons who have namesakes and hence whose address extension may have
changed due to the abovementioned collisions.
For some persons the allocation of a new extension occurred because the
person changed their name temporarily and then reverted to their original name,
but the original email address was not reassigned. We selected one person from
the set that we know has no namesakes and their name had never changed. We
found that while the new email address was specified in the certificate, the
@eesti.ee server actually only accepts email forwarding for the old address.
According to SK, this situation was caused by an error.
6.5.2.4. Email addresses not corresponding to person’s name
We found 52 certificates issued in the period from 2016-07 to 2018-03, where the
surname in the email address did not match the surname specified in the
certificate’s subject name. All of the certificates belonged to persons who had
recently changed their names. The affected certificates were issued in the ID card
certificate renewal process and the email address corresponded to the person’s
previous email, before the surname of the person had changed4. Apparently, the
renewed certificate was filled with the person’s name from the population
register, while the email address was copied from the old certificate. This also
resulted in an inconsistency, where the person’s name printed on the ID card was
different from the name in the renewed certificate. To prevent such a situation,
the business rules of SK should disallow the renewal of an ID card when the
person’s name has changed, as a CA must not issue certificates with incorrect
data (person’s previous name).
4We found that at the time of the renewal, the new ID card with the new name was already
manufactured, but not yet issued to the person.
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6.5.2.5. Truncated email address
We found an ID card authentication certificate issued on 2010-05-07, containing a
truncated email address “sergo.lanno@ees” which belonged to another person,
whose authentication certificate with full email address was issued on the same
day. Most likely the certificates were issued at the same time and the corruption
was caused by some software error.
6.5.2.6. Invalid email addresses
We found 354 email addresses where the local-part of the @eesti.ee address
was not valid according to RFC 3696 [296]. The local-part contained space
characters or parenthesis, started or ended with a dot character or had dot
characters appearing consecutively. This problem most likely has been fixed
permanently, because the last certificate where such a problem is present was
issued on 2013-03-25.
6.5.2.7. Email addresses not accepted by @eesti.ee server
It is interesting to note that we found 22 persons who have no given name (given
name is set to “–”) and hence their @eesti.ee email address starts with a
hyphen. RFC 3696 [296] allows the address to start with a hyphen, however, for
security reasons [297] the @eesti.ee Postfix server does not accept email to
addresses starting with a hyphen. An error “501 5.1.3 Bad recipient
address syntax” is returned when trying to send an email to these recipients.
6.6. Certificates with incorrectly encoded public keys
In September 2015, while testing the beta version of Google Chrome version 46,
it was discovered that the certificates of recent ID cards could not be used with
Google Chrome to perform TLS client certificate authentication [298]. The
problem manifested because Google implemented stricter encoding checks in
their OpenSSL fork BoringSSL, enforcing integer values in the certificate to be
correctly encoded according to ASN.1 DER encoding rules.
According to ASN.1 DER encoding, integers are encoded using two’s
complement representation interpreting the most significant bit as a sign bit. This
requires positive integer values that have the most significant bit of the most
significant byte set to be zero-padded. The ID card certificates were encoded
ignoring this requirement. This resulted in the RSA public key values being
interpreted as negative values and led to an error condition in the development
version of Chrome. Some of the certificates had the integer value padded even
though the most significant bit was not set and hence the padding was not
necesary. This resulted in another decoding error.
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6.6.1. Affected ID cards
While at first it was announced that around 250 000 ID cards issued in the
one-year period after September 2014 were affected [298], later in February
2016 it was announced that 420 000 ID cards needed to be updated to be
compatible with Chrome [299]. We counted 434 567 ID cards (MICARDO –
131, jTOP SLE66 – 175 994, jTOP SLE78 – 258 442) that were valid on
2015-10-01 that had certificates with incorrectly encoded RSA public key.
In the certificate data we found that there were already certificates issued
from 2002 for the MICARDO-powered ID cards that had incorrect ASN.1 DER
encoding for the public key exponent value. The value of the random public
exponent was always padded to 3 bytes hence introducing excess padding in the
case where the exponent was smaller than 16 bits. The problem was fixed in
2014-09, because since then the certificates for MICARDO cards (issued in the
certificate update process) encoded the exponent correctly.
The certificates for jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards contained negative moduli
starting from their issuance in 2011. Starting from 2011-07-19, the modulus was
correctly padded. However, for a year (from 2011-08 to 2012-09), every day
there were still several certificates issued with the negative encoding of the
modulus. Most likely the ID card manufacturer failed to implement the fix on
one of their ID card personalization lines. From 2012-09 the modulus was
correctly encoded until 2014-01, when the ID card manufacturer modified the
personalization process to also include 2047-bit RSA keys generated by the jTOP
SLE66 platform in the certificates (see Section 4.3.1). All the certificates
containing 2047-bit keys (until the end of the jTOP SLE66-powered ID card
issuance in 2014-12) had extra padding for the modulus encoding. The encoding
of the public exponent also had problems. The public exponent was always
padded to 4 bytes, which led to unnecessary padding if the randomly generated
exponent was smaller than 24 bits. The 32-bit exponent values were not
generated to avoid the compatibility problem discovered for the MICARDO
cards (see Section 5.2.1). The jTOP SLE66-powered ID card certificates issued
in the renewal process in PPA service points (from 2012-09 until 2017-07) had a
correctly encoded 2048-bit modulus and the fixed public exponent 65537.
The problem also affected jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards from the beginning
of their issuance in 2014-10. All the moduli were negative, but the fixed exponent
65537 was correctly encoded. All the certificates for Mobile-ID and MULTOS-
powered cards were issued with correctly encoded public key values. Mobile-ID
used a fixed exponent, while the MULTOS-powered cards had a random exponent.
6.6.2. Mitigation
The certificate issuance process was largely fixed on 2015-09-22. However, up
until 2015-10-21 some certificates for the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards were
still issued with negative modulus. These certificates were issued in the PPA
renewal process to fix the colliding @eesti.ee email addresses (Section 6.5).
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After it became evident that the affected ID card holders would not be able to
use Google Chrome version 46 (planned to be released on 2015-10-13), two bug
reports [300, 301] were opened in Chrome’s issue tracker. The involved parties
asked Google to implement a workaround for the next 5 years, until the affected
ID cards expired. At the end, it was agreed that Google would give the authorities
6 months to replace the malformed certificates. The Estonian state decided to
develop a solution for remote certificate update, since the service points of PPA
would be overwhelmed otherwise and the update process would be especially
complicated for all of the roughly 5 000 Estonian e-residents at that time [302].
6.6.2.1. ID card update process
The remote update solution had to be ready by March 2016 at the latest, when the
strict certificate validation was expected to be enabled in Chrome. While for the
jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards the remote update only involved the replacement
of the certificate (see Section 5.3) the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards required the
entire EstEID applet to be reinstalled to update the certificate (see Section 5.4). In
the case where the cardholders of the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards renewed the
certificates in PPA service points, the entire applet was reinstalled and new PIN
codes issued instead of only replacing the certificate. It was done this way because
the applet replacement did not require the knowledge of PIN1, and the applet
replacement solution and the workflow was already in place to fix the security
flaw discovered in 2011 (see Section 6.4). For the jTOP SLE78-powered ID card
renewal in PPA the software solution and workflow was already in place to fix the
certificates with wrong email addresses (see Section 6.5).
The certificate renewal (both remotely and in PPA service points) was open
from 2016-03-18 [303]. At first the remote update option was offered to around
155 000 cardholders of affected jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards [273]. Starting
from 2016-06-22, the remote update was also offered to around 264 000
cardholders of the affected jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards [273]. In January
2017, the remote update solution was also offered to those cardholders whose
certificates were signed with the SHA-1 hash algorithm [304]. This allowed
cardholders whose certificates were issued before January 2015 [125] to obtain
certificates signed using a stronger hash algorithm SHA-256. Since most of the
MICARDO-powered ID cards expired at the end of 2016, for the cardholders of
MICARDO-powered ID cards the solution to update incorrectly encoded
certificates was not provided [273]. Around 23 000 ID cards could only be
renewed in PPA service points [273], most likely because the EstEID card
management features for some reason could not be used for these cards.
Even though the initially agreed deadline was 6 months, Google only
implemented strict certificate validation for Chrome version 61 which was
released on 2017-09-05 [305]. At that time there were still 250 000 valid
ID cards with incorrectly encoded certificates, 116 000 of them were jTOP
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SLE66-powered ID cards which after 2017-07-01 could not be updated anymore
(see below). The updating of the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards was still
possible until 2017-10-25, when all the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards had to be
renewed to fix the ROCA flaw (see Section 6.7).
6.6.2.2. Introduction of eIDAS-compatible certificates
In 2016-11, SK issued a new certificate profile [306] which brought the ID card
certificate profile in compliance with eIDAS technical requirements. This required
additional fields to be placed in the certificate, in particular, new QCStatements
attributes and the Authority Information Access (AIA) extension specifying the
OCSP address where the validity of the certificate could be verified free of charge.
Due to the additional fields added and the 4096-bit RSA signature used by the
intermediate CA “ESTEID-SK 2015”, the size of the certificate become larger
than 1536 (0x600) bytes which is the certificate size limit hardcoded in the
EstEID applet. For the EstEID v3.5 applet on the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards
the certificate size was increased to 2048 bytes (0x800) [12]. Updating the
EstEID v3.4 applet on the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards was considered to be
too expensive and therefore was not pursued. It was decided that the
eIDAS-compatible profile would be only used for the certificates on newly issued
ID cards and for the ID card renewals certificates would be issued using the old
certificate profile. However, the auditors required the eIDAS-compatible
certificates to be issued by 2017-07-01 at the latest, which meant that the
renewals of the jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards had to be ended on 2017-06-30.
In the certificate data we found that by some error on 2016-11-07 eight jTOP
SLE66-powered cards were already (unsuccessfully) renewed in PPA by issuing
the eIDAS-compatible oversized certificates for these cards. For some cardholders
the card was later renewed successfully using the old certificate profile, while for
others a jTOP SLE78-powered warranty replacement was issued.
We see that contrary to the public announcement about the end of jTOP
SLE66 renewals, four jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards were also renewed in PPA
on the first working day of July 2017 (2017-07-03). The renewals were
successful as the certificates were issued using the eIDAS non-compatible
certificate profile. Also on the same day four jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards
were renewed with eIDAS non-compatible certificates. The next day
(2017-07-04) one jTOP SLE66-powered ID card was renewed (unsuccessfully)
using an eIDAS-compatible certificate. For this card a jTOP SLE78-powered
warranty replacement was issued on 2017-07-20.
The eIDAS requirement that was not implemented until the IDEMIA-powered
ID cards were introduced was the use of the country code PNOEE for encoding
the personal ID code in the SerialNumber field of the certificate’s subject name.
It was explainted to the auditors that the migration to the PNO prefix needed some




The problem of incorrect integer encoding was ignored for so long because several
software products created certificates with incorrect encoding and most of the
crypto software tolerated such incorrect encodings. For instance, the most popular
crypto library OpenSSL, since v0.9.3 released on 1999-05-24, had a compilation
option NEG_PUBKEY_BUG which enabled the handling of broken certificates that
encoded public key elements as negative integers [307]. This option was enabled
by default in OpenSSL v0.9.6 released on 2000-09-24 [307]. It has been reported
that at least until 1998, Microsoft software encoded integer values ignoring the
sign bit [308]. The GnuTLS certtool up until 2010-03-15 (when the GnuTLS
v2.8.6 was relased) also ignored the sign bit when encoding the certificates [309].
According to SK CEO, the reason why this error went through and was
permanent was that no browser had discovered it before [310]. However, in 2012
it was already known that some software failed to handle ID card certificates
(slide 6/1 in [311]). Even the EstEID v3.4 specification produced in 2012 states
that the public keys of v3.0 cards do not comply with the ASN.1 standard and
therefore may not be accepted by some information systems (page 113 in [9]).
Only the actions of the software giant Google were able to force the ID card
manufacturer and SK to finally fix the problem.
The incorrect encoding of the public key is not a security issue on its own.
However, it showed the non-conformance to the standards against which SK was
audited. The certificates were not issued according to CA’s certificate policy
referenced in the certificate and hence could have been revoked on the basis that
incorrect data had been entered in the certificate.
This case once more gave the state an opportunity to practice fixing large
scale ID card production errors. Later, the readiness of the remote update
solution played an important role in fixing the ROCA flaw (see Section 6.7).
6.7. Infineon’s RSA key generation flaw
In October 2017, researchers from Masaryk University in Czech Republic
published a paper “The Return of Coppersmith’s Attack: Practical Factorization
of Widely Used RSA Moduli” [258] describing the vulnerability
CVE-2017-15361 (hereinafter – the ROCA flaw) in secure hardware chips
manufactured by Infineon. The vulnerability in Infineon’s proprietary RSA key
generation algorithm allowed the factorization of 2048-bit RSA keys in only
140.8 CPU-years. This vulnerable RSA key generation function was present in
the jTOP SLE78 platform, powering more than 750 000 Estonian ID cards. The
discovery of the flaw started the so-called Estonian ID card crisis described in
this section.
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6.7.1. Timeline of developments
The first suspicion of an anomaly in Infineon’s RSA key generation algorithm
was already raised by the same Czech researchers in their “The Million-Key
Question – Investigating the Origins of RSA Public Keys” paper presented in
USENIX Security Symposium in August 2016 [252]. At that time it was evident
that the distribution of RSA primes generated by the Infineon jTOP 80K smart
card platform did not match the distribution of randomly generated numbers. At
the end of 2016, the researchers were able to reverse-engineer the proprietary
RSA key generation algorithm used in the card and found a method to practically
factor a faulty 2048-bit RSA key in only 140.8 CPU-years, requiring an
estimated $40 000 in computational power [258].
On 2017-02-01, the researchers disclosed the vulnerability together with
proof-of-concept code and CPU-year figures to Infineon. Infineon confirmed the
severity of the flaw and started to inform their customers. From the security
advisory [312] of Yubico (one of Infineon’s customers), we learnt that Yubico
was informed in May 2017, under strict coordinated vulnerability disclosure
restrictions. Yubico was allowed to implement mitigation measures, but was
forbidden from disclosing the flaw until October 2017, when vendors of the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip would release a fix for their firmware and
the researchers would publish initial information about the flaw.
In August 2017, a reviewer at the ACM CCS conference, where the ROCA
paper [258] was submitted, suggested testing the Estonian public certificate
repository to see whether the keys on Estonian ID cards were also affected. The
test confirmed that the Estonian ID cards were affected and were still being
produced with the vulnerable keys. On 2017-08-30, the researchers sent formal
notification to CERT-EE, which initiated the incident handling
process. [313, 314]
As the flaw affected ID cards issued to more than half of the Estonian
population, the incident escalated into a crisis. As the crisis management process
involved more than 200 people from a wide range of areas, a journalist soon
learned of the flaw [315]. The government then decided to make a proactive
press conference on 2017-09-05 with the participation of the Estonian prime
minister [315]. The public narrative was that the risk was “great enough to take it
seriously, but not enough to cancel the cards” [316]. The state knew the
CPU-year figures, but only provided an obscure statement that 60 billion euros
would be required to compromise all of the affected cards [317].
Immediately, the security of i-voting, planned from October 5th to October
11th, for electing local government councils was called into question [318]. On
2017-09-06, the National Electoral Committee unanimously decided to allow
i-voting with the affected ID cards as doing otherwise would be peculiar in a
situation where the government had publicly stated that the Estonian ID card was
still secure [319]. The decision was appealed [320], but the Supreme Court
rejected the appeal, stating that based on current information the resources
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needed were too great to exploit the flaw to an extent that could affect the
election results [321].
On 2017-10-10, Microsoft issued a security advisory informing the public
about the vulnerability in TPM chips [322]. On 2017-10-16, other affected
vendors issued software updates and guidelines for mitigation, and Infineon sent
vulnerability notifications [323] to those customers who were not informed
before. On the same date, the researchers published initial information about the
flaw and released tools to test whether a particular RSA key was affected [324].
RIA announced that the published information did not contain anything new for
the Estonian ID card, but mainly provided more details about the content and the
impact of the vulnerability [325].
On 2017-10-25, the production of new ID cards was switched from the flawed
RSA implementation to the ECC algorithm which was also supported by the chip,
but was not affected by the flaw. On the same date, the affected cardholders were
provided with an option to update their ID cards either at PPA customer service
points or remotely over the internet.
On 2017-10-30, the researchers published the full paper describing the flaw
in detail and presented their findings at the ACM CCS conference on 2017-11-
02 [324].
On 2017-11-02, the Estonian government decided to suspend the affected
certificates on the midnight of 2017-11-03 [326]. The decision was justified by
the increased risk of exploitation due to the full research paper being made
available and a malware allegedly being available on the black market5 that could
exploit the flaw [326]. For the next five months, the holders of the suspended
certificates were still able to update their ID cards at PPA customer service points
and remotely over the internet.
On 2017-11-05, Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange published an improved
attack code which according to their claims could provide 5-25% faster
factorization for 2048-bit keys when compared to the Czech researchers’ initial
estimates [327].
The possibility to renew the affected ID cards was closed on 2018-03-31. The
certificates of the non-renewed ID cards were revoked on 2018-04-01.
On 2018-04-19, a news article was published [328] informing the public that
at the beginning of April, as a proof-of-concept, RIA was able to factor the
vulnerable ID card authentication key belonging to RIA’s eID Domain Manager
Margus Arm. The attack tool was developed by the Estonian research and
development company Cybernetica AS. RIA used their own internal resources
for the computation. They did not disclose the computation effort spent on the
attack, only the electricity cost of a few thousand euros was provided.
In spring 2018, RIA commissioned Tallinn University of Technology to
perform a study on the lessons that could be learned from this ID card crisis. The
report [329], based on expert interviews, was presented together with other
5The malware information was not confirmed by any source.
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presentations on the subject in an international conference “The Lessons We
Learned” held on 2018-05-09 in Tallinn [330]. RIA released a booklet about the
case and the lessons learned [76]. Since then, several research papers have been
published about the case [18, 331, 332].
In June 2019, a master thesis (supervised by the author of this work) was
defended in the University of Tartu, showing that based on the properties
observed from the keys generated by the affected jTOP SLE78 platform, the
original attack can be optimized to 35.2 CPU-years for 90% of the keys and 70.4
CPU-years for the remaining 10% of the keys [259].
6.7.2. Mitigation
As the first mitigation step, before the public press conference on 2017-09-05,
the authorities restricted access to the public LDAP repository holding public-key
certificates of the issued ID cards (see Section 2.17). The restriction was made on
the grounds that without access to the public keys, the security flaw could not be
exploited [333].
As another form of mitigation, officials recommended the use of Mobile-ID
whose private keys were not affected by the flaw [316]. For such a measure to
have practical value, the ID card holders would not only have to use Mobile-ID,
but would also have to revoke the vulnerable certificates of their ID cards. This,
however, was not emphasized in public communication [334].
Since the production of ID cards, using a brand new ID card platform (supplied
by the winner of the new ID card procurement – IDEMIA), could not start for at
least 3 months [315], a solution was needed to issue secure ID cards using the
current jTOP SLE78 platform.
In the course of finding a solution, three technical options were considered:
(1) to generate 2048-bit RSA keys externally and import them inside the card;
(2) to generate 3072-bit RSA keys using the vulnerable algorithm, which would
still provide at least 100 bits of security [335]; (3) to switch to the elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) algorithm supported by the platform. The option to generate
keys outside the chip was discarded as it would violate the security principles,
increasing the risk of someone having a copy of the private key. The jTOP SLE78
platform was discovered not to support RSA keys above 2048 bits. Thus, it was
decided to modify the EstEID JavaCard applet to move from 2048-bit RSA to
ECC keys using NIST curve P-384. The NIST standard curve was chosen as it is
well supported in cryptographic libraries. [96, 336]
The date 2017-10-25 can be considered the date when the technical solution
was implemented and the patch was available to cardholders. The production of
ID cards with RSA keys ended on the evening of 2017-10-24. Starting from 2017-
10-25: the ID cards were produced with ECC keys; the cardholders could renew
their ID cards in PPA service points and remotely over the internet; and PPA
employees were instructed to renew the already produced vulnerable ID cards
before handing them out to the cardholders. [337]
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From an operational perspective, the switch from RSA to the ECC algorithm
required service providers to adjust their systems to support the ECC algorithm
for ID card authentication. To facilitate this, ECC-enabled ID card test cards
were provided to service providers free of charge at the end of September 2017.
The DigiDoc Client application for digital signatures and the digital signature file
format (BDOC) already had support for ECC, since Mobile-ID moved from 1024-
bit RSA to the ECC algorithm using NIST curve P-256 on 2015-01-01 [338]. It
was later discovered that the ECC-enabled ID cards did not work when used to
log into Windows workstations, but soon after, the ID card client software was
updated to include a new Windows minidriver [339]. The encryption function
also had to be updated, as the CDOC encryption scheme [95], used for encrypting
data, only supported the RSA key exchange mechanism.
6.7.2.1. ID card remote renewal
A crucial factor in the success of solving the crisis was the possibility to remotely
renew the ID card applet (see Section 5.4). The technical capability for the remote
ID card update was already designed and implemented in 2016, due to the need
to update incorrectly encoded certificates (see Section 6.6). The remote update
process only took a few minutes, required knowledge of PIN1 and in the process
new PIN and PUK codes were displayed to the user [340].
The remote renewal of the vulnerable ID cards did not come without risks,
as the remote update solution was not designed to securely update vulnerable
ID cards with invalid certificates.
For instance, successful exploitation of the ROCA flaw could have allowed an
entity who had access to the vulnerable ID card but not the PIN codes to
successfully complete the renewal process without entering PIN1, instead
signing the renewal request using the private key factored from the public key.
This was possible because the remote applet update protocol (Section 5.4) was
not able to provide proof to the backend that a successful PIN1 verification was
done by the card.
Another security risk was related to the confidentiality of the new PIN codes
issued in the remote update process, as the new PIN codes were end-to-end
encrypted using the vulnerable authentication key of the cardholder.
6.7.2.2. ID card update process
In the first days the remote update process faced serious difficulties, as the
system could only handle 1 000 parallel update processes. Since the process was
dependent on stable and timely interractions between the servers of four parties
(RIA, PPA, SK and Gemalto) the system experienced temporary downtimes.
Many cardholders experienced delays caused by overloads and had to attempt the
update at a later time. [341–343]
After the affected certificates were suspended on 2017-11-03, the remote
update service was provided exclusively to a list of the 35 000 most active
136
ID card users, betwen noon on Friday and the end of Sunday. The list consisted
primarily of medical workers and employees of state institutions. Two thirds of
those on the list updated their certificates over the weekend. [344, 345]
It was discovered that around 18 000 ID cards could not be remotely renewed
because the card manufacturer for an unknown reason was unable to use the
symmetric applet-level card management keys loaded onto the card in the
personalization process [346].
The PPA service points in larger cities were also kept open on weekends and
the original opening hours were extended by one hour [343]. PPA opened service
points in five hospitals across Estonia to enable medical workers to update their
ID cards6 [347]. On the weekends of November and December, PPA opened
temporary service points in shopping centers across all of Estonia [348, 349].
The state made billboard ads and radio clips, and later, a TV campaign asking
cardholders to update their ID cards was also made [350].
The ID card holders abroad were offered the possibility to apply for a free
ID card replacement over email. The new ID card, however, had to be collected
by visiting the closest Estonian embassy in person [351].
The update period ended on 2018-03-31, when the certificates on non-updated
ID cards were revoked. From the affected 760 000 ID cards, over 494 000 of the
cards were updated (see Figure 45 for the timeline). The number of updated cards
accounted for 95% of the ID cards used electronically at least once. The majority









































































































































































































































































































Figure 45: Updating activity of ROCA vulnerable ID cards (source: certificate
data)
6.7.2.3. Encryption support
During the crisis, the government’s priority was authentication and digital
signature support for ECC-enabled ID cards [353]. The encryption function for
ECC-enabled cards was not available until 2017-12-21 when the CDOC format
was updated [95] to use the ECIES encryption scheme (ECDH algorithm for
6Estonia’s healthcare system is organized through the e-health information system where the
ID card is used as the authentication means.
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symmetric key derivation) and an updated ID card client-side software was
released. The unavailability of an encryption function brought difficulties, for
some hospitals, in exchanging sensitive documents with various partner
institutions [354].
As the digital signature scheme used in Estonia requires a timestamp to prove
that the certificate was valid at the time of signing and since the majority of
service providers perform certificate revocation checks in the process of ID card
authentication (Section 2.8.1), the certificate suspension on 2017-11-03 largely
mitigated the security risk introduced by the ROCA flaw. The revocation of the
certificates, however, does not prevent an attacker who has factorized a
vulnerable key from decrypting data encrypted for that vulnerable key.
Therefore, sensitive information exchanged using the above mentioned CDOC
files is still under the risk of compromise. The ROCA case shows that the current
CDOC encryption scheme, that lacks the forward secrecy feature, should only be
used to encrypt data for which confidentiality must only be protected for a very
short time.
6.7.3. Legal issues solving the crisis
In our paper “Solving the Estonian ID Card Crisis: the Legal Issues” [18], we
analyzed the extent by which the involved parties were able to precisely follow
the applicable laws and regulations in the field when solving the crisis. We found
a number of cases where the requirements were not fully followed, either due to
the lack of technical preparedness, suboptimal decisions made under high time
pressure, or the critical nature of the situation.
Due to the lack of technical preparedness, SK was not able to quickly invalidate
a large number of certificates and correctly indicate their status in the certificate
validity services. For similar reasons, SK and PPA failed to notify the affected
cardholders as required by the law and SK certificate policies.
We questioned the effectiveness and the legal basis for the decision to restrict
access to the public LDAP certificate repository and the decision to suspend (and
not revoke) the affected certificates.
While convenient for the cardholders and significantly cost-saving for the state,
remotely updating the certificates that had been suspended was not in compliance
with the legal requirements. Similarly, the changes to the EstEID JavaCard applet
were done without recertification of the ID card platform as required by eIDAS.
The crisis also highlighted the problems in the current regulation of certificate
validity suspension, in particular, when the suspension is requested by a party
other than the certificate holder. It also showed that it is not clear who (if anyone)
is legally liable for the ID card private key security.
Due to the critical nature of the situation, the state was forced to compel SK
not to invalidate the certificates as soon as it became clear that the affected
ID card platform did not satisfy the legal requirements of QSCDs. In this case,
SK and their auditor TÜViT agreed to follow the plan of the authorities, but, in
our opinion, this should not be a norm.
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We came to the conclusion that the root cause of the crisis was the fact that the
failure in a single, monocultural ID card platform put the reputation and operation
of the entire digital state at risk. To reduce the risk of a future incident of a similar
nature escalating into a crisis, the state should seek to equip its residents with
a secondary electronic identity tool that would rely on a different technological
platform (preferably a different public-key cryptography algorithm also) and a
different CA. This, in case of a similar event, would allow residents to access e-
services in a legally compliant manner, and potentially to also safely renew the
affected electronic identity tool remotely.
6.7.4. Gemalto’s failure to inform the state
From the Yubico security advisory [312] we know that Infineon had already
disclosed the vulnerability to their direct customers in May 2017. This
information, however, did not reach the Estonian authorities until the end of
August, when the Czech researchers directly contacted RIA. Since the Estonian
state is not a direct customer of Infineon, Infineon was expected to inform
Gemalto, who in turn was obligated to inform PPA. Gemalto did not explain the
cause of the delay, stating only that they were analyzing how the information was
spread about the flaw [355].
In November 2017, it became known that the state had filed a claim against
Gemalto regarding the damage caused by the ROCA flaw [356]. Before the
ROCA flaw incident, Gemalto and the state had an already ongoing legal dispute
with Gemalto challenging PPA’s decision regarding the winner of the new
ID card manufacturing procurement [357].
On 2017-11-22, Gemalto’s local representative Andreas Lehmann posted a
comment in LinkedIn stating that he had already informed the responsible state
authorities of the flaw on 2017-06-15, but the authorities kept it quiet possibly
due to the upcoming summer holidays [358]. Soon after, Lehmann deleted his
comment stating that this was his personal statement.
RIA acknowledged that on 2017-06-15, in the regular meeting between
Gemalto and PPA, Lehmann had hinted about an ID card flaw, but the hints were
too vague to act upon. The Gemalto representative promised to provide more
information when it became available, but never did so. [359]
In response to Lehmann’s claims, Gemalto, in a private communication with
PPA, apologized for the claims stating that Lehmann’s comment was a personal
statement and cannot be considered as an official statement by Gemalto [360].
Starting from December 2017, Gemalto replaced Lehmann as its representative in
communications with PPA [361].
On 2017-12-01, Postimees published an article [362] arguing that the state
was aware of the ID card flaw on 2017-06-20 at the latest, when the ENISA
incident report [363] about the flaw in signature creation devices used in Austria
was sent to all EU member states. According to state officials, the ENISA report
was indeed received, but as it referred to the smart card platform CardOS
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developed by Atos, which is not used by Estonian ID cards, the state was unable
to associate the Estonian ID card with the Austrian incident. Furthermore, on
2017-06-22 RIA received a statement from Lehmann that the problem mentioned
by him at the meeting on 2017-06-15 was not related to the Austrian report [364].
On 2017-12-06, Postimees published [365] an excerpt from our (at that time)
non-public incident report made in January 2017, which informed RIA about
several key management flaws found in the ID card personalization process
(Section 6.8). This excerpt published by Postimees was the excerpt that was
shared with Gemalto under the confidentiality clauses of the ID card
manufacturing contract. The Postimees article did indeed contain RIA’s
comment that the findings mentioned in this incident report were not related to
the ROCA case, however, the article also referred to the ENISA Austrian
incident report and the statements by Gemalto representative Lehmann claiming
that he had already informed the state about the ROCA flaw on 2017-06-15.
At the end of 2017, PPA sent a letter to Gemalto announcing that PPA had
withdrawn their letters of recommendation which Gemalto used when applying
for procurements. PPA stated that the behavior and attitude of Gemalto did not
give the opportunity to continue the situation where the Estonian letters of
recommendation would still be true and credible [366].
In the last days of December 2017 the Tallinn Administrative Court dismissed
Gemalto’s appeal about the results of the ID card procurement. Gemalto,
however, later appealed this decision in the second instance court and the case is
still pending [53].
On 2018-08-30, PPA announced [367] that they had made some steps in
reaching a compromise, where Gemalto would be required to only reimburse the
direct costs spent on addressing the ROCA flaw. The direct costs of PPA, RIA
and SMIT combined were 2 million euros [368], of which EUR 1 115 616 was
the cost incurred by RIA [369].
It later became evident that Gemalto had several counterclaims against PPA
for violating the confidentiality clauses of the agreement. Allegedly, Gemalto
submitted a new claim whenever a PPA representative publicly mentioned
Gemalto or an agreement between them [367].
A few days after PPA’s statement, presentation slides (apparently made by
Gemalto representative Lehmann) containing the timeline of the ROCA
vulnerability warnings communicated to Estonia were leaked to journalists [370]
along with information regarding the possible conditions of the
compromise [371].
The slides did not provide any new factual evidence that would substantiate
Lehmann’s claims about informing the state in an appropriate manner.
Postimees, however, used the leaked information as new evidence to prove that
the state officials were “lollygagging” [371].
As a response, PPA announced that Gemalto had failed to demonstrate
willingness to reach a compromise and PPA would take Gemalto to court in the
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following weeks [372]. In a public statement Gemalto denied leaking the
information and expressed their interest in still reaching a compromise [372].
On 2018-09-26, PPA submitted a claim to the Harju County Court demanding a
contractual penalty of 152 million EUR from Gemalto regarding a separate issue
of private key generation outside the ID card (see Section 6.8). The claim was
submitted first and separately from the others due to each violation being legally
and technically very complicated. [373]
On 2018-10-25, it was made public that Gemalto had filed a breach of
contract action against PPA for severely interrupting the compromise
negotiations in September [374].
On 2018-11-05, PPA submitted a new claim to the court demanding a
contractual penalty of 300 000 EUR from Gemalto for violating the contractual
responsibility of immediately forwarding significant information, since the
existence of the ROCA security risk was only confirmed by Gemalto on
2017-09-05 in response to a PPA inquiry made on 2017-09-04 [375].
A news article published on 2020-08-28 [376] stated that the judge had decided
to merge both of PPA’s claims into one proceeding but a new hearing date had
not been set as yet. In August 2019, a preliminary hearing had been held where
the possibility of finding a compromise was discussed. This, however, was not
successful as of 2020-08-28 no compromise had been reached with both parties
having submitted a number of different requests that the court had to resolve.
At the end of 2020, the court reversed their earlier decision and decided to split
the claims and hold the next court hearings in February 2021 [377]. However,
after working hours on Friday, 2021-02-05, PPA issued a press release [378] to
inform the media that a compromise had been reached, with Gemalto agreeing
to pay the state 2.2 million EUR in compensation. The press release stated that
the agreement was signed to “close the claims on the potential vulnerability to
the Estonian ID card which occurred in 2017”. However, PPA confirmed to us
personally that the compromise covered all the claims from both sides, including
the claim regarding the generation of private keys outside the ID card.
6.7.5. Failure of Common Criteria certification
According to Infineon, the flawed RSA key generation function was certified by
BSI, but no mathematical weaknesses were known, or had been discovered
during the certification processes [379]. This section aims to investigate the
Common Criteria (CC) certification process according to which the security of
the vulnerable smart card chip (used in the Estonian ID card) was certified.
The affected Infineon jTOP SLE78 (jTOP INFv#46) platform was certified on
2013-08-07 by ANSSI under the reference ANSSI-CC-2013/55 [380, 381]. The
certification process was based on a “compositional approach”, where the
evaluation of the product to some extent relies on the evaluation results of the
microcontroller chip independently certified by the chip manufacturer. The
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composite certification process evaluated the product which is the result of
embedding an operating system (jTOP JavaCard platform) on top of an already
certified chip.
For a secure implementation of RSA on-card key generation, according to
ANSSI, the certification relied on the evaluation results of Infineon’s M7820 A11
family of microcontrollers certified on 2012-09-05 by BSI [382]. The same
microcontroller with some minor modifications was recertified by BSI on
2015-08-03 [382].
The Security Target of the evaluated microcontroller lists RSA key generation
(implemented by the flawed cryptographic library RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013) as
a Security Functional Requirement “FCS_CKM.1/RSA” (see Section 7.1.4.5
in [383]). The Security Target requires RSA keys to be generated in accordance
with the key generation algorithm specified in the PKCS#1 v2.1 standard [384].
This standard, however, only specifies the format of RSA keys and does not
describe the key generation algorithm. The referencing of this irrelevant standard
allowed the parties involved in the CC certification process to hide the fact that a
proprietary algorithm was actually used for RSA key generation. It is hard to
estimate how many more CC-certified products are using proprietary shortcuts,
that have not been analyzed by the cryptanalysis community.
The evaluation of the microcontroller was conducted by the evaluation facility
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (TÜViT) in Germany. According to
TÜViT [385], “although the know how of the Coppersmith method as well as the
implementation [of the algorithm] was both available to the involved parties, we
have to conclude that the threat was simply overlooked.”. TÜViT did not answer
the question as to what lessons they had learned from this ROCA case.
In response to the ROCA flaw, BSI now plans to improve transparency by
requiring that the certification report at least specifies if the implemented
proprietary cryptography is not exactly conformant to a recommended standard.
BSI does not plan on requiring the proprietary algorithm to be published in any
way. [386]
Even though the certification bodies are now aware that the security claims
specified in the CC certificates do not hold anymore, neither ANSSI nor BSI
have revoked the corresponding certificates. According to BSI [386], a certificate
can only be withdrawn when it was issued under misconception, e.g., when it
turns out that wrong evidence was submitted. After a CC certificate is issued, it
must be presumed that the validity of the certificate decreases over time by
improved and new attacks being discovered. In the case of the ROCA flaw, the
users of the certified end products should have been informed of the flaw by the
vendors. Certification bodies can issue maintenance reports and even perform a
re-certification of the product. These activities, however, have to be initiated and
sponsored by the vendor. Hence, it can be concluded that the responsibility of the
certification body for the claims laid in the certification report ends with the
issuance of the certificate.
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On 2017-10-24, apparently in response to the ROCA flaw, BSI issued the
maintenance report MA-02 [382] for Infineon’s M7820 A11 family of
microcontrollers. A careful reader can find that the updated Security Target in
Section “8.5 SF_CS: Cryptographic Support” now includes an extra statement:
“The RSA cryptographic key generation is not supported for this Target of
Evaluation (TOE).” This statement, however, contradicts other parts of the
Security Target, where “FCS_CKM.1/RSA” is still listed as a Security Functional
Requirement of the TOE. The BSI maintenance report does not mention that the
change to the TOE affects certified cryptographic security functionality, but
concludes that the change is at the level of guidance documentation and has no
effect on assurance. This BSI statement seems to be, at the very least,
misleading.
While several CC certified products have been affected by the ROCA flaw,
vendors’ responses in the context of certification have been different. For
instance, for the BSI certified CardOS platform [387] referenced in the ENISA
Austrian incident report [363], on 2017-07-07 a maintenance report [335] was
issued, which states that only RSA keys with a length of 3072 and 3584 bits have
a security level of at least 100 bits.
6.8. Security flaws in key management
The initial draft version of the Digital Signatures Act [388] in 1999 envisioned
that the digital signature key pair would be generated by the signatories
themselves to prevent the possible misuse of the private keys. The final version
of the act, however, no longer foresaw the possibility for persons to generate
their keys themselves. The result is that in practice the cardholder’s private keys
are generated by the ID card manufacturer in the ID card personalization process.
This situation introduces the risk of the ID card manufacturer collecting the
private keys stored on the ID card.
The involved parties have maintained [389] that the manufacturing contract
requires that the private key be generated inside the chip, such that it never leaves
the card and no copies of the private key exist (only the public key should be
exported from the card). Concerns of how this requirement would be enforced
in practice were met with the standard response that everything is being regularly
audited and, as the ID card manufacturer is in the business of trust, it would never
risk its reputation, for example, by copying private keys.
Unfortunately, the findings of our research described in the paper “Estonian
Electronic Identity Card: Security Flaws in Key Management” [19], among other
things, show that contrary to the requirements, the ID card manufacturer
Gemalto had generated keys outside the card and these previously mentioned
security audits were not able to discover the practice over the 5 year period while
it happened. We provide a brief summary of our findings in the sections below.
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6.8.1. Certificates with duplicate RSA public keys
Our findings started with the discovery of 10 certificate pairs that contained
duplicate RSA public keys. In most of the cases, the same public key was shared
between the authentication and digital signature certificate of the same ID card.
However, in two cases the same public key was shared among certificates of
different cardholders. The certificates that shared a public key were issued at
roughly the same time, with only a few seconds difference. In most of the cases,
the involved ID cards were renewed in PPA to fix the security flaw in the
2011-issued ID cards (Section 6.4). If the cards did indeed contain duplicate
private keys, then the only plausible explanation is that their keys had been
generated outside the card and due to some error the private key was imported
twice.
We decided to investigate the pair where the public key was shared between
two cardholders – Toivo and Ülle, in more detail. In that pair, the authentication
certificate of Toivo and digital signature certificate of Ülle shared the same public
key, meaning that if the ID cards did indeed contain the corresponding private
key, Toivo could forge digital signatures in the name of Ülle and Ülle could
impersonate Toivo. We contacted Toivo and he confirmed that his ID card did
indeed contain the corresponding private key. Later, we obtained convincing
evidence that Ülle’s ID card also contained the corresponding private key.
In the meantime the ID card manufacturer had discovered the problem and
had issued new ID cards for Toivo and Ülle. However, it was still not clear to us
whether the authorities were fully aware of the true reasons behind these faults,
therefore we decided to inform the authorities about the case of Toivo and Ülle,
and our suspicion that the keys were generated outside of the ID card. According
to the authorities, the ID card manufacturer denied that the ID cards contained
duplicate private keys, leading to a deadlock in solving this issue.
6.8.2. RSA private keys generated outside the ID card
Fortunately, in the meantime, there was a breakthrough in the research world due
to the paper “The Million-Key Question - Investigating the Origins of RSA
Public Keys” by Svenda et al. [252]. The researchers found that the RSA public
key modulus N carries a fingerprint that can be used to distinguish between key
generation algorithms. In particular, the range from where primes p and q are
selected to obtain a modulus of the required length. This fingerprint can be
observed from the probability distribution of the most-significant byte of a public
key modulus.
We generated and exported millions of reference keys from each ID card
platform and analyzed whether the properties in these keys (see Chapter 4)
matched the properties of the public keys contained in the ID card certificates.
As a result, we found that the jTOP SLE66-powered ID card keys renewed in
PPA (the renewal was offered from July 2012 to July 2017) had been generated
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outside the card. We came to this conclusion because the public keys in the
certificates of these ID cards were generated by setting the two most significant
bits of p and q, while the key generation algorithm implemented by the platform
did not set these bits.
It is important to note that this could not have been done by accident as the key
import feature had to be programmed into the applet. The original EstEID v3.4
applet that was subject to a security review did not have this functionality. We
hope, however, that the intent was just to speed up the ID card renewal process,
because on-card key generation is quite slow and would have added an extra 5
minutes on average to the ID card renewal process. However, this case clearly
demonstrates what a malicious ID card manufacturer could have done without it
being discovered. It is important to note that this is not only limited to key import,
as the keys could have also been exported after generating them inside the card.
At that time, from more than 74 000 jTOP SLE66-powered ID cards renewed
in PPA, only 12 500 were still valid. After receiving our findings, in May 2018
PPA announced the replacement of the affected ID cards. Gemalto in their public
statement denied the findings, saying that they had fulfilled the ID card
agreement [390]. Later, in September 2018, PPA brought Gemalto to court
demanding a contractual penalty of 152 million euros [373] (see Section 6.7.4).
Today, Gemalto has left Estonia and the latest ID cards are manufactured by a
different company IDEMIA (formerly Oberthur). It is hard to say, however, if
any lessons have been learned from this case, because nothing has fundamentally
changed in the ID card production process to prevent similar incidents from
happening again. Preferably, we would like to have a technological solution that
is secure even if the ID card manufacturer is malicious. Schemes based on
threshold cryptography [391–393] could help here, but introducing such changes,
of course, would require a strong political will.
6.8.3. Certificates with corrupted RSA public keys
By analyzing the certificates, we found a separate key management flaw. A set of
certificates from the jTOP SLE78-powered ID cards contained a corrupted RSA
public key modulus, meaning that the modulus contained small factors (e.g., 3, 5,
7). The inclusion of corrupted RSA key moduli led to a security issue, because
the corrupted modulus (which essentially is a random integer) if fully factored,
could result in to the corresponding private exponent being calculated. We
succeeded in fully factoring one of the corrupted modulus, demonstrating the
potential risk [394].
Eventually, we came to the conclusion that the corruption happened on the
ID card personalization line during the transmission of the modulus of the
generated key from the card to the terminal. More details on this and the
previously mentioned findings are available in our paper [19].
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6.9. The ID card’s built-in security measure causing it to lock
itself
In October 2017, RIA announced that the use of an ID card as a loyalty card in
point of sale (POS) terminals could lead to an ID card being locked. According
to RIA, the lock is triggered by the security mechanism that is built into the card
as it perceives too excessive ID card usage as an attack and locks the card as a
security measure. The cardholders who experienced such a lock were invited to
turn to PPA. [395]
Later, it turned out that the locking was not related to the use of the ID card in
POS terminals, but was triggered by the Pkcs11Interop software component that
used the OpenSC driver (opensc-pkcs11.dll) to read the ID card
certificates [396]. From the related OpenSC bug report [397], we can see that the
EstEID v3.5 applet had a bug in the code that handles the READ BINARY
command which was used to read the certificates from the card. The bug was
triggered when the READ BINARY command was sent over a T=0 connection with
a positive offset specified in P1 and P2 and the Le byte of the APDU set to 0x00.
The EstEID v3.5 cards, in this case, responded with the status word 0x6F00 (No
precise diagnosis is given).
We replayed the faulty READ BINARY command against jTOP
SLE78-powered ID cards running EstEID applet v3.5.2, v3.5.3, v3.5.7 and
v3.5.8, and were able to trigger the card lock in EstEID applet v3.5.7 and v3.5.8
after sending 60 faulty READ BINARY commands to the card. It seems that these
versions of the EstEID applet were counting the number of unexpected
exceptions raised by the applet and after the counter reached 60, the EstEID
applet invoked JavaCard’s GPSystem.lockCard() call, which resulted in the
GlobalPlatfom card’s life cycle state being set to CARD_LOCKED. Once the card
was locked, only the GlobalPlatform ISD applet could be selected. The card
could only be unlocked using the GlobalPlatform ISD security keys. Effectively,
this makes the ID card vulnerable to logical denial-of-service attacks even if a
smart card reader with a PIN pad and a PIN firewall is used.
It is common for smart card platform manufacturers to provide a confidential
operational guide document which contains a list of applet-level security
recommendations that should be implemented by applet developers to protect the
applet against fault injection and other attacks (page 21 in [398]). Since
unexpected software exceptions could be caused by an unsuccessful fault
injection attack, the locking of the card limits the number of attack attempts the
attacker can perform against the card. However, we found out experimentally,
that the locking mechanism implemented by the EstEID applet may not be
effective in practice, as the card lock is only enforced after the EstEID applet is
re-selected. This means that as long as the EstEID applet is not deselected (the
card is not powered off or reset), the attacker could perform an unlimited number
of attack attempts long after the counter has been exceeded and the card’s life
cycle state has been set to the state CARD_LOCKED.
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In November 2017, PPA received a few hundred [399] and in 2018 more than
150 [396] applications for the replacement of locked cards under warranty. In
2019, it became known that IDEMIA-powered ID cards were also affected by a
similar problem [400]. The use of some “incorrect” card readers has been
mentioned as the cause, but the exact reason why the IDEMIA-powered ID cards
are being locked is still unknown [401].
In 2020, the Chancellor of Justice raised an issue about PPA’s procedure for
the replacement of locked ID cards [402]. To replace a locked ID card under
warranty without paying the state fee, the ID card must be examined by IDEMIA
experts in France. Since the examination can take a considerable amount of time,
understandably the affected cardholders will want to apply for a new identity
document before the results of the examination are known. However, if an
application for a new ID card is submitted, the state fee that was paid is not
reimbursed even if the examination later reveals that the ID card lock was not the
fault of the cardholder. We note that the replacement ID cards issued under
warranty terms are issued with the expiration date of the original, therefore PPA’s
reluctance to reimburse the state fee for a new ID card with a fresh expiration
date is understandable.
The Chancellor of Justice found that the state must be responsible for cases
where the electronic part of the ID card becomes unusable due to errors caused
by the peculiarities of the ID card software solution. Although the state has been
aware of this technical problem at least since spring of 2019, the state has not
informed cardholders that such a risk may exist and how to avoid it. The
Chancellor of Justice recommended that PPA should consider changing the
practice when replacing faulty ID cards such as introducing an initial
examination where the probable cause of the card’s failure could be received
within 5 working days.
Initially, PPA announced that they did not intend to follow the
recommendations [403], but later rescinded [404] promising to introduce the
opportunity to establish the cause of ID card malfunction in PPA customer
service points. Furthermore, PPA promised to return the non-functioning ID card
while the replacement ID card is being produced so that the person could at least
use it as a physical identity document.
6.10. Failure to revoke ID card certificates of deceased
cardholders
On 2019-06-26, a news article [405] was published informing the public about
an incident where, due to a technical failure, the certificates for more than 15 000
automatically revoked ID cards were not revoked.
When a person dies or a resident obtains citizenship, the ID card is
automatically revoked and hence also the certificates therein (see Section 2.15).
Once a day, an information system run by the IT and Development Centre at the
Estonian Ministry of the Interior (SMIT) sends requests to SK to revoke the
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affected certificates. According to PPA, from 2014 to mid-2015 the data was
submitted to the SK information system using incorrect request parameters and
this resulted in an error. As the data exchange was not monitored on either side,
the error was only discovered in the middle of 2015. However, even then, the
past faults were not investigated and the failed requests were not resent. [405]
In spring 2019, the issue was finally investigated as some errors began to
appear when attempting to revoke the certificates of certain ID cards. It was
discovered that the certificates for more than 15 000 ID cards had not been
revoked in the period from 2014 to mid-2015. Furthermore, 353 of these
ID cards had been used electronically7 after their certificates should have been
revoked. In 285 of the cases the ID cards belonged to deceased
cardholders. [405]
6.10.1. Police investigation and liability
The police (PPA) initiated a criminal proceeding to investigate the transactions
that were made with the ID cards of deceased cardholders. In most cases the
scenario was the same: the deceased person’s bank account was accessed, bills
were paid, contracts were terminated and money was transferred to the
first-degree heir. PPA ruled that such conduct was not criminal as it is common
for heirs to pay for funeral expenses as well as current bills using the deceased’s
funds. In the course of the inheritance proceedings the notary will make a set-off
if necessary. [406]
In 2020, the Chancellor of Justice was approached [406] by a person whose
grandmother’s ID card was one of the documents that was electronically used after
the revocation. Some other relative had made bank transfers with the deceased
person’s ID card and as a result the amount of inheritance decreased. The person
asked whether the state could be jointly held liable for the damage caused by the
use of this card.
In their reply to the Chancellor of Justice, PPA stated that no damage could
have occurred in this situation because such conduct does not affect the right to
inherit as the notary can make a set-off if necessary during the inheritance
proceedings. However, the Chancellor of Justice found that since PPA had not
contacted persons (potential heirs) who may have been affected by this issue, the
heirs would not have been able to raise this issue during the inheritance
proceedings. We note that, while PPA did not contact potential heirs directly, the
news article [405] published on 2019-06-26 contained a link to a web
service [407] where by entering the personal ID code of a deceased person it was
possible to determine whether their ID card was electronically used after the
document had been revoked.
7The database of OCSP certificate validity responses maintained by SK can be used to infer
whether relying parties had requested validity confirmation of the involved certificates and hence
whether the ID card had been used electronically. Cardholders can see a log of OCSP requests with
the requester’s IP address for their certificates at https://minutoimingud.sk.ee/.
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In addition, PPA noted that they could not be held liable for the damage
suffered as there was no causal link between the actions and/or omissions of PPA
and the use of the deceased person’s ID card. The existence of a technical
opportunity to use the card did not give the right to use it. PPA noted that
although the existence of access indirectly allowed the continued use of the
ID card, they, however, did not cause the damage and there was no right to claim
compensation from them for the damage done.
The Chancellor of Justice did not agree with PPA’s position, as the activities
of PPA created the opportunity to use an ID card after a person’s death. The
obligation that a document must be declared invalid after a person’s death serves
the purpose of preventing third parties from using the deceased person’s identity
document and making transactions on behalf of that person. Thus, there is a
causal link between the activities of PPA and the continued use of the card. The
Chancellor of Justice concluded that if a person had suffered damage, it is
possible to apply for compensation from PPA under the State Liability Act.
6.10.2. Analysis of certificate revocation data
In their 2020-03-10 reply to the Chancellor of Justice [406], PPA confirmed that
at present it was no longer possible to continue using revoked ID cards
electronically and that SMIT had significantly improved data exchange and
monitoring to prevent the same error from happening again.
However, our analysis of certificate revocation data shows that the failure to
revoke certificates of deceased persons was not an isolated case as was reported
in the media. Instead it has been present on a smaller scale throughout the years
and even today there are currently several deceased persons’ ID cards whose
certificates have not been revoked.
We obtained the date of death for deceased persons using the e-service
provided by the Population Register [408] and correlated this data with the
ID card certificate revocation data from CRLs.
First of all, we found that the date of death registered in the Population Register
for 138 persons was set to a date in the future – the dates 2020-12-29, 2020-12-30
and 2020-12-31. For 92 of these persons their ID cards were revoked on 2019-
12-30, 2019-12-31 and 2020-01-01, hence the actual date of their death had been
most likely a year earlier than the date registered in the Population Register. On
2020-10-07, we informed SMIT of this issue. They informed us that this was a
data display error that should be fixed at the end of 2020-10, and that the correct
date of death is indeed a year earlier.
Using the revocation data, we calculated the average time in which the
ID card certificates of a deceased person are revoked or expire after their death.
The average by month is shown in Figure 46.
For the year 2011 our dataset did not have enough deceased persons’
certificates, therefore for that period we cannot provide a comprehensive
overview. The average time in 2011 was determined by the outliers – a few


















































































Figure 46: Time in which a deceased person’s certificates are revoked or expire
after their death (source: our dataset)
From the data we found that the large scale data exchange error that was
reported in the media was present from 2014-07-01 to 2015-07-10 and the
affected certificates were revoked on 2019-05-09. We also found that data
exchange errors appeared on a smaller scale during the last days of 2015, in
September 2018 and in the first months of 2019. Most of the certificates affected
in these cases were revoked on 2019-05-09, 2019-05-10 and 2019-05-16. We
found that the incident was not fully investigated and solved in 2019 as the
revocation of missed certificates once again occurred on 2019-09-30, after PPA’s
media announcement.
As we can see in Figure 46, even in the periods where no significant data
exchange errors occurred, there were quite a few certificates that had not been
timely revoked.
Furthermore, we identified 27 deceased persons whose ID card certificates
were still valid on 2020-10-08. The date of death for these persons were in the
period from 2019-04-08 to 2020-09-28, with the date of death for the majority of
the cases (17) being 2020-07-28. On 2020-10-08, we informed PPA, SK and
RIA of the case. We received no response, but observed that the certificates of
most of the affected ID cards were revoked on 2020-10-14. However, the
certificates of 4 of the affected ID cards were still valid on 2020-10-21, of which
we once again informed PPA, SK and RIA. It turned out that these four ID cards
were part of another type of failure, as even the identity documents of the
corresponding deceased persons were not revoked. We observed that the
certificates of these ID cards were finally revoked on 2020-10-30. Later, on
2021-02-03, a news article was published about these findings [409].
It is important to note that the risk of a deceased person’s ID card being abused
cannot be completely avoided as there is a window of time available (might be
up to several days) until the doctor prepares a death certificate and the data is
registered in the Population Register. Furthermore, for certain types of residents
(especially e-residents8), if the person dies outside Estonia, the Estonian state may
not learn about the person’s death for years.
8From our dataset of 49 360 persons who have had the status of e-resident, the Population
Register has only recorded the death of 12 of them.
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6.11. Transparent PIN envelopes
On 2002-05-03, just a few months after the first ID card was issued, it was
discovered that the security envelope holding the PIN codes did not meet the
security requirements – the PIN codes were clearly visible through the enclosed
envelope by holding it under a lamp (see Figure 47) [410].
The ID card manufacturer Trüb responded by blaming the German company
producing the envelopes [410]. However, as we can see from the fix (Figure 47),
the envelopes were not changed, but the printing was adjusted to replace the black
digits with white digits on a light gray background.
Figure 47: Trüb-issued flawed (left and center) and fixed (right) PIN
envelopes [411]
It can be estimated that at least 15 000 ID cards had been produced with the
flawed PIN envelopes [41]. CMB did not recall the already manufactured ID cards
residing in banks that had not yet been delivered to the cardholders, but made a
recommendation for cardholders to change the PINs either by themselves or by
visiting a CMB customer service point in Tallinn [412]. CMB considered claiming
damages from Trüb for the poor quality work [412], but it is unknown whether the
claims were made in practice.
The same flaw was reintroduced by the new ID card manufacturer IDEMIA
in 2018. On 2018-12-20, a few weeks after the issuance of the new generation
ID cards, it become known that the PIN codes were clearly visible through the
envelope using an ordinary pocket lamp (see Figure 48) [413].
Figure 48: IDEMIA-issued flawed (left and center) and fixed (right) PIN
envelopes [414]
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In total, around 5 000 cards with the flawed envelopes were issued. According
to PPA, the flaw did not present a direct security risk because internal security
procedures for transportation and storage exclude the possibility that the ID card
along with the PIN envelope would reach some third persons and the risk that PPA
employees would look through the envelopes using a pocket lamp did not exist9.
Furthermore, the card could only be used electronically from the moment the card
is issued to the cardholder. [417, 418]
We note that in practice, the non-transparent PIN envelope is the only
physical measure in place that prevents a PPA employee from using the
electronic functionality of the cardholder’s ID card without it being detected. As
an additional measure, the corresponding certificates are not valid until a PPA
employee activates the card, marking it in the system as handed out to the
cardholder (Section 2.15). Since the cardholder receives an email notification
from SK about the certificate activation, it would be risky for a PPA employee to
activate the certificates before the cardholder has arrived for the card. However,
during the PIN replacement procedure (Section 2.11.4) the PPA employee has
access to an already active card which can be abused to its full extent using the
PIN codes visible through the flawed PIN replacement envelope. It is not
uncommon for the PPA employee to perform the PIN replacement procedure in a
separate room which makes the execution of the attack even easier.
We note that the security measure of certificate activation does not prevent the
creation of a valid digital signature in the period before the ID card is activated
(see Section 2.10.3). At its best, it prevents an attacker from using not yet valid
certificates to authenticate in e-services that check certificate revocation status.
For Gemalto-manufactured ID cards, SK validity services acted as if not yet valid
certificates had not been issued, therefore they were not listed in CRLs and the
OCSP returned the status “unknown” (see clause 4.3.1.1 in [172]). This resulted
in a security risk in the case of CRLs, since certificates not listed in the CRL
are presumed to be valid. Only after the introduction of the IDEMIA-powered
ID cards and the new root CA in fall 2018, the SK validity services started to
correctly list not yet valid certificates as being technically suspended.
On 2018-12-28, a news article was published with PPA stating that on
2018-12-20 the ID card manufacturer had fixed the envelopes and it was no
longer possible to see the PIN codes through them [419]. On 2019-01-16, we
observed that in the PPA customer service point Tammsaare in Tallinn the flawed
PIN envelopes were still being used for the issuance of digital identity cards and
PIN replacement envelopes. We informed the representatives of PPA, SK and
RIA about our observations, but received no promise on when the flawed PIN
envelope supplies were to be replaced.
9The fact that insider threat should not be underestimated is well illustrated by the large scale
document forgery case exposed in 2015 involving four PPA employees [415, 416].
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7. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this work we have enumerated a list of challenges that the Estonian ID card and
its ecosystem have experienced over the years. In this chapter we discuss broader
reasons behind why they happened and provide some specific and less specific
recommendations that, in our opinion, would improve the security management
of the ID card and its ecosystem. In the last section of this chapter we list some
open issues that would benefit from a solution.
7.1. Audits and security certifications
Currently, the ID card security management mainly relies on the mandatory CA
audits and the security certifications of ID card platforms. However, this work has
highlighted several shortcomings with these security mechanisms. We discuss
these shortcomings below.
In a traditional PKI, the role of the CA is to issue certificates, keeping an audit
record which proves that the identity of the subject, to whom a certificate is issued,
has been verified, and that the public key included in the certificate is the public
key that the subject has asked to bind to their identity. These audit records help
to solve disputes, keeping CA accountable and deterring CA from abusing their
position of trust. However, in the case of the ID card, the accountability of a CA is
impaired as it is the CA itself that generates keys1 for the cardholders and chooses
which public key will be bound to a cardholder’s identity. As a result, a very high
level of trust is granted to the CA, without the ability to verify that the CA behaved
properly using the traditional audit measures.
We find that the CA compliance audits that are required by eIDAS are
superficial in their nature and only provide a very limited level of assurance. It is
best illustrated by the fact that the manufacturer’s malpractice of generating
private keys outside the ID card was discovered neither in the CA’s internal nor
the external audits over the 5-year period while it happened. Furthermore, since
the audits are episodic, they cannot provide any guarantees for what occurs
between the audits. There is also an inherent confict of interest, as the auditor is
chosen by the CA itself. The CA, of course, would be interested in purchasing
auditing services from an auditor that would provide a positive audit report with
the least effort required. We see that a number of intentional non-compliances
made by the CA were made with the auditor’s approval (Section 6.6.2.2 and
6.7.3).
According to article 20(2) of eIDAS, the supervisory body may at any time
audit or request a conformity assessment at the expense of the CA. The state,
however, takes a passive role, generally only relying on the reports of the
mandatory biennial conformity assessment audits.
1While in practice the keys are generated by the ID card manufacturer, in the context of eIDAS,
key management is the responsibility of the CA.
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Recommendation 1: In case of non-compliance the state should actively
exercise their supervisory function by performing or requiring ad hoc CA
conformity assessment audits.
The security certification is commonly used in the smart card industry to
provide assurance that the product meets certain security requirements. However,
the ITSEC certification of the MICARDO secure channel and the CC
certification of Infineon’s flawed RSA key generation algorithm show that the
certification process does not provide a complete guarantee against security
flaws. We see that the certification bodies are willing to certify products that use
proprietary cryptographic algorithms and in the event that flaws are found,
information about them fails to reach the end-users. The certification bodies are
not allowed to revoke security certificates of known flawed products, but the
issuance of a maintenance report requires the vendor’s initiative. As we saw from
the cases with the MICARDO, jTOP SLE66 and IDEMIA ID card platforms, in
practice it is also a challenge to ensure that the certified version of the product is
the one that ends up in the ID card.
While the security evaluation performed in the certification process increases
the product’s security, it limits the technical flexibility. The eIDAS requirement
that only certified products can be used will likely limit the use of innovative
technical solutions such as the remote applet updating solution that has been
successfully used in Estonia.
7.2. Supervision and legal compliance
The state currently does not supervise the security of ID card manufacturing
process. The manufacturing contract requires the delivery of a secure product,
leaving the security aspects to the ID card manufacturer. The state assumes that
the fines imposed by the manufacturing contract for delivering a defective
product will motivate the ID card manufacturer to apply the best security
measures.
We see that this assumption does not hold in practice. The ID card
manufacturer did not apply the basic security practice of diversifying the
GlobalPlatform ISD keys (Section 5.4.2.2) and in 2011 shipped a flawed
JavaCard applet whose security was not reviewed. Furthermore, imposing fines
in the event of non-compliance is not an effective measure, as a security breach
endangering national security, such as the copying of a cardholder’s private keys,
may leave no visible trace. We only discovered it by accident due to the
manufacturer’s failure to deliver unique private keys.
Recommendation 2: The state should take an active role in supervising the
security aspects of the ID card manufacturing process by requiring the
implementation of security measures that are transparent and publicly verifiable.
Preferably, the ID card technological solution should be redesigned to involve
threshold cryptography [391–393]. This would decrease the risk of accidental
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failures and ensure that intentional malice would require higher conspiracy, hence
increasing the risk of detection and attribution.
Recommendation 3: The state should look for an ID card technological
solution that is more security fault tolerant (e.g., involves threshold
cryptography).
It is necessary to make the ID card personalization protocols and security
procedures public. While this alone would not provide a way of verifying
whether the manufacturer followed them, this would allow the public to assess
whether the applied security measures are adequate.
It is common to hear that information about security measures has to be kept
secret due to security concerns. We note that if a security measure can be broken
by just knowing what the security measure is, such a measure cannot provide the
high level of security which is needed here. Such an approach of “security
through obscurity” contrasts with the widely accepted Kerckhoffs’s assumption
and Shannon’s maxim that “the enemy knows the system” and hence the security
of a system should not rely on the secrecy of its design. Usually, the actual
reason for not disclosing the measures is that there are no measures or they are
not documented, but if they are, then the measures are so poor that the
responsible party is too ashamed to disclose them to the public.
Another benefit of having the measures being made public is that it forces the
involved parties to commit to these procedures, making them aware of their
illegitimate actions in case the procedures are not followed. The trustworthiness
of the parties can then be already called into question when insignificant
deviations from the protocol are found without the need to wait until
non-compliances resulting in a tangible security impact occur.
Recommendation 4: The state should require the ID card manufacturer and
other involved parties to publish a detailed description of security procedures and
measures.
In the course of this research, we have observed numerous legal
non-compliances on different levels.
One could argue that the ability to bend the rules provides some advantages.
For example, the use of ID card platforms whose SSCD compliance had not been
assessed have allowed the state to experiment with new ID card platforms (the
NFC-enabled Digi-ID), and to quickly mitigate ID card security flaws (the
ROCA flaw). By not revoking the ID card platforms that did not satisfy SSCD
requirements (the 2011 ID cards and the cards affected by the ROCA flaw), the
state was able to make a reasonable decision to sustain the digital society at the
expense of increased security risks.
On the other hand, this loose attitude towards the compliance requirements has
created an atmosphere where the requirements (including security) are arbitrary
and left up to an individual. The decision by the authorities to approach their duty
of SSCD conformance assessments as only a formality, resulted in the ID card
manufacturer shipping flawed 2011 ID cards with an applet whose security had
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not been reviewed. Since no serious consequences followed, this created a feeling
of impunity, which reached its extreme when the ID card manufacturer made an
intentional decision to not follow the security requirements and generated ID card
private keys outside the card.
We have observed a number of cases where the ID card certificates were not
compliant with the certificate policies. Compliance violations are also frequent
issues among web browser CAs [420]. Browser vendors enforce strict policy
compliance by requiring CAs to revoke affected certificates even when
seemingly unimportant non-compliances are found. Unfortunately, applying this
model in the context of the Estonian ID card is problematic, as cardholders will
blame the state who provided a faulty ID card to them instead of the CA that
provided a defective service. We see that there is a conflict of interest as the state
is expected to supervise a CA scheme where the state itself is a stakeholder. This
would explain why the authorities do not even require the revocation of
certificates whose non-compliance result in a security risk (e.g., the case of
certificates with an incorrect @eesti.ee email address). The problem, however,
is that this approach does not motivate the parties to avoid non-compliances. As
we saw from the incident where certificates had incorrectly encoded public keys
(Section 6.6), a seemingly unimportant non-compliance can one day became a
serious issue.
Throughout this work we have observed a list of quality issues related to the
ID card manufacturing process. In several cases, the involved parties failed to find
and fix the root cause of the problem, which led to the same or a similar issue to
occur again. For instance, over the years there have been recurring issues with
the encoding of RSA public keys, handling of @eesti.ee email addresses in the
certificates and revocation of the certificates of deceased cardholders. The case
of the duplicate RSA public keys showed that the same issue had to be dealt with
repeatedly. The case of the corrupted RSA public keys showed that the warranty
ID cards were issued to cardholders without finding and fixing the cause of the
flaw and without realizing the security impact of the flaw.
This shows a systematic failure to sufficiently investigate incidents when they
occur. To ensure that every incident and quality issue related to the
manufacturing of ID cards is sufficiently investigated, the authorities should
require detailed incident reporting. For example, browser vendors require CAs to
publish detailed reports, describing how the incident was detected, the security
impact, root causes of the problem and what has been done to make sure that it
does not happen again [421, 422]. It is also important to ensure that the quality
assurance procedures developed in this process are transferred to successors,
because otherwise it may occur as in the case of transparent PIN envelopes,
where the exact same flaw was reintroduced 16 years later by another ID card
manufacturer.
Recommendation 5: The state should require the involved parties to publish
detailed incident reports, describing the root cause analysis and the measures
taken to prevent it from happening again.
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To be able to exercise its supervisory function, the state should avoid practices
that increase their dependence on a particular ID card manufacturer or CA. For
instance, the state increased its dependence on the ID card manufacturer when it
granted the ID card manufacturer the manufacturing contract for two terms
without competition. The authorities’ decision to cover up the manufacturing
flaw in the 2011 ID cards increased this interdependence even more.
The latest ID card manufacturing procurement suggests that the authorities
may have learned a lesson. We hope that the state’s decision to only provide
ID card-related services in PPA customer service points was made to decrease the
dependence on SK, in the event the certification services would one day have to
be provided by a different CA. An idea worth considering, is to give the smart
card chip manufacturing to a manufacturer other than the one manufacturing and
personalizing the plastic document.
The ID card crisis in 2017 also showed that the reliance on a single,
monocultural eID solution backed by a single CA creates a risk that endangers
the sustainability of the Estonian digital society.
Recommendation 6: The state should strive to decrease the dependence on
the ID card manufacturer and CA by encouraging an open competition and by
diversifying the technical solutions and their suppliers.
So far we have not seen fundamental changes in the organization and
execution of the ID card manufacturing process, therefore incidents like the ones
described in this work, in one form or another, are likely to occur again. We
hope, however, that the public knowledge of these incidents have changed the
perception of the ID card as being infallible. This should now allow the
construction of better security systems and legal rules which are able to deal with
potential security failures of the ID card. A good example here is Swedbank’s
internetbank, where an additional authentication factor (a relatively
unpredictable user ID) is required for ID card authentication.
Recommendation 7: Security-critical systems that rely on the ID card should
be built with the assumption that someone may have a database containing the
private keys of all Estonian residents.
7.3. Research and expert opinion
It is positive to see that the authorities are seeking expert opinions by procuring
regular Cryptographic Algorithms Lifecycle reports [96, 121, 423–425].
However, there have been ID card-related developments where the expert
opinion and analysis have been missing. For instance, the ID card’s 3DES
passphrase authentication feature was enabled and reimplemented in later
ID card platforms without analyzing the security implications and its usefulness.
The decision to generate ID card keys with a random RSA public exponent
was made without consulting cryptographers. This caused serious ID card key
generation performance issues and resulted in the ID card manufacturer’s decision
to breach the security requirements by generating keys outside the ID card.
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The decision to introduce the timestamping application TeRa was made
without understanding the implications of the weaknesses of the SHA-1
algorithm. As a result, significant resources were spent by the public and private
sector trying to solve a problem that did not exist (the risk of a second-preimage
attack against SHA-1). At the same time, the authorities still have not completely
deprecated SHA-1 as the DDOC signatures created using SHA-1 are still
accepted by the state-supplied digital signature validation software.
Recommendation 8: The authorities should gather and consider a wide range
of expert opinions before deciding on eID-related developments.
We appreciate the state’s decision to develop the ID card software using the
open-source development model, as it provides transparency and supports
contributions from the wider public. However, the development of the EstEID
chip application has always been a non-transparent activity even after RIA
became the holder of its intellectual property rights. We invite the authorities to
promote the use of open eID technological solutions, at a minimum, providing
open access to the ID card JavaCard platform such that at least black-box testing
of the platform could be performed. We note that the discovery of Infineon’s
RSA key generation flaw was only possible because the Czech researchers had
somehow obtained a sample of the affected JavaCard platform and could
experiment with it.
The fact that during this research we had to go to such great lengths to establish
basic facts (e.g., which chips were used and their capabilities), shows that more
information should be placed in the public domain to support research in this field.
Recommendation 9: In the eID-related procurements, the state should give
preference to open and transparent eID solutions and should strive to publish as
much technical documentation as possible.
7.4. Transparency about security issues
Today, the private sector relies on the ID card to secure transactions that are worth
millions, the ID card authentication is used to protect loads of sensitive personal
data, and the ID card is used by citizens to exercise their constitutional right to
elect the parliament. In this situation, the security of the ID card and the eID in
general is not the authorities’ internal issue, but the personal concern of the entire
digital society.
We have observed a number of cases where the state has not been honest with
the public. The most serious deception was in the communication of the 2011
ID card incident. The situation improved greatly in 2017 with the disclosure of
the ROCA flaw, but even there the authorities hid the CPU-year figures of the
attack and the details about the successful factorization attack performed later in
2018.
We note that the public would not have known about the incidents of
certificates with duplicate RSA public keys and certificates with corrupted RSA
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public keys had we not ourselves discovered this in the certificate data. Hence,
the list of ID card-related security incidents covered in this work may just be the
tip of the iceberg, with the other incidents being kept hidden from the public.
Complete transparency about the security issues concerning the ID card is
needed, as it is the only way the involved parties can learn from the incidents and
the public and private sector can conduct appropriate risk assessments. This
would also support research as it would allow researchers to focus on real world
issues making the research more beneficial for society.
There is a natural desire for the authorities to sweep the eID-related security
issues under the carpet as there is a fear that this will damage the reputation of the
state. However, it is a trap, as it only serves as a short-term reputation management
strategy. We hope that the Estonian society has reached the maturity level where
the digital society-related security issues can be discussed in the open.
Recommendation 10: The state should release detailed information about the
flaw in the 2011 ID cards and all other security incidents that have not been made
public. The state should define a clear transparency policy for security incidents
with the nation’s eID system.
There are worries in the Estonian society that certain government agencies may
hold a copy of the ID card private keys [426]. As our findings have shown, this
can be technically done with only a handful of people being aware of it.
There is also a concern that the state may compel the CA to issue false
certificates [427] that can be used by the intelligence agencies to covertly
intercept encrypted communications and impersonate cardholders. The Estonian
law does not explicitly forbid this.
The law does not foresee imposing criminal liability for knowingly
mishandling the security of the ID card. As we saw from the aftermath of the
incident where key were generated outside the ID card, the liability for the
ID card manufacturer and its contractors is rather limited – in the worst case only
the breach of contract action can be brought against the ID card manufacturer.
Recommendation 11: To increase the trustworthiness of the state-issued eID
solutions, the state should declare a transparent, backdoor-free policy for its
technologies. Furthermore, the law should foresee introducing criminal liability
for knowingly issuing false certificates and knowingly mishandling the security
of cardholders’ private keys (e.g., holding copies of the private key or generating
weak keys). The ideas from Certificate Transparency2 should be implemented to




7.5. Other open issues
In this work we have touched upon a list of open issues related to the ID card
ecosystem that would benefit from a solution. We summarize them below.
1. The current ID card-based encryption solution (CDOC) does not provide a
forward secrecy feature, meaning that confidentiality for the encrypted data
is only provided as long as the cardholder’s private key is not compromised
(Section 2.9).
Recommendation 12: The ID card encryption solution should be redesigned
to provide confidentiality guarantees even after the cardholder’s private key
gets compromised.
2. The current use of the ID card for authentication to a machine provides very
little security as the authenticity of the data in the personal data file is not
cryptographically protected (Section 2.12).
Recommendation 13: The state should consider equipping the ID card with
a cryptographically secure method for using it as a physical authentication
token.
3. The ID card is not protected against malware attacks even if a smart card
reader with a PIN pad and PIN firewall is used (Section 2.14.1). Currently,
we have not seen any malware exploiting this weakness, but this may
change any day.
Recommendation 14: The next generation eID solutions should work
towards solving this weakness (e.g., by introducing a next generation
ID card that has a built-in trusted display).
4. The ID card crisis in 2017 highlighted the fact that it is not clear who bears
liability for the security of the ID cards private keys.
Recommendation 15: The legal framework should be updated to provide
clear answers to the liability questions of ID card security.
5. The current certificate suspension mechanism creates a security issue
when suspension is requested by a party other than the certificate holder
(Section 6.7.3). Furthermore, the possibility of certificate suspension
allows the validity of any digital signature created with the Estonian
ID card to be challenged (Section 2.10.3).
Recommendation 16: The certificate suspension mechanism should be
deprecated and the revocation mechanism should be adjusted to
accomplish the same purpose.
6. Signing using the ID card browser extension provides a very poor
evidentiary value as the signatory is not able to see what is being signed
(Section 2.10).
Recommendation 17: The ID card browser signing extension should be
redesigned to show the content that a service provider is requesting to be
digitally signed.
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7. A complete deprecation of SHA-1 in the context of the digital signature
format DDOC has still not occurred.
Recommendation 18: The digital signature validation software should
refuse to validate recently created digital signatures that use the DDOC
format.
8. Currently there is no legally binding technical standard that would precisely
describe the validation rules of a digital signature.
Recommendation 19: To provide legal certainty for digital signature
validity the authorities should actively engage in the creation of a digital
signature validation standard that complies with the digital signature legal
requirements set by eIDAS.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have shown that over the two decades of the existence of the
Estonian ID card, the ID card and its ecosystem have experienced various faults
and security issues in different parts of the ecosystem.
We put forward three concluding statements that should summarize the
answer to our work’s second research question on how sufficiently the technical,
organizational and managerial mechanisms address the ID card related security
challenges:
1. Security audits and security certifications of the ID card components are
not able to guarantee security and enforce compliance. The findings of
this work have shown that the audit mechanisms used have catastrophically
failed, as they could not discover serious non-compliances in the ID card
personalization process over the 5 years while it happened. Similarly, we
have seen that the security certifications of the ID card components are not
enough to guarantee that security flaws are not present in these components.
We propose that instead of relying on organizational security measures that
are difficult to audit and enforce, the security of the ID card should rely on a
more fault-tolerant design. Such designs can be invented and implemented
but require further research and interest from the involved parties.
2. There is a systematic failure to sufficiently investigate incidents and learn
the lessons. The findings of this work show that the involved parties have
repeatedly failed to sufficiently investigate incidents to understand their
security impact, scale, root causes, and implement measures that would
prevent similar incidents in the future. The incident reporting (if it is
present at all) is not transparent. Furthermore, the impartiality of the state’s
supervisory function is greatly encumbered as the state is also directly
responsible for the development of the solutions under its supervision.
3. Greater transparency, openness and expert involvement is needed.
Throughout this research, we have encountered difficulties obtaining some
rather basic technical information, especially on issues concerning the
card. Similarly, the state has not released information regarding the
ID card incident in 2011 and other security issues that have not emerged to
the public. We have seen that in some cases, the involved parties rely on
the flawed “security by obscurity” approach, which eventually makes life
more difficult for the defenders rather than the attackers. We have also
found that some ID card related developments have missed sufficient
expert opinion and security analysis, which has introduced security issues.
We call for greater transparency and openness, as it can increase security
by encouraging research in this field and allowing the participants of the
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SISUKOKKUVÕTE
Eesti elektrooniline ID-kaart ja selle turvaväljakutsed
Eesti elektrooniline isikutunnistus (ID-kaart) on Eesti kodanikele pakkunud
turvalist elektroonilist identiteeti üle 18 aasta. See on olnud turvalise
elektroonilise autentimise ja õiguslikult siduvate digitaalallkirjade tehnoloogiline
nurgakivi. ID-kaart on võimaldanud turvalist identifitseerimist erinevates
e-teenustes, kõige ambitsioonikam neist on valimised interneti teel. Eesti
ID-kaardi kasutuselevõtt algas 2002. aastal ja seda peetakse levitamise ja aktiivse
kasutamise aspektist üheks edukamaks kiipkaardipõhiste riiklike
ID-kaardisüsteemide juurutamiseks maailmas.
Käesolevas töös uuritakse põhjalikult Eesti ID-kaarti ning sellega seotud
turvaväljakutseid. Käsitleme teemat ulatuslikult, kuna ID-kaardi turvalisus sõltub
lisaks kiibis olevast krüptograafilisest funktsionaalsusest ka selle kasutamisviisist
ja kogu selle ümber ehitatud ökosüsteemi turvalisusest. See töö põhineb avalikult
kättesaadaval dokumentatsioonil, meedias kajastatud teabel, kaasatud osapoolte
teabel ning meie enda analüüsil ja selles valdkonnas tehtud katsetel. Oluline
andmekogum, mida kasutati meie enda andmete valideerimiseks ja
analüüsimiseks, oli aastate jooksul kogunenud ID-kaardi avaliku võtme
sertifikaatide kogu ID-kaardi avaliku sertifikaatide hoidlast. Lõputöö on
kirjutatud monograafia stiilis ning võtab lühidalt kokku ja viitab meie lõputöö
lõpus loetletud originaalväljaannetele.
Selle töö esimene panus on anda põhjalik ülevaade Eesti ID-kaardist ja sellega
seotud aspektidest. Töös käsitletakse praktilisi aspekte, teadmisi ja nüansse, mida
pole eelnevalt mujal käsitletud. Oluline panus on ka teemaga seotud õiguslik ja
ajalooline kontekst. Avastasime selle töö kirjutamise käigus mitmeid õiguslikke
rikkumisi ja tõime välja Common Criteria sertifitseerimissmeemi puudused. See
töö võib olla lähtepunkt teadlastele, kes on huvitatud Eesti ID-kaardist ja selle
ökosüsteemist.
Selle töö teine panus on detailne ülevaade Eesti ID-kaardi tehnoloogilistest
platvormidest (kiipkaardi kiibiversioonidest) ja vastavatest isikut tõendavate
dokumentide tüüpidest. Iga platvormi jaoks esitatakse ID-kaardi elektroonilise
funktsionaalsuse rakendamiseks kasutatava tehnoloogilise lahenduse kirjeldus ja
kiipkaardi mikrokontrolleri fotod ning vastavate isikut tõendavate dokumentide
näidiste fotod. Oleme analüüsinud iga platvormi pakutavat krüptograafilist
funktsionaalsust, selle toimivusomadusi ja vastavust standarditele. Rakendades
erinevaid musta kasti analüüsimeetodeid, oleme osaliselt taastanud platvormide
rakendatud RSA võtmete genereerimise algoritmid. Leidsime, et mitme
ID-kaardi platvormi puhul ei vasta ID-kaardi tootjate tarnitud kiibid ametlikus
spetsifikatsioonis määratletud sertifitseeritud versioonile.
Eesti ID-kaardi puhul on kasutatud ainulaadseid tehnilisi lahendusi, mis on
võimaldanud ID-kaardi omanikel oma kaartidel olevaid andmeid ja tarkvara
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Interneti kaudu kauguuenduse kaudu ajakohastada. Oleme selles töös
dokumenteerinud ja analüüsinud selle funktsionaalsuse rakendamiseks kasutatud
protokolle. Selle tulemusena oleme leidnud, et ITSEC-i sertifitseeritud turvalise
sõnumivahetuse protokollil on krüptograafiline puudus, mis võimaldas läbi viia
teesklusrünnakuid ja GlobalPlatformi turvalise sõnumivahetuse protokolli
juurutamisel jäi märkamata oraakli täidise haavatavus, mis võimaldas
teabevahetuse dekrüpteerida. Need leiud on aidanud kauguuenduse lahenduse
turvalisust parandada ja loodame, et see töö on kasulik viide tulevaste ID-kaardi
kaugvärskenduslahenduste väljatöötamiseks.
Selle töö veel üks panus on üksikasjalik ülevaade minevikus toimunud Eesti
ID-kaardi turvaintsidentidest. Toimunud sündmused on rekonstrueeritud avalikest
allikatest leitud teabekildude põhjal. Kui see oli võimalik, kogusime täiendavat
teavet, võttes ühendust asjaomaste osapooltega ja analüüsides meie sertifikaatide
andmekogumit ning tehes ise analüüse ja katseid. Oleme pingutanud intsidentide
põhjuste ja tagajärgede kindlakstegemiseks ning kaasatud poolte reageeringute
ja avaliku suhtluse kajastamiseks. Töös leidub mitmeid uudseid järeldusi ja see
võib olla aluseks juhtumitest täiendavate õppetundide saamiseks. Eesti ID-kaardi
kogemus annab teistele üleriigilist avaliku võtme taristut rakendavatele riikidele
põhjaliku ülevaate tekkida võivatest probleemidest.
Avastasime selle töö käigus erineva raskusastmega turvaprobleeme. Kõige
olulisemad avastused, mis on seotud võtmehalduse turvavigadega, on kaasa
toonud reaalse mõju, näiteks ID-kaartide tagasikutsumise ja kohtuprotsessi
ID-kaartide tootja Gemalto vastu.
Ehkki see pole selle töö peamine eesmärk, oleme teinud laiahaardelisemaid
järeldusi ja pakkunud välja soovitusi, mida saab kasutada sisendina ID-kaardi
turvalisuse korraldamisega seotud poliitikamuudatuste tegemiseks.
Selle töö sisu on jagatud seitsmeks peatükiks:
• 1. peatükis tutvustatakse teemat lühidalt, tuuakse välja selle töö panused ja
lõputöö ülesehitus.
• 2. peatükis tutvustatakse muuhulgas Eesti ID-kaardi ökosüsteemi, andes
ülevaate: isikutest, kes on seotud ID-kaardi tootmise, väljastamise ja
järelevalvega; ID-kaardi põhilisest elektroonilisest funktsionaalsusest ja
sellega seotud juriidilistest mõistetest; autentimisest, dekrüpteerimisest ja
digitaalse allkirjastamise kasutamisest ning sellega seotud probleemidest;
seotud tugikomponentidest, näiteks kiipkaardilugejad ja ID-kaardi
tarkvara; sertifikaatidest, avalikust sertifikaatide hoidlast ja @eesti.ee
e-posti aadressist; ning ID-kaardi ja selle sertifikaatide elutsüklist.
• 3. peatükk tutvustab aastate jooksul kasutusel olnud ID-kaardi platvorme
(kiipkaardi kiibiversioone) kronoloogiliselt ja isikut tõendavate
dokumentide tüüpe, mis nendele platvormidele väljastatud on.
• 4. peatükis kirjeldatakse üksikasjalikult iga ID-kaardi platvormi pakutavat
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asümmeetrilise krüptograafia funktsionaalsust. Analüüsides võtmete
omadusi ja krüptograafiliste toimingute ajastusteavet, püüdsime taastada
igal platvormil kasutatavate asümmeetriliste krüptograafia algoritmide
rakendusdetailid. Leidsime, et igal platvormil rakendati krüptograafilisi
algoritme väikeste erinevustega.
• 5. peatükis kirjeldatakse ID-kaardi kauguuenduse lahendusi ja sellega
seotud turvaanalüüsi. Toome välja turvalised sõnumivahetuse protokollid,
mida kaardihaldustoimingute tarbeks kasutatakse ja kirjeldame
kauguuendamise lahendusi, mida on kasutatud iga ID-kaardi platvormi
jaoks.
• 6. peatükis on välja toodud turvaintsidentide ja teiste sarnaste probleemide
loetelu, millega Eesti ID-kaart aastate jooksul kokku puutunud on. Mõnest
selles peatükis loetletud ja meie poolt töö kirjutamise käigus leitud
probleemist on ka asjaomastele osapooltele teada antud.
• 7. peatükis kirjeldatakse käesoleva töö tulemusi laiemalt ning esitatakse
loetelu soovitustest, mis meie arvates võiksid tugevdada Eesti ID-kaardi ja
selle ökosüsteemi turvalisust.
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